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This thesis thinks deeply about what clouds mean to us, first through the 
identification of a paradigmatic ‘cloud concept’ that is brought into play by 
economists and engineers of the cloud computing industries, before moving 
to identify the historical interlocutors of this cloud concept within art, 
literature, poetry, theory and theatre and performance. The cloud computing 
industries are contributors to greenhouse gases, responsible for at least 2% 
of carbon emissions. The service-oriented architecture of these industries, 
which allows “users” to deposit data in remote databanks and access this 
data from mobile devices in disparate locations, depends on outsourcing 
labour through biocapital arrangements that generate vital energy from 
displaced migrant workforces in the US and dislocated populations in the 
global South. Digital capitalism abstracts economic flexibility from a 
disposable workforce that live in a secured state of precarity. This thesis 
takes the cloud computing industries as an emblematic sociotechnology, 
through which global populations are mediated into these economic 
relations. 
This thesis has henceforth sought to interrogate how a system of 
exploitation could be sustained behind the icon of a cloud. According with 
this central aim, this thesis unfolds upon an interrogation of the deep 
conceptual history of the cloud concept, written against the notion of a ‘total 
history,’ following Michel Foucault’s ‘general history’ in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (1969) or Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy’ in On the 




disciplines in the history of ideas, seeking disruptive moments that can 
displace the contemporary valorisation of clouds as environmental forms. 
The decentring move that is driving this historical method puts my work in 
dialogue with Kalindi Vora, Life Support: Biocapital and the New History 
of Outsourced Labor (2015), Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: 
Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (2004) and Joan Martinez-
Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Environmental 
Conflicts and Valuation (2002). These writers have narrated the 
discontinuous history of environmental values by way of mapping those 
values through the appalling co-ordinates of global structures of biocapital. 
My work similarly decentres our conceptual frameworks for thinking about 
clouds, by locating historical moments where ideas about them seem to stem 
not from deep meditation “on” or “about” the “truth” of the “ecology,” but 
from gendered and racialised operations of social ostracism, modes of 
biocapital abstraction, and the dialectics of bestiality and sacralisation, 
primitivism and value-conferral, to recapitulate the economic relations of 
gendered and racial capitalism. Therefore, I attempt to deconstruct the cloud 
concept as an environmental value claiming to be the summation of a long 
history of “humans” relating to the skies, where in actual fact it services a 
global model of capital accumulation by dispossession. Overall, the thesis 
hopes to displace its readers’ way of looking at the skies via dispersing 
static concepts about clouds. The thesis seeks to rescind the conceptual 
assumptions through which we perceive clouds as tearing and forming. 




patterns of life, an image of ecological orchestration. Dissolving this illusion 




TEARING AND FORMING 




Preface to Style and Structure....................................................p.8 
 
Introduction................................................................................p.29 
The conceptual history of the ecology.........................................p.32 
The cloud concept........................................................................p.55 
1960s CLOUD, or Silver Kool-Aid Acid Gas Becomings..........p.62 
Chapter One: Gathering...........................................................p.111 
The anthropological project of reading Aristotle’s Poetics.........p.127 
Aristotle’s Poetics and Meteorologica........................................p.150 
Chapter Two: Pockets...............................................................p.167 
Informationalisation, or clouds in Michel Serres........................p.181 
The colonial mechanisation of clouds.........................................p.200 
Labouring clouds within art machines........................................p.213 
Chapter Three: Elastic Flocks..................................................p.225 
Primitivism and clouds as the “zero degree”...............................p.236 
The creative self-discipline of elasticity......................................p.265 
Erotophobic objects of desire......................................................p.283 
  







Sacha Matulovich, ‘5 big reasons everything is moving to the cloud’, 
Memeburn, 29 Oct 2017 
Amy Balkin, Public Smog, NOx gas trade registrations, 2004–ongoing 
Amy Balkin, Public Smog, Los Angeles, 2004–ongoing 
HeHe, Nuage Vert, installation, light and industrial pollution, 2008 
Andy Warhol, Silver Balloons (1966) 
HeHe, Nuage Vert aura-t-il lieu, silkscreen print, 66 x 46 cm (2009) 
anon. La lutte continue, activist poster (1968) 
Martin Creed, Half the air in a given space (1998) 
Pieter Engels, [Wolke,] Zeevang Collective (1975) 




Preface to Style and Structure 
 
Every act of writing begins with a reader. A thought-figure at their origin, 
this reader tells the writer how to become who they are in their writing; this 
reader shapes, shades and silhouettes the linguistic being of things. It is in 
this sense that a reader alters, forms and deforms processes of linguistic 
formation, thereby disclosing the reader as, to echo Walter Benjamin, the 
‘foundation of every insight into questions of style’.1 In this same fragment, 
Benjamin confirms the way readers legislate a writer’s actions: 
 
A good writer––and here we must be careful if we wish to arrive at any 
real insight––is a writer who does not say more than he thinks. This 
definition will probably be read as a request for “clear and simple writing”; 
people will imagine that a good writer is one who says exactly what he 
thinks. But it is this obvious inference that must be avoided at all costs. 
The foundation of every insight into questions of style is the realization 
that there is no such thing as “saying what you think.”2  
 
Benjamin describes the relational quality of writing, as if hung or threaded 
between imagined-reader and, so far as they have not yet begun writing, 
imagined-writer. Throughout their joint manifestation, their coming into 
being, there is no communication in what happens under the writer’s hand. 
There is only the commencement of language forming in the thought-figure 
																																																								
1 Walter Benjamin, ‘May––June 1931’, Selected Writings, vol. 2, 1927–
1934, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Others, ed. by Howard Eiland, 




of the reader, this shape that induces every potential linguistic movement, as 
a mark upon a page. 
Benjamin brings clarity to the act of writing, divulging the futility of 
any effort to say what one thinks as a writer. Alternately, he propounds that 
a writer should imagine the reader with whom she does not want to speak. 
This person exists on the peripheries of her thoughts but they belong at the 
centre of any act of writing. There is just no “telling” this reader – there is 
simply no such thing as “saying what you think” to this reader – and as 
such, this reader makes the act of speaking truly worthwhile, clarifying the 
thoughts that we possess through forcing, as the foundation and the focus of 
each linguistic means, each act of writing. 
How can I place this reader centrefold in the following work? This 
preface addresses questions of style, before the commencement of the 
thesis. I worry that a resistant or reluctant reader might misinterpret the 
“conceptual history”, and believe this work to offer a new conceptualisation 
of history as a given medium in which we can find examples of clouds. 
Further, I worry this work will be erroneously read as if adopting an 
archival register, as if collating materials “about” or “on” clouds through the 
apparent coherence of chronology or time. These are very real concerns that 
cut to the centre of the critical outlay of the following work. As will be seen, 
the project is about deconstructing the way that time is compressed into 
clouds as ecological objects, as already existing within and communicated 
through an archival register. Clouds as concepts are arrangements of history, 
in so far as they are collations of text, painting, image, philosophy and 




means negotiating the way that concept is fabricated, in order to disturb or 
perturb any apparent cohesion of that fabrication. Written against the 
coherence of collective meaning the conceptual history follows Michel 
Foucault’s general history in his revision of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
genealogy, driving toward discontinuity, decentring and dispersion.3 In the 
context of ecological concepts, I have brought this mode of attention to bear 
on clouds as objects with collective meaning, whilst attending to a 
continuum of expropriation and dispossession. 
In thinking about this continuum of expropriation and dispossession, 
I have been gripped by one particular passage where Karl Marx describes 
‘So-Called Primitive Accumulation’, in the final section of Volume One 
(1867) of Capital: 
 
In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than are the 
means of production and of subsistence. They want transforming into 
capital. But this transformation itself can only take place under certain 
circumstances that centre in this, viz., that two very different kinds of 
commodity-possessors must come face to face and into contact; on the one 
hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence, 
who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying other 
people’s labour power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers of their 
own labour power, and therefore the sellers of labour. Free labourers, in 
the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the 
																																																								
3 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discourse on 
Language, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. by 
Carol Diethe, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Political Thought, ed. by Raymond Geuss and Quentin Skinner 




means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the 
means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; 
they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production 
of their own.  
[...] 
The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the labourers 
from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour. As 
soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains 
this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale.4 
 
Marx describes a process of primitive accumulation that is foundational to 
capital. However, it is vital to resist the overly historicist reading that might 
thus position slavery as an outmoded labour regime, or to think of land 
appropriation as a historical stage that pre-dates an antecedent narrative of 
globalisation.5 As Nikhil Pal Singh underscores, what Marx calls primitive 
accumulation aligns with what he elsewhere calls the ‘premature death’ of 
‘veiled slavery,’ meaning that in every procedure of capital life is seized 
into what Orlando Patterson termed the ‘social death’ of the dispossessed.6 
In each phase of globalisation, the ‘most violent aspects of primitive 
accumulation’, as Silvia Federici writes, including the ‘continuous 
expulsion of farmers from the land, war and plunder on a world scale, and 
																																																								
4 Karl Marx, ‘So-Called Primitive Accumulation’, Capital, vol. 1, trans. by 
Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. by Frederick Engels (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), pp.507–549, p.507. 
5 Nikhil Pal Singh, ‘On Race, Violence and So-Called Primitive 
Accumulation’, Social Text 128, 34.3 (2016) 27–50. 
6 Singh, ‘On Race, Violence and So-Called Primitive Accumulation’ (p.29). 
Cf. Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p.381 (pt.3, ch.10); p.925 (pt.8, ch.31). Orlando 
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, 




the degradation of women’ continue to serve as necessary conditions for the 
existence of capital.7 Without transforming bodies into disposable units of 
energy and thereby dispossessing those bodies of any right they have over 
their land and their life, capital would be inoperable as relations of 
production. 
My work is invested in critically interrogating the environment as a 
medium for this power of capital to disfigure bodies and abstract 
populations from their land. I have wanted to understand the way that a 
discontinuous history of clouds might fit into the continually extending 
scale of separation and dispossession. I have wanted to understand the way 
that an ecological concept could serve to separate people from land, from 
the construct of “the human,” and from the civil liberties and legislative 
rights that ecological embeddedness and humanity bring.  
On these grounds, the mode of attention that this work embodies is 
one of tentative advance and retreat. In the introduction, I diagnose a 
paradigmatic cloud concept at work in the present, particularly identifiable 
in the visual metaphors that proliferate around “cloud computing”. Through 
the chapters, I will advance through materials that appear to confirm or 
substantiate the way that clouds are being conceived paradigmatically in the 
present. Doing so brings depth to the ideas that circulate in the computing 
industries and which, as I argue, extend into the arts, media studies, and to 
such organisations as the Cloud Appreciation Society. The structure of the 
chapters could be mistaken as operating on the language developed for 
																																																								
7 Silvia Federici, ‘Introduction’, Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body 





clouds through the computing industries, as if these chapters historicise the 
ideas grounding that phenomenon. Instead, this work aims to ask why we 
possess the epistemic frameworks for clouds that are brought into play by 
the visual metaphors of the computing industries, and to what end these 
metaphors or symbols circulate. As a mode of attention that modulates 
between ontology and symbol, this has involved contemplation, 
appreciation and critical self-reflection.  
Appreciating the cloud concept has brought me to reflect upon how 
normalised it has become to contemplate clouds as fanciful, unstable, non-
objects, in which shapes or “things” can be identified. The idea of a “little 
white fluffy cloud” suggests a cartoon-like emblem of day-dreaming, and 
looking at and thinking about clouds feels like an act poised between this 
playful mode of attention and a more serious appreciation of the sublimity 
of nature––its ability to produce “beautiful” and “infinite” forms. Looking 
up at clouds, one feels oneself becoming aware that these forms vary 
infinitely but repeat, globally and temporally, that clouds have “always 
been” in the sky above “humans”. This gives way to a sense of 
connectedness––as if looking at clouds is sharing in something 
“fundamental” or “ancestral”.  
Putting a critical frame around this mode of attention meant 
questioning the conception of clouds as human, infinite and drifting 
concepts. This became a constant balancing act between seeing the concept 
as it first appeared, and appreciating what I brought to it as a researcher and 




design. The mode of writing was intended to engage my reader in the same, 
subtle balance of attention. 
Underpinned by this mode of attention, the forthcoming work has 
been haunted by stylistic questions. I have been absorbed by the question of 
how best to communicate the knot of reality and imagination, when thinking 
about the concepts, metaphors and symbols that extend in and beyond an 
industry such as cloud computing. How can I stand my reader beside me 
and hold between us a cloud (a concept) through which we can both 
perceive the forces that architect that concept as “natural” form? 
I want to align this mode of attention to Critical Thought and 
Literary Studies. As Jonathan Culler states, the writing of criticism matters 
because it places demands of otherness on thought.8 In keeping with that 
thought, the performance of critical writing is never secondary to the 
practice of research. Writing produces a discipline and all of its particular 
modes of operating, inasmuch as institutional entities like universities, 
architectural places like buildings, and systematic segmentarities like 
departments, institutes and research divisions, produce allegiances, spheres 
of understanding, and fidelity to fields. In literary studies, we cannot help 
but begin our acts of writing as questions of style, and we cannot help but 
begin stylistic questions with queries regarding language: What words 
belong in this piece of writing? What is the discourse of my intellectual 
forbearers and my institutional colleagues? Where are those insistent and 
indispensable areas of my thinking that extend beyond this discourse? The 
																																																								
8 Jonathan Culler, ‘The Literary in Theory’, What’s Left of Theory?, ed. by 
Judith Butler, John Guillory, and Kendall Thomas (London: Routledge, 




literary critic is devoted to such auto-interrogative questions about language. 
Every literary study thus happens in and about language. Every word 
claimed by literary studies is so because it critically regards the discourse it 
is given to work within. 
In this conception of literary studies, I recollect the language-
philosophical dialectical project of critical theory, and do so in order to 
align literary studies with the theorists of the Frankfurt School. This 
Institute for Social Research pioneered the dialectical critique of the objects 
and customs of mass culture, holding all social and aesthetic practice under 
the light of Marxist-Leninist theories (theories that they also held with 
critical regard). These thinkers challenged systems of thinking by producing 
radically divergent and unconventional objects of criticism, using swerving 
sentences exhibiting the uncanny employment of syntax – placing words in 
weird arrangements that confront their readers with an unfamiliar literary 
textual surface.  
The Frankfurt School thus transformed the page-plane into a site for 
performance, where they might stage their radically divergent ideas in 
language.9 Walter Benjamin, in his oft-quoted essay, ‘The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, simultaneously exposes and 
reassesses the effects of mass culture, discovering the radical political 
reserves of art’s objecthood in the mechanical reproducibility of cultural 
objects. For Benjamin, the objects of art parasitically draw their worth from 
																																																								
9 For the page as a site of performance, see Ric Allsopp and Kevin Mount 




a ritualistic system that values authenticity.10 Contrary to this, reproducible 
art objects do not need to be seen as authentic in order to be seen as art 
objects. These objects thus possess the political efficacy to resist cultural 
systems typically conferring value on art.  
It is my contention that we cannot appreciate this ability to rethink 
the political efficacy of artistic objects, and that indeed, we will entirely 
miss Benjamin’s ability to review Marxism-Leninism with this thinking, 
unless we simultaneously appreciate his thoughts on ‘linguistic being’, as 
described in his essay ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of 
Man’.11 In this essay, Benjamin privileges language as a shared medium of 
animate and inanimate nature. By implication, language no longer serves as 
an instrument of human communication, but exists as the constitutive 
medium in which humans and things together partake. 
These thoughts about language are indissolubly tied to Benjamin’s 
thoughts about art objects. The immediacy of language allows things to 
partake in the linguistic constitution of reality, insofar as language-things 
overthrow the privileged position of the speaking human subject. Admitted 
into the material realm of objects, with no need for the act of writing or 
speaking, language itself comes to resist any ostensible ‘subject’ / ‘object’ 
divide upholding the privileging of human communication. In its 
																																																								
10 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. by Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp.217–252. 
11, Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, 
Selected Writings, vol. 1, 1913-1926, ed. by Marcus Bullock and Michael 
W. Jennings (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1996), pp.62–74, p.63. In thinking about this essay from Benjamin, I remain 
cognisant of Hito Steyerl, ‘The Language of Things’, Transversal 06/06: 
Under Translation, an imprint of the European Institute for Progressive 




materiality, language ceases to partake in objectivity. Language rather 
achieves what Jon Erickson would term, ‘objecthood that by resisting 
reduction to easily consumed sign value gives rise to a process of unfolding 
meaning through the act of contemplation’.12 To echo the closing words of 
‘The Work of Art’, for the first time in world history, language emancipates 
things from their parasitical dependence on communication. From a ‘thing’ 
one can fashion any number of words; to ask for the 'authentic' word makes 
no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable 
to communication the total function of language is reversed. Instead of 
being based on truth, clarity and correspondence, it begins to be based on 
another practice – politics.13 
Much as concepts are the political medium of critical argumentation 
in the forthcoming work, language was, for the Frankfurt School, the 
political medium of critique. Contemplating language in its present is a 
political act, because language unfolds into a privileged history through that 
act of contemplation. This is why language was so important to the 
Frankfurt School, not as an object of study, but as a medium of work. In the 
hands of Benjamin, the labour of writing is an act of contemplating 
language, of critically enquiring: What is and isn’t included in the language 
of the polis? The works of Theodor Adorno are likewise inflected by this 
question of how style can rupture the given medium of thought. Inevitably, 
there is a kind of self-questioning insomnia to this mode of thinking: an 
																																																								
12 Jon Erickson, ‘The Fate of the Object in the Modern World’, The Fate of 
the Object: From Modern Object to Postmodern Sign in Performance, Art 
and Poetry (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp.1–45, 
pp.31–2. 




inability to rest for the need to challenge what Judith Butler terms ‘tacit 
presumptions’, unrelentingly working to overhaul these, to ‘provoke new 
ways of looking at a familiar world’.14 Butler here echoes Adorno, whose 
Minima Moralia constantly aphoristically surges toward yet resists defining 
the insurmountable task of critical theory. It is paradoxical: ‘our perspective 
of life has passed into an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life 
no longer’.15 It is enigmatic: ‘perspectives must be fashioned that displace 
and estrange the world’.16 Its truths approach contradiction: ‘only at a 
remove from life can the mental life exist’.17  
These procedures indicate just how incredibly static Benjamin and 
Adorno are capable of making language, even when it is on the move. In 
Benjamin’s hands, language does not have a function: it is going nowhere, 
producing nothing. Yet from here Benjamin allows the reality of things to 
proliferate through our linguistic contemplation of their being. In Adorno’s 
hands, the function of language is to swerve from and displace the common 
sense understanding, in order to realise the indispensable veracity of their 
being beyond our thoughts. Our want to translate these writers attests to the 
lasting efficacy of these critical repudiations. We want to draw Adorno into 
the sensical, just as we want to seize upon the interrupted surface of 
Benjamin’s essays. 
																																																								
14 Judith Butler, ‘A ‘Bad Writer’ Bites Back’, New York Times (20 March 
1999). 
15 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Dedication’, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a 
Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), pp.15–20, 
p.15. 
16 Adorno, ‘Finale’, Minima Moralia, pp.247–9, p.247. 




In this thesis, my concern for concepts bears an affinity to these 
writers and their beliefs, whilst I relate expansively to the concept of 
“language” and “style”, through the structure, field, discipline and design of 
this work. While the Frankfurt School were struck by a revelation of 
language, I have been equally struck by the way concepts constitute our 
lived reality. I am interested in contemplating this concept-being of the 
ecology. I want to bring those concepts into objecthood, so that they might 
resist reduction to ‘easily consumed sign value’, giving rise to a ‘process of 
unfolding meaning through the act of contemplation’.18 
And so the stylistic question of this work is how to rupture or 
displace these environmental forms whilst leaving them intact so that we 
might learn through them. This stylistic question is not just about how to 
write the work and what lexical choices to make in its composition, but 
about how the entire project is composed, and the message of the structure 
and form of the work. In this, I am reminded of Gregory L. Ulmer’s essay 
‘The Object of Post-Criticism’, where he questions whether the academic 
essay can stage an avant-garde collage/montage revolution in representation, 
injecting into the discourse of knowledge the ‘anamorphosis’ of the object 
of study.19 For Ulmer, it is Roland Barthes (1915–1980) who first proposes 
the anamorphic object of post-criticism by compacting poetry and criticism 
into one writing of style, in defence of his Racine book.20 The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines anamorphosis as ‘a distorted projection or 
																																																								
18 Erickson, ‘The Fate of the Object in the Modern World’, pp.31–32. 
19 Gregory L. Ulmer, ‘The Object of Post-Criticism’, Postmodern Culture, 
ed. by Hal Foster (London: Pluto Press, 1985), pp.83–110. 
20 Ulmer, ‘The Object of Post-Criticism’. Cf. Roland Barthes, On Racine, 




drawing of anything, so made that when viewed from a particular point, or 
by reflection from a suitable mirror, it appears regular and properly 
proportioned; a deformation’.21 The anamorphic object has been deformed, 
and this deformation can only be undone by adopting a very particular 
perspective upon the object. I might add that this idea of deformation is 
itself perspectival. The regular and proper proportion of objects is itself a 
question of perspective. Rather, the object is differently formed from 
different positions. The incentive of post-criticism is move toward an 
interpretation of the object as formed, as most properly thought of as 
regulated or proportioned. 
I hope by now to have made transparent that the content of this work 
is not the most important feature. Granted, the peculiarity of this project has 
afforded me the opportunity to visit and cross-reference some unexpected 
materials.	 I spent time in the Library of Congress with the rare documents 
from the Fluxus Happening “Zeevang”, I worked with Tate archivists 
looking at Turner’s sketchbooks and finance ledgers, and Constable’s cloud 
studies. I also hunted down clouds in contemporary theory. Doing so, I was 
shocked by the amount of available material. I found multiple examples of 
theorists working with clouds from the 1960s onwards, complemented by 
contemporary writers in eco-criticism, or artists in eco-art working with 
clouds. And of course, cloud computing emerged simultaneous with when I 
was starting this project––a simultaneity that had to be seen as instrumental 
in my decision to take up this topic. The Cloud Appreciation Society was 
																																																								
21 "anamorphosis, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. 




growing. The BBC wanted to make radio shows with me. My friends 
wanted to buy me cloud mugs and cloud t-shirts.  
This produced a very conflicting experience, where I would attend a 
conference and tell people about my PhD and they would tell me how 
weird, unusual and interesting it was, whilst rarely would a day go by when 
I would not receive some kind of ephemera in the post from a friend or an 
article, photo or link relating to clouds on an email. I would look at all of 
this material and find the same ideas regurgitated again and again. The idea 
of clouds as fleeting, the idea of clouds as communal, shared forms. This 
experience made me sit back and look at my own project with a more 
critical eye, asking: why am I writing about clouds? Why is anyone writing 
about clouds? What has led us all to this topic? Why clouds? 
 I was reluctant to use the university as a setting in which to valorise 
the paradigm of clouds, without inflecting my work with a self-reflexive 
question of “Why clouds?” I was reluctant to lend institutional bearing to 
the emergence of clouds as paradigmatic concept. The question “what is 
your thesis about?”, which I continuously encountered during this doctoral 
project, shortly followed by the response “clouds? That’s so interesting and 
unusual”, seemed to me poised to perform this unwanted function of 
institutional valorisation. This question of content is a locutionary act 
performed by the inquisitor, with an illocutionary intent of ascertaining the 




proliferate an ideology of objectivity.22 On this matter, Jacques Derrida 
writes: 
 
what [a pedagogical institution] cannot bear, is for anyone to tamper with 
language[...] It can bear more readily the most apparently revolutionary 
ideological sorts of ‘content,’ if only that content does not touch the 
borders of language and of all the juridico-political contracts that it 
guarantees.23  
 
To treat the content as if independent from the style of a work seeks to 
confer the value of objectivity on the labour of writing. This proposition 
contractually binds the writer to the ideology of objectivity. This ideology 
of objectivity restricts the discourse of knowledge from approaching the 
anamorphosis of objects. It proffers that we share in thought an object of 
clear dimensions: points, angles and sides, paused in space and time, 
advancing through critique, devoid of any linguistic realities. For Derrida, 
the binary that subordinates style to content sustains the university as 
institutional form through the continuity of objects of study that do not 
disrupt norms of understanding. 
A reflection such as Derrida’s made this preface appear necessary, as 
I obviously needed to make clear from the outset whether or not this work 
“tampers” with the institutional code set out for a doctoral thesis. In 
																																																								
22 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd edn, ed. by J.O. Urmson 
and Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
23 Jacques Derrida, ‘Living On/Borderlines’, trans. by James Hulbert, in 
Harold Bloom, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey H. Hartman, J. 
Hillis Miller, Deconstruction and Criticism (London: Routledge & Kegan 




contemplating clouds as concepts, I draw from science, literature, theatre 
and performance, art, history and philosophy. How I move through these 
materials varies from case to case, even to the extent that I move into and 
out of the language of these fields. This may perturb or even upset scholars 
who feel a doctoral thesis works within a given field and template to allow a 
given form of depth on a particular topic. I would contest that this work 
follows the concept it seeks to examine, and that that concept has its own 
depths, as much historical as conceptual. Following this concept meant 
reconfiguring some of the established procedures in place in universities, 
prescribing the form in which a doctoral thesis should appear. That is, 
writing this work was a balance between attending to the specificities of 
materials and the schools of thought around them, and pursuing, analysing 
and overhauling a concept. This might at times mean overlooking certain 
paradigms or normative codes of reading in place in the different fields that 
I touch upon, and I do so in order to be able to stage a continuous and 
rigorous critique of the question at hand. 
In the main, I wanted to avoid “building” a pre-established concept 
of clouds by drawing from different fields in order to valorise that concept. 
This would be to value a system whereby my object of study became a 
fetishistic object of pre-determined ways of knowing.  The university can 
perform as a space for overhauling these determined ways of knowing, not 
lending them institutional weight. The university can be where we ask 
questions of style. Without asking these questions of style, we are left 
looking toward a semblance of the things we are studying. The more we ask 




such labour is of perfect theoretical dimensions. It is an object of ideal 
objectivity, as it does not exist beyond our programmed means, imploring 
us to institutionally dispose this writing one way or another.  
I should be equally transparent about the critical genealogy of this 
thesis and the lines of thought to which the work is committed. This 
amounts to how I use the word “capital”. I use “capital” to imply an 
operation of accumulation by dispossession, originally outlined by Marx 
and since built upon by the likes of Harvey, Tadiar, Federici and Vora. 
Accumulation by dispossession is a centralised concept of capital that 
allows for speaking about economic relations of production of both local 
and global dimensions. These structures, posit complex concatenations of 
human and nonhumans that optimise the potential for surplus value 
generation. Where possible I have used sociological research that exposes 
the relations of production driving the acceleration of the cloud computing 
industries to bring historical specificity to this centralised concept of 
“capital”, which otherwise appears as an abstract argument about the 
mechanisation and command of the environment and the social into a 
machine for producing and re-producing wealth. This centralised concept of 
capital has the pitfall of appearing abstract at times, as if straying into 
Derrida’s criticism of objectivity. I have attempted to utilise cloud 
computing to undermine any collectivised concept of “capital” at work in 
the broader conceptual scaffolding of this thesis. Yet at times a centralised 
concept of capital as accumulation by dispossession allowed me to analyse 
how capital works as a constitutive medium, as lived metaphor, taking 




language, concept and idea. The introduction outlines in detail how the 
environment has been put to use as a conceptual domain servicing economic 
structures of relation. Ideas about the environment are used to optimise the 
potential for surplus value generation. In places, the complexity of this 
argument necessitated using capital as shorthand for those processes, with 
only limited space for discussing specific industrial relations. This style of 
writing was not intended to proceed toward objectivity or totality, but to 
allow the reader to function on a conceptual level in order to understand the 
role that concepts perform in relations of production, through questioning a 
generalised dynamic of accumulation by dispossession.  
Considering the concern that this work shows for processes of 
abstraction, or ‘veiled’ labour, a preface is also an appropriate place to step 
out of the work to speak about, ironically, the work. As a printed and bound 
object, the production of this thesis used paper, ink, plants, dyes, chemicals 
and minerals, to name but a few material dimensions, and the production 
and the transportation of these materials no doubt involved outsourced 
factory labour employment. Though I have attempted to avoid using cloud 
computing, that industry has no doubt played host to some aspects of this 
work––in drafts stored remotely in email inboxes; through digitised archives 
searched and used online; or even in social media posts about the process of 
my work. Ultimately, the digital and bound thesis are both testament to the 
extent to which I have been produced as human through my complicity in 





I intend to close this preface with the narrative of my productive 
labour, as the writer who produced this work. No doubt this narrative is not 
exhaustive but merely representative. I wrote my first project involving 
clouds in 2011, when I tried to use cloud nucleation processes to analyse the 
opening speech of Prospero in The Tempest. The application was one-
directional, but this project ignited my excitement for the topic. I revisited 
clouds the following year, during my Masters studies. I started to gather 
materials on clouds – cloud books, cloud t-shirts, cloud mugs, cloud 
artworks, cloud essays, cloud photography – until, reaching a tipping point, 
an amusing collection of ephemera became symbolic of the paradigmatic 
function of clouds in the present. As far as the following period of my 
doctorate is concerned, there are many life events sitting in the wings of 
2014-2018, the least avoidable and the most unthinkable being the loss of 
my dad in a cycling accident in August 2016. It is difficult to remember the 
exact process of writing the thesis before this landmark of loss, around 
which my existence as a writer cannot help but pivot, and which greatly 
shapes the landscape of memories available to me. My doctorate was not 
fully funded by a research council. This means that I was not paid to do this 
work, and though I covered fees through grants and bursaries from charities 
and trusts, and supported myself through tutoring, both privately and in 
universities, my parents supported me financially at many points along the 
way. I remember that I wrote the majority of this thesis in the British 
Library, in the Rare Books and Music Reading Room. I owe thanks to the 
staff of the British Library, especially the library assistants and those 




I should also extend immense gratitude to the British Library security staff 
for their caring nature. I would cycle to the library on my vintage Falcon 
bicycle, silver with a rainbow sticker around the frame, and chain it up 
outside. I queued to get in and was asked to leave at the end of the day – 
working long hours, like many doctoral students. I wrote the thesis on an 
11-inch MacBook Air, which I have owned since 2011. It was designed by 
Apple in California and assembled in China (likely the Suzhou 
Manfacturing Facility). Regarding the citations of Damisch in Chapter 
Three, I worked with librarians and staff of the Maughan Library, to arrange 
complex inter-library loans from libraries in France. Regarding other rare 
sources, I worked with librarians and staff of the Library of Congress, 
Senate House Library, Leeds University Library, Oxford Bodleian, and the 
archivists in the Tate Prints and Drawings Room, whose expertise I drew 
upon in repeated visits to the Tate Britain archives.  
Beyond the page, the writing process of this thesis happened in 
conversations. Kélina Gotman taught me how to read with care, encouraged 
me to pursue writing as a practice, and gave me valued friendship, Seb 
Franklin gave me direction and friendship of equal merit, John Thornes 
bought me cups of tea and taught me about meteorology, members of the 
faculty of the English Department and the Comparative Literature 
Department at King’s College London let me learn from their approach to 
their work, the administrative staff in the Literatures Office at King’s helped 
to organise me, in every aspect of my enrolment and employment, the 
cleaners and security staff of the Strand Campus, Virginia Woolf Building 




staff enrolled me and dealt with my interruption, our student and 
postgraduate representatives presented my views to the college, my students 
in the departments of English, Culture, Media and Creative Industries, and 
Comparative Literature let me join their learning curves, Claire Malaika-
Tunnacliffe and Max-Louis Raugel helped with my French translation, Aliki 
Kylika sat next to me while I read Aristotle, Katrina sat next to me through 
everything, Ella designed projects with me, Janhavi discussed Sanscrit and 
environmental politics, Bryony S. told me to keep going, Bryony W. bought 
me my first book on clouds in 2012 (Richard Hamblyn’s The Cloud Book: 
How to Understand the Skies (2008)), Phil collaborated with me, the Lake 
District became my home, Seamus understood, Kayleigh and Ben climbed 
across mountains and up rock faces, my uncle Matthew read and read and 
read, my mum took up watercolour painting, Richard made breakfast, 








This thesis thinks deeply about what clouds mean to us, first through the 
identification of a paradigmatic ‘cloud concept’ that is brought into play by 
economists and engineers of the cloud computing industries, before moving 
to identify the historical interlocutors of this cloud concept within art, 
literature, poetry, theory and theatre and performance. The cloud computing 
industries are contributors to greenhouse gases, responsible for at least 2% 
of carbon emissions. The service-oriented architecture of these industries, 
which allow “users” to deposit data in remote databanks and to access this 
data from mobile devices in disparate locations, depends on outsourcing 
labour through biocapital arrangements generating vital energy from 
displaced migrant workforces in the US and dislocated populations in the 
global South. Digital capitalism abstracts economic flexibility from a 
disposable workforce that live in a secured state of precarity. This thesis 
takes the cloud computing industries as an emblematic sociotechnology 
through which global populations are mediated into these economic 
relations. 
This thesis has henceforth sought to interrogate how a system of 
exploitation could be sustained behind the icon of a cloud. According with 
this central aim, the thesis unfolds upon interrogating the deep conceptual 
history of the cloud concept, written against the notion of a ‘total history,’ 
following Michel Foucault’s ‘general history’ in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969) or Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy’ in On the 




disciplines in the history of ideas seeking disruptive moments that can 
displace the contemporary valorisation of clouds as environmental forms. 
The decentring move that is driving this historical method puts my work in 
dialogue with Kalindi Vora, Life Support: Biocapital and the New History 
of Outsourced Labor (2015), Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: 
Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (2004) and Joan Martinez-
Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Environmental 
Conflicts and Valuation (2002). These writers have narrated the 
discontinuous history of environmental values by way of mapping those 
values through the appalling co-ordinates of global structures of biocapital. 
My work similarly decentres our conceptual frameworks for thinking about 
clouds, by locating historical moments where ideas about clouds seem to 
stem not from deep meditation “on” or “about” the “truth” of the “ecology,” 
but from gendered and racialised operations of social ostracism, modes of 
biocapital abstraction, and the dialectics of bestiality and sacralisation, 
primitivism and value-conferral that recapitulate the economic relations of 
gendered and racial capitalism. Therefore, I attempt to deconstruct the cloud 
concept as an environmental value claiming to be the summation of a long 
history of “humans” relating to the skies but that in actual fact services a 
global model of capital accumulation by dispossession.  
My argument about the cloud concept divides it into three registers: 
clouds are concepts of “gathering” or communalism, clouds are “signifiers” 
or modes of conveyance, and clouds are forms of “flexibility.” “Gathering” 
carries connotations of exclusion and dispossession. “Signification” 




“flexibility” implies the ability to be overworked without breaking, or the 
capacity to work laterally, amorphously, in a state of constant precarity. 
Each chapter interrogates one of these registers of the cloud concept. 
“Gathering” goes back through history to Ancient Greece, extending from 
cloud computing industry handbooks to the Festival of Dionysus, as 
theorised in the work of Aristotle. This chapter is about displacing the 
collectivity that clouds denote. Secondly, “signification” can be traced to 
various sources that input clouds into a machinic logic. The second chapter 
seeks to interrogate the way the cloud concept works—how an ecological 
form can come to denote socioeconomic structures. Finally, clouds are 
perceived as objectively elastic forms, as if their ecological reality is to 
morph with unrivalled flexibility. The final chapter maps this belief that 
clouds are elastic onto primitivist constructs, exploring the deeply troubling 
historical associations of flexibility and androcentric, Eurocentric structures 
of thought. Overall, the thesis hopes to displace its readers’ way of looking 
at the skies via dispersing static concepts about clouds. The thesis seeks to 
rescind the conceptual assumptions through which we perceive clouds as 
tearing and forming. Through these unremarked conceptual assumptions 
clouds lend to biocapital patterns of life an image of ecological 
orchestration, and dissolving this illusion of ecological orchestration is the 
central aim of this thesis. 
The introduction to this thesis will perform three roles. In part one, I 
want to build on some of the thinking in the preface, setting up the stakes of 
a conceptual history of environmental form. Here I will outline my thoughts 




composition of the ecology under the logic of capital, within which I would 
claim that clouds have been afforded a privileged status. In part two of the 
introduction, I will narrate that privileged status by looking across media, 
art and media studies, outlining the paradigmatic functionality of clouds. In 
this section, I will theorise the abstract functions of clouds, recognising that 
clouds are composed of ideas; concepts made up of notions of 
communalism, signification and elasticity. The thesis on the whole looks 
through the late twentieth century as an optic, through which to maintain 
these three areas of concern whilst exploring a diverse set of historical 
materials, focussing the deep conceptual history through its relation to the 
present. In the final section of the introduction, I want to outline how clouds 
were emerging into their position of privilege in the 1960s, so as to 
introduce the late-twentieth century optic that re-emerges within each 
chapter of the forthcoming work. 
 
 
The Conceptual History of the Ecology 
 
I will begin by fully situating environmental forms within the critique of 
language and concepts, which I touch upon in the preface to this work. 
Therefore, here I argue that any apparent coherence of “natural” form 
depends upon the primacy of concepts and the collective discourse of 
environmental thought. The consensus of authentic linguistic environmental 
forms and the complicit production of tacit presumptions about the 




prioritization, ideality and reification, through which we can identify 
operations of power. The conceptual history is a mode of intervening into 
this process of valorization. Through the conceptual history, environmental 
forms can come into view as formed and forming concepts. The conceptual 
history hence re-frames the language-being and concept-being of the 
environment. As an act of writing, the conceptual history is a strategy of 
gathering together the subtle allusions and suggestive depths of an 
environmental form. The discontinuities of those suggestive depths can be 
used to stage a critical contradiction to the coherent “truth” of that form. 
This method of thinking about the environment is in dialogue with 
writers for whom the representative qualities of the “ecology” can be 
contested. The Invisible Committee, in The Coming Insurrection, decry that 
‘There is no “environmental catastrophe”. The environment itself is the 
catastrophe’, later expounding that ‘Ecology isn’t just the logic of total 
economy, it’s also the new morality of Capital’.24 Or as Silvia Federici 
writes in an essay from 2010, ‘capital is learning about the virtues of the 
“common good.”’25 For these writers, our concept of the ecology as “in 
crisis” is an abstract idea that does not extend from ecological forms but 
from the logic of economy. Climate crises, as Naomi Klein has suggested, 
present business opportunities, with corporations able to exploit climate 
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disasters in order to advance their objectives. 26  Federici has similarly 
analysed the way that:  
 
Under the guise of biodiversity and conserving “global commons,” the 
[World] Bank has turned rain forests into ecological reserves, has expelled 
the populations that for centuries had drawn their sustenance from them, 
while making them available to people who do not need them but can pay 
for them27 
 
Federici asserts a nonsubjectified geopolitical dimension to the expansion of 
capital. This geopolitical dimension has more recently been echoed in the 
work of Neferti X. M. Tadiar, who argues that processes of primitive 
accumulation depend on ‘the territorial international order of sovereign 
nation-states established through European imperialism’.28  That land is 
being appropriated under the guise of a capitalist “virtue” or “morality” of 
the “common (ecological) good” reconfigures the fact of environmental 
catastrophe as a conflict of concepts. The concept of catastrophe dominates 
environmental thought, but is recapitulated as an organising logic or as 
convenient moral ground upon which to re-produce the logic of capital. 
To unpack this style of argument even further, Marx argues that 
capitalist production is multiply sustained through the disruption of what we 
would now call the ecology: 
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Capitalist production[...] disturbs the circulation of matter between man 
and the soil[...] violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the 
soil[...] But while upsetting the naturally grown conditions for the 
maintenance of that circulation of matter, it imperiously calls for its 
restoration as a system, as a regulating law of social production, and under 
a form appropriate to the full development of the human race.29 
 
This passage anticipates the working theorem of The Invisible Committee, 
and hence underlies the critical frame they place around environmentalist 
fears that the ecology is “in crisis,” opining that capitalist modes of 
production depend upon a concept of ecological catastrophe, so as to 
constantly call for the restoration of capital, as a system of order, regularity, 
law and ‘development’. For The Invisible Committee, a concept of the 
ecology makes capital seem necessary. The system of capital and the law of 
social production come to stand in for the failing system of ecological 
circulation. 
 I read this passage hand-in-hand with Marx’s theorem of ‘primitive 
accumulation’.30 Primitive accumulation describes the process of abstracting 
surplus value from surplus populations. The notion of a ‘surplus’ population 
is produced, for Marx, through the ‘separation’ of workers from their land, 
their means of production and the materials of their labour.31 This leaves the 
worker ‘unencumbered’ by their ‘means of production’, meaning they are 
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‘free’ not in the sense of being liberated but in the sense of being unmoored 
from any safe conditions of livelihood, health and security. These unmoored 
populations are rendered vulnerable so as to depend on wage relations for 
their safety. I read this passage hand-in-hand with Marx’s exegesis on the 
disturbed circulation of ‘matter’, ‘man’ and ‘soil,’ as outlined above because 
doing so begins to suggest that ecological concepts are acting in these 
processes of expropriation. In David Harvey’s working theorem of capital 
accumulation by dispossession, the circulation of ‘man’ and ‘soil’ is 
disturbed in order to dislocate populations allowing for the appropriation of 
both ‘soil’ and ‘man’ as a biocapital resource.32 The way that the world is 
configured into economic relations is inimitably bound to how the ecology 
is being conceived, who is thought to own it, and whose values preside over 
its future. 
This implies that the forces of capital are constantly shaping how we 
perceive the “ecology,” producing the “ecology” as a sort of collection of 
inter-dependent ideas that best serve the ends of capital. This brings a 
conceptual dimension to the frequently materialist emphases of 
environmentalist economic critique.33 Historically, the forces of industrial 
production that undergirded economic gain are critiqued for having brought 
about what we now term the “catastrophe” of global warming, through 
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interventions of degradation and exploitation, such as carbon emissions. The 
climate has been shaped by capital through centuries of industry and the 
irreversible effects of climate forcing, as detailed in the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC).34 These historical ties 
between capital as an industrial practice and the climate as a domain that is 
exploited and degraded, are what many have termed the ‘anthropocene’, 
implying human shifting of the climate––or what Jason Moore has aptly 
dubbed the ‘capitalocene’.35 Moore means to mark the vital role capitalist 
modes of industrial production have played in the way ‘humans’ have 
shifted the climate. He thereby interrogates the ‘anthro–’ of anthropocene. It 
is not that human life inherently involves the processes of exploitation and 
degradation that explain climate change. These dynamics are not necessary 
facets of humanity and do not apply equally to all humans; they have been 
imposed upon life through the dominant ‘morality’ of capital. 
Yet, the ecology is more than a material substrate of industrial 
production. Language, ideas, representations and concepts are at play in the 
relationship between capital and life, working beyond resource exploitation, 
atmospheric pollution and toxic degradation. That is, the manipulation of 
nature goes beyond visible use, waste and pollution. Capital has 
manipulated life into a symbolic structure, a moral ground, serving as 
conceptual substrate to its modes of production. Ideas of the “ecology” are 
hence at play in transnational capitalism and the forces of globalisation. I 
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think here of the work of Kalindi Vora, who argues that life in India was 
transformed, through a long history of colonial social relations, into ‘vital 
energy’ for use, consumption and production.36 Rather than analysing how 
this system exists in the present, Vora seeks to point out ‘a longer history of 
power relations underpinning what may seem like an emerging form of 
biopower’.37  
The ecology (human and nonhuman biological life) carries the 
representative quality of vitality to which Vora refers. But that is not to say 
that ‘natural resources’ have been used as ‘fuel for consumption’. Rather, 
the ecology has been fashioned into a symbolic structure that to some extent 
predicates the transformation of humans and nonhumans into vital matter. 
History has brought about the formation of concepts about the ecology that 
re-express the ecology through its service to capital. These are divisive 
concepts, as they are often used to instigate social and economic structures 
that fracture along lines of ethnicity, gender, race, class, religion and 
generation. The terminology of the anthropocene hence distracts from the 
real need to interrogate the colonial histories and contemporary effects of 
these symbolic structures, and I purposefully avoid that term in the 
forthcoming work. Anthropocene does nothing to suggest the way 
operations of power are embedded in symbolic structures of the ecology. 
Collectivising humans distracts from the divisive role the ecological 
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concepts play in the production of all life, through the instantiation of social 
and economic relations. 
According to Joan Martinez-Alier, the ecology is a space where 
‘social conflicts’ play out.38 Through conflicting ‘languages of values’, the 
livelihood, economic security, resources and health of the poor are 
superseded by the priority of economic growth.39 In this understanding, the 
ecology is a figurative space that is being used as a technology to produce 
social separateness, in line with Cedric Robinson’s critique of racial 
capitalism.40 This social separateness befits capitalist modes of production. 
The disposability of one set of symbolic terms for nature, in preference for 
another set of terms, can be used to transform people into disposable labour. 
For Martinez-Alier, land resources and labour resources hence intersect 
through conflicts of ecological values, which express North-South divisions. 
The subjects of his enquiry are communities in Africa, South America and 
India, through which he argues that the North has profited, through 
disposing of local and indigenous environmental values. For Martinez-Alier, 
‘poverty and powerlessness result in the local environment and health being 
sold cheaply’.41 The social separateness that different sets of environmental 
values insinuate can be exploited for profit. Hence, this involves the 
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supersession of all concepts of the ecology that accord with economic 
growth, over all other concepts, perhaps grounded in other values, such as 
the livelihood, health, security or environmentalist concerns of vulnerable 
indigenous communities. 
The ecology is therefore a technology for sustaining socioeconomic 
patterns. For Naomi Klein, how we think about the atmosphere has allowed 
some countries to develop through industry, stunting the development of 
others. She argues that the atmosphere is where we can see the legal and 
political frameworks that assign different nations different capacities to emit 
carbon dioxide.42 These legal and political frameworks have henceforth 
been divisive boundaries for restricting growth in certain areas and 
advancing industry in others. This disregards the livelihoods, health and 
environmentalist concerns of those populations who are left out of the 
global carbon calculus. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
and select European Union (EU) countries, as high-income “stakeholders” 
in the monetisation of the atmosphere, have been allowed to grow their 
industries through carbon emissions. This implies a kind of service-industry 
logic to how we think of the atmosphere. I think here of the work of Blake 
Hudson, who uses Elinor Ostrom’s commons analysis to suggests that air or 
‘natural capital’ in the US, has been transformed into a privatised space, 
with the federal government figured as the ‘producer’ of NOx gas and fossil 
fuel burning industries as the ‘provider’.43 The problem here is the very 
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notion of ‘emission capacity,’ a representative framework that overlays 
industrial legal and political formulae over the atmosphere. The idea of an 
emission capacity, though seemingly stemming from an environmentalist 
desire to cap pollution, presides over the socioeconomic logic that will 
always prefer pollution to environmentalism, or always prefer labour to life. 
The violence of this technology takes ‘slow’ effect.44 It is this ‘slow 
violence’ that Rob Nixon understands as the non-spectacular, incremental, 
accretive and ‘environmentally embedded violence’ of ecological 
colonialism.45 For Nixon, it is necessary to take a long historical view on 
violence when we are attempting to understand these slow effects. I am 
sympathetic to this perspective of the role of history and time. Concepts of 
the ecology appear to me as violent accretions. Overlaying nature, these 
concepts have allowed for the incremental transformation of bodies and 
space into labour and land resources, or the production of what we know as 
biopower. I am sympathetic to the emphasis of slowness, depth and 
increment, over any tendency, when thinking about the operations of power, 
to focus on events, acts or instances. Fredric Jameson seems to me equally 
sympathetic to these emphases on depth and slowness, when thinking about 
the incremental advance of colonialism through time. He writes:  
 
The older village structures and precapitalist forms of agriculture are now 
systematically destroyed, to be replaced by an industrial agriculture whose 
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effects are fully as disastrous as, and analogous to, the moment of 
enclosure in the emergence of capital in what was to become the first 
world. The “organic” social relations of village societies are now shattered, 
an enormous landless preproletariat “produced,” which migrates to the 
urban areas (as the tremendous growth of Mexico City can testify), while 
new, more proletarian, wage-working forms of agricultural labor replace 
the older collective or traditional kinds. Such ambiguous “liberaton” needs 
to be described with all the dialectical ambivalence with which Marx and 
Engels celebrate the dynamism of capital itself in the Manifesto or the 
historical progress achieved by the British occupation of India.46 
 
The production of labour has a long history, at all moments directly tied to 
differently shaped ideas of how society and the ecology, labour and land, 
relate to one another. The idea of organic social relations is posited and 
undone in order to produce the migratory ‘landless’ preproletariat. As 
‘landless,’ the preproletariat must migrate to urban areas, where labour is 
concentrated, as if in a “new,” landless form. Agricultural labour also 
appears as “new,” reconceptualised as wage-working labour as if liberated 
from the land. This liberation draws the preproletariat from their ‘organic’ 
forms of life, hence allowing them to be bound into socioeconomic 
relations. To return to Marx, ‘while upsetting the naturally grown 
conditions’, capitalist production ‘imperiously calls for its restoration as a 
																																																								
46 Fredric Jameson, ‘Periodizing the 60s’, The 60s Without Apology, ed. by 
Sohnya Sayres, Anders Stephanson, Stanley Aronowitz and Fredric 





system, as a regulating law of social production’.47 The increments through 
which these changes are happening mark huge shifts in history. 
Approaching the way labour and land, or more expansively, economic and 
ecological patterns, relate to one another requires a deep history that attends 
to the non-spectacular increments of time. 
Such broad temporal brush strokes reveal the way different 
conceptions of the ecological have been used to produce the social. Yet I 
would also add that how these concepts move through time is two-fold. 
Concepts of the ecology are ‘environmentally embedded’—as if natural, as 
if springing from nature. Hence, not only do these concepts allow biopower 
to be produced, they also perform as symbolic structures that come to 
obscure social inequities and socioeconomic distortions. These concepts of 
the ecology as such, serve to naturalise the incremental violence they 
facilitate. They harmonise biocapital into ecological orchestration. This 
echoes the thought of Adrian Parr, who writes:  
 
[...] capitalism appropriates limits to capital by placing them in the service 
of capital; in the process, it obscures the inequities, socioeconomic 
distortions, and violence that these limits expose, thereby continuing the 
cycle of endless economic growth that is achieved at the expense of more 
vulnerable entities and groups.48 
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Parr alludes to the notion of using whatever limit is placed in the service of 
capital to expose the limitations of that project. I want to integrate time and 
concepts into this argument––not just time, but slow time, slow violence, or 
the deep history of how an operational concept was formed. There are 
concepts of the ecology that are working in the service of capital, and it is 
necessary to bring those concepts to light as fabrications. This means 
realising the fundamental roles those concepts have to play in the 
contemporary moment. It means moving toward unfolding the deep 
histories that are called into play––the increments through which those ideas 
have advanced. It means mapping the emphatic violence of an idea in the 
present, as an accretive violence of conceptual forming. If we want to 
understand the ‘conceptual violence’ of biopower in the present, to use 
Vora’s terminology, then we have to expose and critique the historical 
processes of conceptual formation: the way a concept comes into being, and 
is made to seem necessary, natural and universally applicable.49 
 This is the sort of historical process I am approaching in the 
forthcoming work. Each chapter is going to extend a hand through history to 
a set of materials I feel can expose the way in which a concept of clouds 
formed or came into being. I am going to work through the choice of clouds 
momentarily, but before I do so I want to talk further about my method of 
using history.  
In chapter one, I find my way to Aristotle and Ancient Greece 
through two avenues. Firstly, analysing cloud-computing handbooks it 
becomes evident that computational modes of social interpellation are being 
																																																								




conceived through ideas of Ancient Greek agora. This may strike the reader 
as unusual. However, upon interrogation, it becomes evident that this is not 
the first time that writers have attempted to allude to the architectonics of 
Ancient Greece in order to envisage the forms of democratic participation 
they feel digitality facilitates. The associations between the agora and 
computational modes of social interpellation extend back to mid-1980s 
hyperbole about networks, and what computers might mean for social 
participation. This opens computational social interpellation to exactly the 
sort of criticisms we can vocalise about the agora. That is, these were 
spaces where social relations were primarily economic, and where 
participation was determined by race, gender and generation.  
This is one avenue into the history of clouds, yet the relationship 
with Ancient Greece is much more complex than a collision of cloud and 
agora. Indeed, the second avenue through which I find my way into the 
Ancient Greek materials is via the late-twentieth-century theoretical 
writings of Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914–2007) and his collaborator Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet (1930–2006). Vernant is known for having developed the 
analysis of classical texts toward historicism. Vernant attempted to diagnose 
Greek cultural episteme through the analysis of language in extant Greek 
texts. He understood how social thought operated, and how Greek society 
was structured, through the tragic texts that have remained over time. A key 
concept to Vernant is the idea that Greek society descended into states of 
hubris or lyssa, and that these states left someone outside the bounds of 
social law. This, he believed, was key to how that social law necessitated its 




person could be drawn back into the disciplinary order of the city-state. 
What is absolutely fascinating is that Vernant refers to this hubris as a 
‘cloud of atē’. This suggests that clouds are somehow beyond social law, 
yet also, and fundamentally, within that social law. It suggests that people 
leave the social to enter into the chaos of a cloud, before this externality 
delivers them back into the social order of the state. The grid of the social 
produces clouds as excessive extension or lacerations of order, situating 
clouds as chaoid non-structures that re-focus social regulatory orders.  
Aristotle (384–322 BC) has a key role to play in the analysis of this 
concept of clouds. My focus on Aristotle developed as I was working to 
analyse how Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) uses clouds as imagery in 
The Birth of Tragedy (1876), in the process of analysing how Vernant uses 
clouds in The Origins of Greek Thought (1982), Myth and Thought Among 
the Greeks (1983) and Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (1990). 
Through the lens of Vernant’s analysis of Ancient Greece, ideas of order 
and disorder appear conflated in clouds, which model a space beyond social 
law yet fundamental to social interpellation. Vernant uses clouds as imagery 
to express how tragedy performs this interior-exterior logic. Similarly, 
Nietzsche uses clouds to illustrate his understanding of the de-sublimatory 
function of Greek theatre gatherings – though this theory is not drawn from 
close analysis of Greek plays or extant Greek theatre texts, but rather, it 
seems, from a philosophical juxtaposition of order and disorder, often given 
the shorthand of Apollo and Dionysus. Whilst neither writer suggests any 
direct link between their theorisation of clouds and Aristotle’s work, in 




covertly theorising a bridge between Aristotle’s Meteorologica and Poetics, 
two texts that could not seem further apart in their subject matter. In the 
Meteorologica, Aristotle describes clouds as processes of gathering and 
separation. Aristotle means the dynamic of tearing and forming that is 
visible in the way clouds come-into-being in the sky, precipitate, and then 
form again, in a continuum. Through Nietzsche and Vernant, I make the 
move to compare this idea with Aristotle’s ideas about theatre gatherings, 
arguing that ‘gathering’ does not only denote the processes of cloud 
formation in the Meteorologica, but equally denotes social gatherings for 
theatrical events at the Festival of Dionysus. Retrospectively reading this 
connection between theatre events and clouds into Aristotle assumes a latent 
anthropomorphic quality of meteorological phenomena, bringing to the fore 
the extent to which Aristotle was influenced by Empedoclean theories of 
Love and Strife. My reading of Aristotle is hence not intended to present a 
new interpretation of his texts, and for this reason the thesis overlooks 
arguing toward or away from hermeneutic paradigms in Aristotelian studies. 
My reading of Aristotle is secondary to my efforts to understand how any 
latent anthropomorphism in the concept of clouds as gathering has been 
reignited in the paradigm of the cloud concept as an escapist space, free 
from social law. As a social mechanism, the cloud concept iconographically 
reinforces and naturalises the idea that all humans should be tearing and 
forming, thereby entering every person into this interior-exterior relational 
logic of social interpellation. I was interested to pursue the identification 
between humans and clouds gathering, and it was this identification that 




through writers such as Vernant and Nietzsche, whilst other paradigms in 
Aristotelian studies are overlooked. 
 Chapter two uses history in a less linear manner, and the long history 
of this chapter is reached not by avenues but by branches or bifurcations. 
Here I want to understand how the symbolic structure of clouds operates. 
The branches of this chapter hence extend outwards from the idea of clouds 
as signs or signifiers. This signifying functionality is at play in the post-
structuralist writings of Michel Serres (b.1930). Serres has worked to 
theorise clouds in several of his texts, and they are image-objects through 
which he projects his theory of forms as topological swarms of atoms. 
Serres condenses his ideas about atomism and topology into clouds. Doing 
so, he figures clouds through the late twentieth-century recession of matter 
into information making clouds, into informationalist bodies of data. The 
mechanisation of clouds as signs is equally at play within the nineteenth-
century British colonial uptake of a poem entitled Megha-dūta, or ‘Cloud 
Messenger’, translated by Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-1860). In his 1813 
translation, Wilson read the cloud messenger as a literal vehicle for 
messages, whereas in the original poem this is only ever a fantasy. 
Assimilating this fantasy into the western cannon, Wilson tries to translate 
the cloud messenger through drawing parallels to Shakespeare’s Antony and 
Cleopatra. These parallels hinge on the allusion to the Early Modern 
practice of building cloud machines, and the ability of clouds to convey or 
symbolise. 
The sign-function of clouds in the Early Modern theory and practice 




stage or to suspend deities in paintings. This parallels Serres’ informationist 
concept of clouds, revealing how an ecological concept is brought into 
being when an environmental form is input into a machinic assemblage. 
When clouds are put into Early Modern cloud machines they become modes 
of conveyance or deific signs. When clouds are put into Wilson’s 
mechanisms of Orientalist appropriation, they become information 
compatible, or messengers. When clouds are input into Serres’ writing 
machine, they are output as topological agglomerations of matter-as-
information. In this sense, what relates these materials within the conceptual 
history of clouds is the relationship between ecology and machine. This 
chapter is not about an isolated aspect of an ecological concept. It is about 
how that concept is working, how it is put to work. This does come down to 
questions of abstraction and association, and I do look at the way labour is 
abstracted from life in order to produce the spectacle of clouds as signs. But 
I am also thinking here of the life of clouds. The long history of this chapter 
is the long relationship between clouds and their mechanically produced 
sense. 
 The historical dimension of chapter three is sparked by an error of 
self-historicisation. The French art theorist and historian, Hubert Damisch 
(b.1928), claims to have ‘invented’ an ‘elastic concept’ in the late-1950s to 
1970s.50 He claims that this elastic concept is drawn from his thinking about 
clouds, which began with a published essay in 1958 and continues to this 
day, serving as non-systematic subterfuge, or as non-structured horizon of 
structuralist thought. Deleuze and Guattari’s investment in this concept, in 
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their final work Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? [What is Philosophy?] 
(1991), suggests a different history. They associate Damisch’s ideas of 
elasticity with his analysis of the art brut artist Jean Dubuffet (1901–1985). 
Through correcting this error of self-historicisation, I unfold the history of 
the racialised logic of elasticity. This brings me to more thoroughly 
interrogate the role that the elastic concept had to play in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s preceding works. The conceptual compatibility between the anti-
capitalist dimensions of their radical philosophy and the theorem of 
elasticity or flexibility is striking. If Deleuze and Guattari’s work has 
become foremost in how neoliberalism is articulated, then this involves the 
re-organisation of the elastic concept through its racist history, and in that, 
of anti-capitalism through capitalist modes of production and the implied 
dynamic of usurpation and expropriation.51 The elastic concept, key to the 
radical, anti-capitalist project, has been re-rooted into the colonial history 
that gives it meaning. 
 This structure of thought is extended to the nineteenth century, 
where I offer a parallel history of the elastic concept of clouds. John Ruskin 
(1819–1900) attempted to position artists and the arts beyond the political 
economy, through idealising artistic labour as a non-structured event of 
creative, organic form. He valorised J.M.W. Turner (1775–1851) and his 
cloud studies for fulfilling these terms of artistic freedom. However, while 
Ruskin wished for an artist whose forms arose organically, from a socially 
liberated artistic practice, Turner was not this ideal artist, and the content of 
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his sketchbooks and notebooks demonstrate just how intimately his finances 
were related to his cloud studies. What Turner’s works provoke is the 
economic logic that underwrites the emergence of clouds as non-structures, 
or as elastic forms. Luke Howard’s scientific language for clouds 
disseminated this economic logic of elastic forms, as if objective fact. 
Howard chose Latinate terms for describing the basic structures of clouds, 
developing a morphological language that could describe ‘transitional’ 
forms. Adopting an ecofeminist position, writers such as Val Plumwood, 
Greta Gaard and Ariel Salleh have written against the androcentrism of the 
natural sciences.52 Following this movement, I pursue a queer ecofeminist 
critique of the Latinate terms cirrus–stratus–cumulus, exposing the way that 
these terms are inflected with androcentrism and Eurocentric imperialism. 
Strikingly, Nietzsche is a key figure in the dissemination of this 
scientific discourse. Nietzsche suffered from chronic illness, and took up the 
nineteenth-century pursuit of climate tourism. He owned and read health 
tourism books, and built upon this knowledge by reading around the natural 
sciences, where the emerging practice of meteorology, and the nomenclature 
of clouds, had a prevalent role. This brings a biographical dimension to the 
many cloud metaphors that peppered his late writings, many of which were 
written during his time convalescing at Sils-Maria in the Swiss Alps. 
Nietzsche, as Ruskin before him and Deleuze and Guattari after, uses clouds 
as image-objects for enacting the anti-systematic of their thought. Hence, 
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this chapter is about historicising how flexibility is instrumentalised in the 
valorization of the non-systematic, revealing the colonial histories that 
underwrite flexibility. If flexible is a constant state of unbreakable 
instability, then flexibility has been transposed into an economic logic of 
life in an era of late capitalism. The conceptual history of clouds reveals 
there is nothing new about this logic of the elastic. 
Though the thesis does not claim to be chronological there are of 
course some historical continuities, even between the chapters. This 
introduction seems the place to frame those inter-chapter continuities, as I 
will not always have the opportunity to step out of the trajectory of a chapter 
to do so. In chapter two, Aristotle features twice. Firstly, Aristotle features 
in the working theory of clouds as significatory functions. Serres draws 
these ideas from Lucretius, whose atomistic theory of swarms of atoms, 
agglomerating or coming-together into forms, may appear aligned with 
Aristotle’s theories of gathering. Aristotle enters again when I reflect on the 
Early Modern theory clouds as signs, which was drawn from Averroes’s 
reading of the Meteorologica.53 A brief note on these two continuities: it is 
not possible to retroactively read the argument of chapter two into chapter 
one. Aristotle does not conceive of clouds as messengers, signifiers, 
information-forms, nor as aesthetic-sign-functions, and so his ideas of 
gathering are not ideas of signification. If the sign-functionality emerges 
from the idea of gathering, it is through processes of assimilation that adjust 
the idea to fit within a broader logic of signification, informationalisation or 
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molecularisation. It was more important to understand how and why these 
processes were taking place by looking directly at clouds in those moments, 
than to establish some linear movement of thought from Aristotle to Serres. 
It may be noted that Nietzsche does not only feature in chapter three, 
but is prevalent within chapter one, where I analyse Nietzsche’s work upon 
the Festival of Dionysus in his early writings. Could this material be 
brought into the historicisation of his later use of clouds, as image-objects 
for enacting the anti-metaphysical of his thought? This elision could be 
carried out. Nietzsche’s thinking about the Apollonian and the Dionysian do 
serve as one backdrop to anti-metaphysics, and his reading of the Dionysiac 
as a ‘cloud’ does feature in the biographical history of clouds as anti-
metaphysical image-objects. However, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy 
(1876) pre-dates the period when his travels and escalating illness gave him 
reason to engage with climatology, health tourism and meteorology. This is 
apparent when reading across his oeuvre, as the style of the late works 
indicate a writer who is thinking about clouds through scientific parameters, 
as opposed to an earlier writer who is working with Ancient Greek concepts 
of clouds. For this reason, though clouds may have transmitted into the late 
writings, the histories and implications of these concepts has shifted by the 
time he arrives at writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra between 1883-1885, and 
the semi-autobiographical Ecce Homo in 1888. The clouds of these late 
works are conceptually discontinuous with the ones in The Birth of Tragedy. 
For this reason, I have left the connection between Nietzsche’s early and 





I now want to set out the terms of the cloud concept. What follows is 
a diagnostic of the paradigmatic function of clouds in the present. This 
paradigmatic reading of clouds is sparked by the digital cloud and extends 
outwards into the present, across art, media theory and some aspects of eco-
criticism. I argue that the contemporary cloud concept has three working 
parts: clouds are concepts of “gathering” or communalism; clouds are 
“signifiers” or modes of conveyance; and clouds are forms of “flexibility.” 
While the thesis works in these three registers, in the forthcoming part of the 







Figure 1: ‘Notwithstanding the soft-edged depiction of “the cloud” on 
network diagrams, it is neither a fuzzy (ill-defined) nor a fluffy (hyped) 
concept. It is easy to understand and it is big, big business’. Sacha 
Matulovich, ‘5 big reasons everything is moving to the cloud’, Memeburn, 
29 Oct 2017.54 
 
 
The Cloud Concept 
 
There are currently over 69 million posts tagged with #clouds on 
Instagram. 55  Considering the fact that users often hyperlink unrelated 
pictures that hold no overt connection to clouds––selfies, Pokemon Go 
screenshots, cups of coffee––this number of images tagged as ‘clouds’ is 
unsurprising. Mobile app and web-based users are daily piggybacking on 
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the fluctuating popularity of #clouds, in order to trend digital content 
extraneous to these ecological phenomena. This extension of a digitally 
mediated concept of clouds to heterogeneous phenomena suggests that 
ecological clouds in the present are performing paradigmatically. Indeed, 
the #clouds trend extends beyond social media and into technology and the 
arts. When artists such as choreographer Mathilde Monnier and visual artist 
Dominique Figarella collaborate on a soap-bubble-cloud medium for their 
Soapéra; or composer David Bowen devises a ‘cloud piano’ that produces 
sound-patterns ‘set in motion to function as if the clouds are pressing the 
keys on the piano as they move across the sky and change shape’; when 
Fujiko Nakaya builds cloud sculptures; or crowds gather in Saint Petersburg 
Square for the ‘Clearing Cloud Game’ of wishing the clouds away; when 
New York Maker Faire and artist Karolina Sobecka alike, offer participants 
the chance to ‘eat’ clouds and ‘think like’ clouds; or when computing 
‘moves to the cloud’, does it suffice to say that clouds are ‘trending’?56 Or 
must we seek to understand this trend as the cultural production of ideas and 
signifying practices, and think of the emergence and multiplication of 
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‘cloud-like’ forms as a re-signifying procedure typical of the way working 
concepts mediate and normalise the ideological content of the social? 
To begin, the cultural diagnostic of a #cloud trend must be situated 
in relation to the move to monetise clouds. Gavin Pretor-Pinney founded the 
Cloud Appreciation Society in 2005. The website adopts the tone of a social 
movement, with a polemical ‘Manifesto’. The “society,” however, which 
now has	 43,359 members in 119 countries, is not registered as a not-for-
profit organisation.57 Though most of the 43,359 members are original 
members who paid a one-off fee, any newer members are paying for a 
Cloud-a-Day subscription service. 58  Members must subscribe to pay a 
yearly fee of £32.00, with a £10 sign-up fee, purchasing them a ‘Somewhat 
Occasional’ Cloud Newsletter, a badge, a certificate, an ‘Innovative Cloud 
Selector Wheel’, ‘Free entry’ to online conferences, 15% off in the ‘Cloud 
Shop’, and ‘help supporting the society’s development’.59 Under the guise 
of an activist movement, clouds have been transformed into a site for 
service-oriented profiteering. Pretor-Pinney has additionally used the social 
media Twitter @CloudAppSoc username to crowd-source photos of 
proposed undulatus asperatas cloud, “campaigning” for the addition of this 
scientific cloud classification to the International Cloud Atlas of the World 
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Meteorological Organisation (WMO).60 This scientific movement has been 
re-embedded within the service-oriented ethos of the society, with a 
growing line of products available to traffic led to the site through the 
undulatus asperatas campaign. Users browsing the pages of the Cloud 
Appreciation Society can use their Paypal account to purchase cloud key 
rings, cloud earrings, cloud cushions, cloud cards, cloud calendars, cloud 
badges, cloud classification mugs (also on sale in John Lewis) and cloud t-
shirts. Pretor-Pinney even markets a self-help book entitled Every Cloud 
Has A Silver Lining (Keep Calm) (Summersdale Series), contributing to the 
neoliberal austerity adoption of wartime propaganda, ‘Keep Calm and Carry 
On’.61  
There is a distinct lack of critical reflection that situates cloud 
“activist” movements or cloud “campaigns”, in relation to the marketisation 
of clouds by global technology corporations. These cloud businesses are far 
larger than the Cloud Appreciation Society, with multi-million dollar 
corporations such as Google, Amazon and IBM economising the lexicon of 
clouds through selling ‘cloud space’, ‘cloud storage’ and other ‘cloud-based 
services’. Yet I would suggest that in their conceptual content there is little 
to distinguish an appreciation society that sustains itself on a particular way 
of thinking about and sentimentalising clouds, and a global technology 
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corporation seeking to use clouds to mask over operative systems of 
economic dominance. Both use clouds as if they are already ideas, as if 
these forms are best thought of as concepts. This not only implies a link 
between clouds as conceptual commodities and clouds as forms of the 
ecology. Crucially, it implies that the digitally mediated concept has come 
to over-ride the real in the social conscience of these ecological forms. 
The San Francisco-based artist Amy Balkin encapsulates this 
mediation of atmospheric form through economic relations. In her 
conceptual artwork Public Smog (2004-ongoing), Balkin disarms the 
corporate forms that fill our atmosphere. Public Smog began when Balkin 
purchased emissions offsets in 2004, creating conceptual works that are 
composed of legal, financial and political activities to do with the 
marketisation of the atmosphere.62 Balkin’s work takes the form of a NOx 
gas trading list (see figure 2). Balkin is listed as a trader showing her 
purchase of 24lbs of NOx (these oxides of nitrogen are a threat to public 
health and an indirect contributor to climate change).63 
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Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 





Figure 2: Amy Balkin, Public Smog, NOx gas trade registrations, 2004–
ongoing. 
 





In visualising these trade purchases (see figure 3), Balkin produces aesthetic 
forms of the sky, not as ‘real’ clouds, but as conceptual forms shaped 
through stocks. I am struck by the effect of these ‘cloudlike’ regions in 
recapitulating the atmosphere as private commodity. The NOx emissions 
units that Balkin purchases are tradable units of the total US emissions 
budget of NOx (alongside SO2), made law by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (1990 CAAA), and cemented by the NOx SIP Call and NOx 
Budget Programme.64 This US legislation builds on the 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendment, which imposes fossil fuel burning limits across US states––
mainly affecting electric power generators, but also affecting individual 
fossil fuel burning industries.65 The legislation was made following studies 
revealing the environmental and architectural damage of acid rain, and 
public health hazards of NOx. The idea is to reduce the total budget of 
harmful gases and support industries in their compliance of this reduction. 
However, the law effectively makes the atmosphere a tradable commodity. 
Balkin purchases the right to emit noxious gases into the atmosphere 
in order to offset the tradable units of emissions gases. In doing so, she 
declares her privately owned unit a literal airspace, opening this space as a 
public park. This creates a conceptual space, above cities such as LA [figure 
3], visualised in the photographic documentation as public lacerations in the 
urban smog. These conceptual ruptures reveal the extent to which the 
atmosphere is already a conceptual domain that is traded and exploited by 
private corporations. In this respect, Balkin’s artworks parallel those of 
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HeHe, an activist and art collective comprised of Heiko Hansen and Helen 
Evans. In their work Nuage Vert (2008), they project green light onto 
pollutant industrial smoke coming from factories on city skylines.66 
 
 
Figure 4: HeHe, Nuage Vert, installation, light and industrial pollution, 
2008. 
 
As HeHe highlight in their co-authored article, the pollutant plume is the 
visible effect of climate shifting.67 By lighting the cloud green, HeHe 
highlight the engineered forms of industrial clouds.68 The cloud computing 
industry is performing a paradigmatic role in this engineering of clouds. 
Firstly, the supercomputers that ‘house’ the hardware of cloud computing 
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services produce at least 2% of global carbon emissions.69  The cloud 
computing industry is hence responsible for engineering pollutant clouds. In 
another respect, the cloud computing industry is increasing its role as a 
mediator of weather and climate data. As a working example, in October 
2015, IBM finalised a deal putting them in charge of the digital assets of 
The Weather Company.70 This acquisition of live weather data by a global 
leader of the IT market, re-values climate observations according to the 
market value of weather analytics. Moreover, this re-valuation is mediated 
through the cloud computing industry. Under the management of IBM, the 
distributed networks of the cloud computing industry are valuable weather 
analytic tools, allowing The Weather Company to analyse social media 
using rubrics, such as #clouds, cross-referencing these with computer-
generated weather forecasts in order to feed back into valuable road and 
transport information. 71  In this sense, the cloud computing industry 
mediates weather ‘facts’ and climate ‘truths’. This industrial phenomenon is 
coming to condition the truthhood of the climate. 
In another UK-based example of this re-mediation of the climate, 
through the medium of the cloud computing industry, the Met Office 
recently lost the BBC weather forecast contract (the new data service is yet 
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to be named). As a public service, the BBC is legally bound to lower their 
financial outgoings. They can do so by seeking providers who use the cloud 
computing industry to lower the cost of data collection and analytics, by 
using tools such as social media as crowdsourcing methods, exploiting the 
labour of users of social media to reduce overheads. This is why the weather 
now starts with a photo from a ‘member of the public’, whose free labour 
we must see as complicit in loss of the BBC contract by the Met Office. 
Within a cloud economy, the BBC can capitalise upon computer networks 
and their users in order to reduce the cost of monitoring real clouds, thereby 
monetising clouds through #clouds. 
Cloud computing industry handbooks instrumentalise history to 
justify this business model. In examples such as Mobile Clouds: Exploiting 
Distributed Resources in Wireless, Mobile and Social Networks (2014), 
Frank H. P. Fitzek and Marcos D. Katz define the role of cloud computing 
industries in a mobile era as a model of social resource pooling, dating the 
disciplinary and behavioural principles of these industries to the 1960s.72 
Periodizing the principles of the cloud computing industry to this time, 
Fitzek and Katz attempt to tell the natural history of data sharing and digital 
co-option, in a chapter that opens: 
 
Since the 1960s a great deal of research has been carried out in this field, 
but here we will try to understand key essential principles of cooperation. 
These principles, inferred from cooperative behavior of Nature, ultimately 
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serve as inspiration sources while developing cooperative rules for mobile 
clouds. Understanding the cooperative rules of vampire bats, monkeys, 
cheetahs, and hyenas the most important rules can be derived. There are 
many more examples from Nature such as the symbiosis of the lycaenid 
butterfly larvae with ants, and others. The rules are often very simple and 
can be directly implemented on mobile devices, leading to cooperative 
gains without complexity.73  
 
This codification of ‘Nature’ (with a capital “N”) stands to reciprocally 
produce the social as an informationalised or codified form, where 
relationships are about complying with rules of digital reciprocity and 
participation. The cloud computing industry is a networked medium based 
on these rules, through which the social must pass.  
As a further example, Joe Weinman opens his text on the economics 
of the cloud computing industry, Cloudonomics (2012), by outlining his 
version of the history of the coinage of ‘the cloud’, before continuing to 
relate a ‘human history’ of resource pooling.74 Weinman looks at Roman 
irrigation systems and argues that these models of resource pooling have a 
prior social relevance and justification through the ‘human history’ of 
supply-and-demand industrial economic relations. In stating so, he cites 
Don Tapscott’s much earlier publication Digital Capital (2000) (co-written 
with David Ticoll and Alex Lowy).75 Here, they trace the use of the term 
‘Agora’ in digital lexis to Greek society: 
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Agora. The agora of ancient Greece was originally the assembly of the 
ancient people, convoked by the king or one of his nobles. The word then 
came to mean the place where assemblies gathered, and this place then 
evolved to become the city’s center for public and especially commercial 
intercourse. We apply the term to markets where buyers and sellers meet to 
freely negotiate and assign value to goods 76 
 
The first sentence demonstrates a really important omission. Conventionally 
a space used for gathering, the agora was a mechanism for ostracising 
peasants, slaves, women and children. If Tapscott, Ticoll and Lowy had 
cited fully from the 1910 11th edition of The Encyclopædia Britannica, they 
would have begun ‘The agora of ancient Greece was originally[, in 
primitive times,] the assembly of the ancient people, convoked by the king 
or one of his nobles’.77 Presumably the primitivism implied here is that of 
ostracising individuals through architectural-geometric arrangements that 
literalise social structures. Tapscott, Ticoll and Lowy hence omit that these 
spaces were used for ‘primitive’ ostracism, and omit the strict limitations on 
freedom of speech within the agora. 
It is vital to note that it is not just history that is being 
instrumentalised in these handbooks. Clouds are also being 
instrumentalised, as ecological referential bases for computational systems. 
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This significatory practice of instrumentalising clouds has seeped into 
works that supposedly critique the cloud computing industry. Tung-Hui Hu 
claims to have mapped the pre-history of ‘the cloud’.78 Hu refers to the 
physical networks and data centres housed in Cold War nuclear bunkers in 
order to critique the one-way structures of necropolitical power 
emblematised by the computing industries as a medium of the social.79 Yet I 
find Hu’s work problematic because, throughout, he continues to use the 
adjective “cloudlike” without critiquing the implications of this 
terminology. Similarly, James Gleick, in referring to the cloud metaphor, 
used by Google to describe their management of information, suggests that 
the ‘physical aspect [of Google’s Cloud] could not be less cloudlike’.80 
What does this word “cloudlike” mean in these instances? What ideas 
underpin this adjective? 
From this perspective, the thorny adjectival thicket implied by “the 
cloudlike” marks an intersection between methods of critiquing and 
methods of marketising clouds, as a lexical site of the cloud concept. The 
“cloudlike” is operative in what Paul N. Edwards has criticised as the 
‘infrastructure’ moment of computing, where cloud affinities are used to 
market the sociotechnical system of the digital cloud.81 The “cloudlike” is 
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used to sell the illusion of freedom identified by Slavoj Žižek, and to 
advertise the idea of deterritorialised drift, identified by Daniel van der 
Velden, Vinca Kruk, and Alysse Kushinski of Metahaven.82 The “cloudlike” 
also runs through vapid debates around who coined the digital lexis of ‘the 
cloud’, which evade the larger question of what this digital lexis is doing.83 
In the context of the cloud computing industries, the “cloudlike” could be 
taken as a diagnostic for the entire technological mediation of the ecology. 
The paradigmatic function of clouds is hence rooted through 
technology. Not only are clouds mediated through the economic logic of 
computational media. Clouds are, as such, transformed into a technology 
through which the present is mediated. In referring to computational media 
and the computing industries as “cloud computing”, we hence mediate an 
industrial phenomenon through a naturalised metaphor. “Clouds” hence sit 
alongside visual metaphors for computational and Internet systems, such as 
“networks/nets”, “lattices”, “corals” and “webs”. Clouds are distinct from 
these other visual examples, however, due to the fact that the metaphor of 
“cloud computing” seems to borrow qualities from an ecological 
phenomenon in order to visualise digital phenomena. Cloud computing 
performs a paradoxical function in the paradigm of the cloud concept. 
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Clouds appear at once new and revolutionary, yet in doing so, ideas about 
clouds are concretised into a metaphorical tenor; concepts of clouds are re-
disclosed as a-historical and “natural”. It is this relationship, or this concept-
appearing-as-natural, that is the focus of the thesis, not simply the “use” of a 
metaphor for computing. 
This goes beyond the digital cloud. In the previous example, the 
artists HeHe were drawn to use clouds—in this case industrial pollutant 
clouds—to mediate an environmentalist critique. Though this to some extent 
displaces the contemporary production of clouds by industry, it arguably 
recapitulates the paradigmatic totality of the mediation of the present 
through clouds. In all of the above examples, from artworks, cloud 
appreciation societies, economic handbooks for the computing industries, to 
media theorists, the present is being re-rooted through clouds. This performs 
the function of concretising the conceptual dynamics of clouds. The self-
referentiality of the cloud concept is arguably its predominant feature, over 
and above any decreed qualities of clouds. The cloud concept has become 
instated over time, as an accretion. However, this accretion has the 
appearance of newness—or so the tendency for artists and social media 
users to gravitate towards this #clouds trend would suggest.  
In Dick Hebdige’s seminal work on subcultural style, he writes 
against this production of paradigmatic cultural forms, arguing that during 
the 1960s ‘the most mundane objects[...] like [Jean Genet’s] tub of vaseline, 




self-imposed exile’.84 For Hebdige, objects that were once talisman for anti-
normative subcultures become absorbed and incorporated into the dominant 
cultural mythology.85 Anti-normative concepts, radical forms, phenomena 
and ideas, transition toward ‘trending’ as a contemporary ideology. 
Following Hebdige, I will now counterpoint contemporary artists, media 
theorists and some aspects of eco-criticism, with preceding works from 
1960s artists. In part, this will expose the cloud concept as a complex 
inheritance of an emergent 1960s concept of clouds as anti-normative, 
radical or environmentalist forms. Principally, this will expose the 
axiomatic function of the “cloudlike,” as an adjective that catalogues a 
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Figure 5: Andy Warhol, Silver Balloons (1966). 
 
1960s CLOUD, or Silver Kool-Aid Acid Gas Becomings 
 
The aforementioned art collective HeHe intermittently produce silkscreen 
prints and posters as part of their activism, often referencing their work to 
the familiar posters produced by an anonymous artist for May 1968 riots of 
Paris (see figures 6–7). 
 
Figures 6–7: HeHe, Nuage Vert aura-t-il lieu, silkscreen print, 66 x 46 cm 
(2009) and anon. La lutte continue, activist poster (1968). 
 
Doing so, they identify their politics with the militant radicalism of the 
Polish March 1968, May ’68, the armed struggles in Latin America, and the 
anti-war and Black Power movements in the US, amongst others.86 HeHe 
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supplement a green cloud for the left-wing fist of solidarity in the well-
known poster, alluding to an idea of clouds as socialist forms of uprising. 
Fredric Jameson and Marianne DeKoven state the importance of remaining 
critical of sentimentalising the 1960s, suggesting we should avoid 
overstating the revolutionary significance of those years. 87  That said, 
HeHe’s work begins to suggest that the 1960s could be a really useful optic 
for configuring what it means to be “cloudlike.” HeHe’s work is a 
provocation to situate the 1960s as an optic for understanding the way ideas 
of clouds transition from revolutionary significance to engineered forms that 
embed ecological consciousness within the logic of the economy. 
Several other contemporary artists reference the 1960s in their 
deployment of “cloudlike” forms. Martin Creed, in the work Half the Air in 
a Given Space (1998), gathers balloons in a gallery space and allows 
visitors to wander through the static of the room (see figure 8). Creed uses 
pink balloons, white balloons, multi-coloured balloons and silver balloons, 
alluding in this latter version of the artwork to Andy Warhol’s Silver Clouds 
(1966). Creed’s Work No.360: Half the Air in a Given Space was recently 
on display at The Henry Gallery in Washington (2015), where it was 
described as a ‘formless sea of spheres’.88 This description is striking since 
Creed’s work lacks any of the provocative qualities of the ‘formless’ that 
exist within Warhol’s work. In Silver Clouds, Warhol used new technology 
developed by Billy Kluver to make silver, heat-sealed, helium-filled 
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balloons that were allowed to drift around a gallery space. Jennifer Doyle 
and David Getsy offer a means to theorise the criticality of these 
clouds/balloons. Doyle and Getsy suggest that Warhol’s artistic gestures 
carry critical force because they exemplify what they term ‘queer 
formalism’, as works that exhibit anti-normative usages of cultural forms, or 
what they term the redeployment of objects ‘against their use as cultural 
capital’.89 These queer formalist gestures insist, Doyle and Getsy suggest, 
upon cultural forms as blocks of meaning, shaped by one formal logic and 
redeployed in another.90 When Warhol made his work Kluver’s technology 
was yet to be commodified through the cultural production of party 
balloons. Warhol’s materials have thus yet to attain their cultural capital, 
and hence when Warhol reassigns the balloons as ‘clouds’, what he really 
does is open the signification of clouds. He queers the forms of clouds, not 
the forms of balloons. The signification of the balloons is reciprocally 
opened through the ruptured signification of clouds. 
When Instagram users tag non-cloud images under #clouds they 
arguably employ what Hebdige describes as the repositioning, 
recontextualising and subversion of forms. Yet rather than mediating queer 
formalist gestures, #clouds mediates the ideological and commodity form of 
clouds.91 More explicitly, the designer Marc Jacobs made reference to 
Warhol’s clouds when he filled the ceiling of his Autumn/Winter 2014 
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show with silver clouds.92 This displaces the radicality of Warhol’s artistic 
gesture. Similarly, the artist Berndnaut Smilde secured a place in the Saatchi 
Gallery and Saatchi auctions by producing ‘indoor clouds’, and now 
collaborates to photograph his clouds with the likes of Karl Lagerfeld, 
Donnatella Versace, Alber Elbaz and Dolce and Gabbana.93 When Warhol 
queered clouds and brought these subverted forms into the gallery space he 
explored what could disrupt the formal conventions of art, and implicitly 
asked how this rupture might be absorbed into the logic of art institutions. In 
these contemporary examples the axiomatic gesture of the “cloudlike” has 
lost any sense of institutional interruption. The intervention now confirms 
the logic of the gallery, and signals the entrapment of clouds within the 
institutions of art and the creative industries. 
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Figure 8: Martin Creed, Half the air in a given space (1998). 
 
Hal Foster has duly noted this enclosure of abject form within the 
institutional conventions of art. Commenting upon the complex political 
stakes of what he variously calls a contemporary aesthetic of formlessness, 
the anti-aesthetic, formless forms, or the informe, Foster writes: 
 
[...] when process opens up the work of art radically, it sometimes runs the 
risk of formlessness. For Bataille “the formless” was an operation pledged 
to undo any form that had become fixed, in particular fixed as meaning 
(which he tended to regard as ipso facto idealist). If detached from its 
transgression of the formal, the informe can become a meaning, even a 
value, in its own right, which Bataille would have rejected outright. The 
same is true of “the anti-aesthetic”; if removed from its agon with the 
aesthetic, it can become a protocol, even a principle, of its own. Such 
might be the risk, too, of painting that is asked to visualize the image flows 
of mass media that far exceed it, and of sculpture that is expected to be 
anti-formal as a matter of course.94 
 
For Foster, formlessness is a fixed concept that encodes postmodern 
aesthetic sensibility. In this respect, formlessness lacks the critical qualities 
of intervening into any ideological state of stasis, and is instead shifted to 
the status of immobile norm, protocol, code or principle. Bataille employed 
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the term ‘l’informe’ as an anti-systematic movement of thinking. This anti-
systematic operation of formlessness was equally celebrated in Yve-Alain 
Bois and Rosalind Krauss’s 1996 publication Formless: A User’s Guide¸ the 
catalogue to an exhibition in the Pompidou Centre, Paris, yet it has since 
been opened to critique by Foster, and likewise by theorists James Elkins 
and Harper Montgomery, David Joselit, Richard Flood, Laura Hoptman and 
Massimiliano Gioni.95 In their co-authored introduction entitled ‘The Use 
Value of “Formless”’, Bois and Krauss celebrate the formless as an act of 
sabotage that is put to work in the avant-garde and modernist practice of 
disappointing aesthetic expectations and laying to waste ‘the academic 
world and the spirit of the system’ of exchangeability in art.96 They revisit 
Bataille’s analysis of Manet’s refusal of ideological codes in Olympia, and 
suggest that the formless is the quality of an action that does not produce an 
art object with typical exchangeable value within the given ideological 
codes of art. A formless action is instead ‘an operation (which is to say, 
neither a theme, nor a substance, nor a concept)’.97 This act of tearing is, for 
Foster, a principle of art in its institutional content, and hence the tear no 
longer intervenes into any social programme. 
Through this critique of the formless it becomes possible to identify 
the affirmative quality of Creed’s work when compared with the 
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subversiveness of Warhol’s Silver Clouds. Creed is referencing a critical 
aesthetic operation that no longer intervenes into the ideological codes of 
art, but has rather become the ideological code of art. The operation of 
bringing clouds indoors has become systemically operationalised, and thus 
it has shed any of the political interventionist spirit of its anti-systematic 
aesthetic. On this basis, I want to propose that the queer, ‘anti-aesthetic’ 
qualities of clouds are part of the postmodern rubric of the cloud concept.98 
If the anti-aesthetic of clouds as queer or queering forms was an operation 
identifiable with avant-garde practice, then the 1960s saw the emergence of 
the ideological operationalisation of clouds as the horrifying fulfilment of 
this renunciation of order. Through the 1960s, the system learns to 
recuperate through the anti-systematic renunciation of its logic. 
Broadening the bases of this suggestion, William E. Connolly has 
astutely suggested that ‘it is now possible to draw a philosophy of 
becoming, the trajectory of political economy and appreciation of the 
fragility of things into close communication’.99 Connolly’s words ring true 
when reading the works of various writers employing the concepts central to 
a philosophy of becoming (rhizomatic, planes, deterritorialisation), which 
Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello diagnose as the managerial logic of late 
capitalism.100 
It is fascinating to relate this to the work of Franco Moretti and 
Dominique Pestre, who employ Moretti’s method of quantitative formalism 
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to undertake a frequency analysis of the content of the World Bank’s yearly 
report between 1946-2012. Moretti and Pestre identify a metamorphosis in 
the linguistic codification of the Bank Report, drawing conclusions about 
the semantic evocations of these syntactic transmutations: between 1946 
and 2012, a semantic ‘atmosphere of factuality’ drops away, giving way to 
gerunds (‘ing’ words) and progressive verb forms.101  Both grammatical 
conventions denote actions that are yet to be completed. As such, gerunds 
and progressive verbs denote a ‘blurred, slightly amorphous temporality’, 
as, Moretti and Pestre continue:  
 
[...] the function of gerunds consists in leaving an action’s completion 
undefined, thus depriving it of any definite contour. An infinitely 
expanding present emerges, where policies are always in progress, but also 
always only in progress. Many promises, and few facts[...] All change, and 
no future.102 
 
Pestre and Moretti expose the economic substrate of what I am presenting as 
an emergent 1960s logic of queer or radical cloud forms. The post-1950s era 
that Moretti and Pestre describe is marked by the linguistic shift from 
concrete to vapour, from noun to verb, from perfect past to continuous 
present. This era is thus marked by the shift from form to form-as-a-
happening––from form to form as only-ever-forming. In line with Boltanski 
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and Chiapello, the transition from form to forming (from being to 
becoming) is symbolic of the perversion of artistic critique, which has been 
neutralised into an ever-wider ideological morality of capital.103 As this 
framework extends, so too does the logic of becoming, and with that, the 
move form to forming.  
Late capitalism puts the gerund into action. On this basis, I find it 
really provocative to discover the following passage in Tim Ingold’s 
ostensibly eco-critical work: 
 
[...] the earth is ‘earthing’, continually growing and sprouting as a melange 
of material flows, practical activities, perceptive observations and personal 
stories, and its shape is woven from all of these 
[...] 
Nor are clouds objects. Each is rather an incoherent, vaporous tumescence 
that swells and is carried along in the currents of the medium. To observe 
the clouds is not to view the furniture of the sky but to catch a fleeting 
glimpse of the sky-in-formation, never the same from one moment to the 
next. [my emphases]104 
 
Ingold offers the ideology of forming as if this were an intervention into the 
sustaining ideologies of climate injustice. Doing so, he claims that clouds 
are not objects but a phenomenal feature of the ‘earthing’, the ‘sky-in-
formation’. This application of the gerund can be located in the 
contemporary discourse of the computing industries. Looking primarily at 
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engineer and economist handbooks produced for prospective investors or 
systems designers of the cloud computing industry, the authors of these 
works often shift away from speaking in concrete terms whenever they 
attempt to define that industry as a new form of technology. For Borko 
Furht and Jinzy Zhu, in the Handbook of Cloud Computing, and Weinman, 
in Cloudonomics, the computational networks of the computing industry is 
designated as enabling streamlined, on-demand, dynamically-scalable, 
automated, remote, low-labour cost, low-skills requirement systems.105 In 
this operational definition, Weinman follows the terminology developed by 
Ramnath Chellappa in the 1997 paper at a meeting of the Institution for 
Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS), where 
Chellappa theorises the cloud computing industry as an entirely economic 
phenomenon.106 This definition was later formalised in the 2011 definition 
given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
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Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction. This cloud is composed of five essential 
characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.107 
 
Rather than delivering on the promised ‘simple taxonomy’ of cloud services 
and their deployment, the industrial relations that they describe emerges in 
this definition as a sociotechnology of becoming.108 The cloud computing 
industry is the ‘enabling’ of technology to create social patterns of provision 
and release, pooling and convenience. Elsewhere, Microsoft cloud engineers 
inform us that this industrial phenomenon is made up of ‘patterns’ and 
‘practices’.109 Morretti and Prestre’s critique of the gerunds of the World 
Bank Reports haunts this definition of the cloud computing industry, in the 
terminology of ‘comput-ing’ and ‘enabl-ing’. It is thus unsurprising to find 
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Business leaders interested in the future of enterprise technology should 
stop thinking of “the cloud” as a noun and start thinking about “clouding” 
as a verb.110  
 
The industry of cloud computing is a technological architecture that is 
complicit in the ideologies of becoming, forming and earthing. The 
proposed shift from the concrete noun to the gerund ‘–ing’ form thus 
emphasises the centrality of the ideology of forming to the structures, 
systems and services that make up this service-oriented industry. The 
Amazon Elastic Cloud (EC2) encapsulates this shift, as it promises a 
constantly mutating and becoming form of computing services. The concept 
of clouds, that is being used to describe the cloud computing industry, thus 
entails the logic of labour forming whereby the industry of computing 
capabilises the exploitation of exceptions (leisure time, sleep time, the lives 
of subaltern workers) or excesses of work. The cloud concept is an 
emblematic open architecture of work and labour. The cloud concept, in its 
elasticity, is thus an emblem of this capitalist logic of forming, of the 
transmutation of signifying processes into an imposed constancy of change 
with no promise of a future. 
Linked to this concept of clouds as open or elastic architectures is 
the related scientific philosophy of clouds as epistemological ruptures in 
thought or knowledge; or of clouds as metaphysical ruptures in the 
computational logic of modern meteorological science. In the reports of the 
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IPCC–considered the lead scientific output of climate studies–the authors 
reflect upon the difficulty that clouds present for the numerical 
parametisation of Climate Modelling Systems. 111  The computer power 
needed to model the climate down to the time-space scale of a cloud would 
make climate modelling inefficient, and so invariably clouds are instead 
rendered parametrically through a law of averages that processes probable 
variations in cloud cover within a given cube of the atmosphere (Balkin’s 
work aptly depicts this imagined cuboid of parametised cloud). Modern 
meteorology has thus, since at least as long as the IPCC reports, been 
advancing through marking and remarking upon the ‘epistemological 
rupture’ of clouds, in keeping with Gaston Bachelard’s theory of scientific 
advancement.112 Bachelard viewed science as proceeding through historical 
tears and tearing, and while he speaks on much broader terms, the way 
clouds exist for contemporary meteorologists (largely computer scientists) 
exemplifies this scientific procedure. The cloud is hence an object-as-tear 
within the sciences, and the parametisation of clouds arguably smooths over 
what is constituted as an ostracised and pathologised form of clouds. 
Clouds are pathologised on an on-going basis through a renewed 
view of clouds as scientifically objective epistemological ruptures. I want to 
bring this into the rubric of the gerund or the ‘–ing’, as examined above, in 
order to suggest that the formula of clouds as a tear is better thought of as an 
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ideology of clouds as tearing. This formulation of clouds as tearing is 
sustained by literature and theory that takes clouds as ecological metaphors 
for inconstancy, or tears of unknowing. This is evident in the working 
concept of clouds at play in Ingold’s work, cited above, where he writes that 
clouds are not objects, and where he deploys the gerund as philosophy of 
nature.113 Yet Ingold is not alone in this theorisation of clouds and not-
becomings, and his ideas express a central tenet of clouds in cultural studies 
of climate, weather and the ecology, and across Ingold’s field of so-called 
eco-philosophy. The different iterations of eco-philosophy, inclusive of the 
metaphysical formulations of the ecology within Speculative Realism, 
‘Thing Theory’ or Object-Oriented-Ontology of Graham Harman et al., 
produce questionable titles such as Projit Bihari Mukharji’s ‘The “Cholera 
Cloud” in the Nineteenth-Century “British World”: History of an Object-
Without-an-Essence’, where these fields are compounded into a study of 
clouds as ‘lacuna’, as ‘“extra-rational” objects’; and as ‘constantly in 
motion’, with ‘no stable essential identity’, ‘repeatedly and always refigured 
and internally heterogeneous’.114 Counterintuitively, this anti-essentialising 
analysis of clouds, which seeks to attend to the heterogeneity of form, 
merely serves to essentialise the (anti-)logic of clouds as tearing, serving 
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also to necessitate the method of ‘transcendental empiricism’, borrowed 
from Gilles Deleuze via Levi Bryant, which Mukharji adopts.115  
 The ideology of clouds as tearing thus extends far beyond the 
bounds of contemporary meteorology, into and through the eco-critical 
literary treatment of the science of meteorology. Richard Hamblyn’s The 
Invention of Clouds: How an amateur meteorologist forged the language of 
the skies (2002) is a particularly provocative example, as he offers a cultural 
history of science without ever seriously interrogating the cultural politics of 
those scientific constructs.116 This is especially evident in the romanticism 
of clouds as unknowable or as immaterial forms. In The Cloud Book: How 
to Understand the Skies (2008), and in Extraordinary Skies: Skies of the 
unexpected from the beautiful to the bizarre (2009), Hamblyn poeticises the 
science of clouds as tearing forms by translating meteorological tenets of 
clouds into a contemporary cultural discourse, leaning this upon the literary 
canon: ‘altocumulus lenticularis’ clouds are classified both as the product of 
orographic lifting (CM4 in the World Meteorological Society’s International 
Cloud Atlas) and as the inspiration for Shakespeare’s scene between Young 
Hamlet and Polonius (where Hamlet spots ‘a camel... a weasel... a whale’, 
in Hamlet, Act III, scene ii).117 In all of his works, Hamblyn resists 
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rigorously interrogating culturally constituted ideas of clouds as tearing 
forms, and guarantees a wide readership for his work by continuing to 
employ the discourse of the “ephemeral” or the “fleeting” that has come to 
define clouds. Such works remain committed to a working concept of 
clouds as tearing forms. 
In the 1960s, this particular idea of clouds as tearing forms and as 
anti-epistemological objects emerged as an idea of clouds as ruptures or 
tears, specifically within environmentalist aesthetic critiques of the political 
economy. On 1st August 1975, Dutch artist and hippy activist Fons Elders 
led a co-operative experimental landscape project called Zeevang in North-
Holland, publishing the photographic documentation and notes under the 
title Luchte, water, vuur, aard: experimenteel landscapsproject 
“Zeevang”=Air, Water, Fire, Earth: Experimental Landscape Project 
“Zeevang” (1977).118 His fellow artist Johan Claassen contributed to the 
landscape project by sitting in a DIY wooden box, measuring 1.5m3, set 
upon ten-foot stilts, containing a chair, table and a mirror, allowing the 
occupier to study a mirror-image of the clouds passing above the box. 
Claassen called his work the cloud/mirrorbox. Claassen was not the only 
attendant artist using clouds as part of the Zeevang aesthetic. Jan van 
Munster set up two cameras, a day-camera and a night-camera, both 
equipped with 28mm film, pointed at the sky. Munster made photos during 
July, August and September, at 12-noon and at midnight. While Claassen 
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was journaling clouds from inside cloud/mirrorbox and while Munster was 
taking photos of the passing clouds, Pieter Engels surprised the collective by 
arranging for a small fleet of aeroplanes to fly over the site, dragging an 
advertisement banner that read ‘Wolk,’ the Dutch for ‘cloud’ (see figure 9). 
 
     Figure 9: Pieter Engels, [Wolke,] Zeevang Collective (1975). 
 
Engels’ work is striking because the word Wolk, though standing in as a 
sign for a cloud, cannot perform as a full semantic supplement. In the 
Zeevang collective documentation, the sky event is described as follows:  
 
To clear up every misunderstanding about Zen and the idea ‘cloud’, Pieter 
Engels has put the relationship of the triad reality, language and thinking in 




the idea ‘cloud’; no idea ‘cloud’ without the word ‘cloud’, but sometimes 
the word ‘cloud’ without a ‘real’ cloud.119 
 
The Wolk thus makes reference to its own function as a linguistic signifier 
disassociated from its ‘real’ referent, symptomatic of 1960s strategies of 
linguistic freeplay. The artwork makes reference to Benjamin’s meditations 
around the linguistic chains of signification catalysed by the word Wolke, 
particularly in the way that this dispersal or tearing of meaning, set up by 
the word for cloud, was then celebrated in the 1986 essay from Werner 
Hamacher, ‘The Word Wolke––If It Is One’.120 Hamacher follows Benjamin 
and Engels in using the signifier ‘clouds’ to affirm the post-structuralist 
jouissance of linguistic freeplay, establishing the difference between the 
word ‘Wolke’ and the heterogeneity of clouds. ‘Cloud’ (to follow 
Hamacher’s employment of the singular form) is ‘never one and never 
assumes a lasting form’.121 Binarising this heterogeneity of the reality of 
clouds and the singular, static form of the referent, thus allows Hamacher to 
maintain that language is without security.122 Pointing at the solidity of the 
word Wolke is taken as an aesthetic and theoretical intervention into the 
assumption that that stable form can be tethered to the sky. This frees 
language of its relation to reality, in much the manner Engels sought to do 
with his own Wolk artwork at Zeevang. 
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Fredric Jameson contextualises these postmodern efforts to tear 
language, through radical, political movements that sought to break from the 
dominant cultural or political logic, suggesting that in 1967 signs radically 
broke from referents, followed by the further rupture of signifiers from the 
signified.123 This destabilisation of meaning was sought, as Jameson has 
highlighted, by anti-capitalist political movements and theorists alike in the 
1960s and into the early 1970s. Movements that sought to purify the sign of 
its normative and hegemonic role did so by tearing it from its established 
semantics. The Wolk of Engels’ work embodies this aesthetic strategy. It is a 
word that has been torn from its conventional ecological referent through 
being made to perform as an inadequate supplement.  
And it is with this in mind that I want to relate this strategy of 
tearing to the Zeevang art collective’s more general agenda, as an 
environmentalist, anti-capitalist group. In an opening statement of the 
collective’s aims, given in the 1977 book, they write:  
 
For most people today nature is an economic and esthetic experience and 
an accidental one. 
This book shows a new integration of art and philosophy as a consequence 
of the idea that nature is not private property and cannot be used 
arbitrarily, as the sciences, art and philosophy for the most part are using it 
today. 
Nature belongs to herself: she includes us.124 
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The Zeevang collective aimed to disassociate their perception of the natural 
environment from ‘economic and esthetic’ experience. The journal entry 
that Claassen made whilst sitting in cloud/mirrorbox reads as follows:  
 
Saturday, September 20th, 1975 
[...] 
I will let this discussion between my eye and my intellect dissolve into a 
chemical solution in the milky substance right in front of me. The light wall 
begins to dissolve itself in moving fields of milky and watery colours, 
which people call ‘clouds’. On the door of this black box stands 
‘cloudbox’.125 
 
It might be reasonable to speculate that Claassen was on LSD in the 
cloudbox. The style of perceiving the world from this disassociated 
perspective of the ‘black box’ has remarkable overlaps with LSD trip 
narratives. Indeed, on reading this passage from Claassen, I cannot help but 
think of Anaïs Nin’s famous LSD journal entry, where Nin attempts to 
describe her psychotropic drug-induced disassociation from the material 
world in the following way: ‘doors, walls, and windows were liquefying. 
All rigidities disappeared’.126  
Fons Elders was instrumental in instigating disassociation as the general 
aesthetic of Zeevang’s rural art collective. Four years prior to gathering on a 
farm in the North-Netherlands, Elders conducted the so-called ‘Lost 
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Interview’ with Michel Foucault, before moderating the 1971 televised 
Chomsky–Foucault debate as an episode of the Dutch initiative, the 
International Philosophers Project.127 Foucault’s anti-humanist critique of 
biopolitical mechanisms of power runs through the Zeevang agenda, 
expressed as a desire to de-naturalise the idea that nature is ‘private 
property’. They seek to tear nature from this culturally produced concept of 
the ecology as an object or form of the political economy. 
This deployment of clouds can be further contextualised through the 
contemporaneous work of Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998). In 1971, 
Lyotard published Discourse, Figure, his thèse de doctorat d’État.128 Here, 
Lyotard theorises the nonconceptuality of works of art.129 Then in the later 
work Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event, published in 1988, Lyotard offers 
what Gayle M. Ormiston has aptly termed a ‘propaedeutic’ of Discourse, 
Figure.130 Providing a key to his Discourse, Figure, Lyotard associates 
clouds with the nonconceptuality of art, stating he is in pursuit of ‘new 
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Thoughts are not registered by areas, except of human commodity. 
Thoughts are clouds. The periphery of thoughts is as immeasurable as the 
fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot. Thoughts are pushed and pulled at 
variable speeds. They are deep, although core and skin are of the same 
grain. Thoughts never stop changing their location one with the other.132 
 
Lyotard is seeking to naturalise thought in a manner that will bypass the 
problematic procedures of essentialism and universalism so central to 
structuralist and high modernist movements. Clouds mediate this critical 
move. The assertion ‘Thoughts are clouds’, followed by Mandelbrot’s 
fractal theory of clouds as ‘immeasurable’, naturalises Lyotard’s aesthetic 
theory of clouds as ‘changing’ forms. 
In this manner, the emergent aesthetic of clouds in the late twentieth 
century capitalised upon the perception of these ecological phenomena as 
constantly changing, in an effort to tear through the idea of form as 
constant. This theory of form was associated with rationalising, dominant 
ideologies of structuralist schools of thought. At the Languages of Criticism 
and the Sciences of Man conference at the Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore, which took place on October 18–21, 1966, Derrida described 
early efforts at post-structuralism and deconstruction as ‘destructive 
discourses’.133 He continued to suggest that these discourses seek to disrupt 
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‘the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations’ of structuralism, yet such 
interventions and strategies can easily be absorbed back into the normative 
codes.134 He retorts: 
 
The opposition is part of the system, along with the reduction. And what I 
am saying here about the sign can be extended to all the concepts and all 
the sentences of metaphysics, in particular to the discourse on 
“structure.”135 
 
For Derrida, post-structuralist, radicalising movements were always 
overshadowed with the capacity to reciprocally produce structure. The 
implications of this insight have been aptly highlighted by Seb Franklin, 
who theorises the relation between ‘form’ and ‘formlessness’, critiquing 
how ‘that which is disavowed as formless is also that which makes form 
possible’.136 In line with his astute suggestion that capital accumulation and 
dispossession is at base a process of forming that makes use of the formless, 
or even, a process of forming that makes use of a process of tearing, I want 
to relate Franklin’s argument to contemporary theorisations of 
semiocapitalism. Where Hal Foster offered a means to see the emergent 
aesthetics of clouds transitioning into a contemporary working concept of 
clouds as forming, the theory of semiocapitalism offers a contemporary 
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optic for picturing the rupture, break or tear as a working concept of clouds 
as tearing.  
The term ‘semiocapitalism’ is attributable to Left-thinker Franco 
‘Bifo’ Berardi (b.1949), who has attempted to reveal that the action of 
tearing or rupture no longer intervenes into the dominant logic of the 
political economy, but has instead become the dominant economic logic 
through which the social is ordered. 137  In Berardi’s theory of 
semiocapitalism, the de-regulation of the market following the economic 
crisis led to the effective linguistic freeplay of virtual economic signifiers. 
This mechanism of disassociation is fundamental both to the economic lexis 
of neoliberal markets and to the business model of cloud computing as a 
global industrial phenomenon and network of social relations. Sean Cubitt 
in particular, highlights that semiocapitalism not only instates symbols as 
the primary mode of cultural and economic production and trade; Cubitt 
additionally argues that semiocapitalism harnesses desires for connection, 
community and education.138 The industry of cloud computing is a business 
model where these harnessed desires are compounded with this mechanism 
of disassociation. As Cubitt remarks, the ‘transactional costs of electronic 
data transfers in cloud services’ exemplify the semiocapitalist ‘dissociation 
of consumption from environmental impact’, while the industry of cloud 
computing harnesses the desire for social consumption through the rhetoric 
of ‘resource pooling’.139 The working concept of clouds thus capitalises 
upon the ecological forms in order to use them to model post-structuralist 
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ideologies of tearing, ripping, rupture or break. Doing so lays a moral 
ground for capital. The realities of material waste and human exploitation 
are predicated on the dissociation or tearing of the symbolic from the 
material. 
The working concept of clouds is hence a complex inter-relation of 
tearing and forming. These conceptual counterparts are made inseparable 
through clouds. As such, clouds are axiomatic of the co-dependence of tears 
and forms. The concept of clouds perpetuates the ideology of forming in a 
manner that makes every-thing seem process; in a state of modification; 
elastic; dynamic and changing. The mediation of the ideology of tearing 
through clouds builds upon this notion of perpetuity yet does so in a manner 
that harnesses its allusions to immateriality, in order to put forth an idea of 
clouds symbolically un-tethered to reality.  
If the cloud concept mediates the ideologies of cloud computing as 
an industrial form, then what was it about the conceptuality of clouds in the 
1960s that suggested these ecological phenomena to artists and technocrats 
alike, as ideal forms for mediating human desires for connection, or for 
mediating the otherwise terrifying anti-metaphysical, revolutionary ideal 
that everything is changing, nothing is stable and all being is becoming?  
To answer this question, I now want to turn to some contemporary 
examples of artists who are using clouds to suggest a sense of community, 
before reflecting upon the trajectory of this thinking from the 1960s. I will 
focus upon Palo Alto, the region where Silicon Valley is home to pioneers 




concept as a sociotechnology that was formalised in experiments with 
drugs, art and software design. 
In the works written about in Art in the Anthropocene: Encounters 
Among Aesthetics, Politics, Environments and Epistemologies (2015), 
edited by Heather Davis and Etiennne Turpin, contemporary artist Tomás 
Saraceno, humanities researcher Sasha Engelman and social scientist 
Bronislaw Szerszynski , document their work on a project called ‘Becoming 
Solar’.140 This work offers participants the opportunity to commune in 
‘shifting assemblies’ called cloud cities–‘cumulo-cities, cirrus-cities, 
stratocumulo-cities’–which they argue will activate an ‘aerosolar society’ 
challenging the ‘existing, politically demarcated volumes partitioning the 
atmosphere’.141 This association of clouds with ideals of communality runs 
through Engelman’s other work, where she suggests that the ‘poetics of air’ 
can be politically motivated to make artworks that are both affective and 
political in form, where people can gather together in a ‘collective sensing 
of the atmosphere’.142 The suggestion seems to be, as in Szerszynski’s own 
writings about eco-art, that clouds are eco-active forms or spaces where we 
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can commune and gather together to recognise our responsibility to the 
environment.143  
 Yet this concept of clouds is the dominant conceptual framework 
running through the economist and engineer handbooks of the cloud 
computing industries. This industry looks to enmesh humans “into clouds,” 
questioning the knowledge that we are separate from the skies. We 
encounter our computer screens and enter the cloud as a “user.” As “users” 
of the cloud, the actions and interactions of human beings become ordered 
into particular forms, through largely involuntary subjection to the 
infrastructure of the cloud computing industry.144 While Gleick and Hu 
independently attribute this operation of socialisation to the specific use of 
cloud metaphors by technology corporations, Franklin looks more broadly 
at the cloud as a medium of the social; in keeping with Fredric Jameson’s 
suggestion that the social reality of late capitalism structures human beings 
into biocapital, Franklin assesses the cloud of cloud computing as a 
sociotechnology.145 For Franklin, this cultural logic of the cloud not only 
entails the organisation of human beings into certain social arrangements. 
He also suggests that the cloud metaphor works by suspending the sense of 
materiality, as emblems of what Franklin has termed the ‘ideology of 
immateriality’. 146  This idea is also evident in the work by Saraceno, 
																																																								
143 Bronislaw Szerszynski, ‘Reading and Writing the Weather: Climate 
Technics and the Moment of Responsibility’, Theory, Culture and Society, 
27.2–3 (2010), 9–30. 
144 Hu, A Prehistory of The Cloud (2015). 
145 Seb Franklin, ‘Cloud Control, or The Network as Medium’, Cultural 
Politics, 8.3 (2012). See also Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991); Seb Franklin, 
Control: Digitality as a Cultural Logic (London: MIT Press, 2015). 




Engelman and Szerszynski. Clouds are made to serve as emblems of 
formlessness; promoting the illusion of an online commons, as if we can 
exist together in the ‘immaterial’ realms of social media and other forms of 
cloud-based interactions. Digitality employs a concept of clouds in order to 
suspend the sense of the materiality of its networks, making a virtual hole in 
the knowledge we have of the actuality of bunkers, wires, cables and fibre 
optics––concentrations of labour that are signified by the bunkers that house 
this global industry, the exploitation of those working to make 
computational networks appear seamless, and the inevitable sovereign 
operations of power that these formulations entail. 
These critical assessments must be run alongside those of 
communications theorist John Durham Peters, who has recently argued that 
‘[Media] are our infrastructures of being, the habitats and materials through 
which we act and are’.147 In this vein, Peters argues that media brings us 
into being. Media is a system of social engagement that calls the individual 
into being, existing in accordance with media-based social norms. As 
Ronald E. Day makes clear, computational media calls us into being as 
‘users’.148 As Seb Franklin has argued, alongside the likes of Maurizio 
Lazzarato, sociotechnology digitality fashions populations into displaced 
workers or active “users,” for whom the illusion of co-existence allows for 
the sustained practices of ‘immaterial’ labour that digitality equally 
																																																								
147 John Durham Peters, ‘Understanding Media’, The Marvelous Clouds: 
Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015), pp.13–52, p.15. 
148 Ronald E. Day, ‘Social Computing and the Indexing of the Whole’, 
Indexing It All: The Subject In the Age of Documentation, Information, and 




affords.149 Hu builds upon this argument by looking at exploited labourers 
who work to sustain the illusion that the cloud is seamless; these formless 
forms of labour anonymise human beings into non-existence by the 
normativizing bias of digitality’s interpellations.150 
Let me be clear then, that communing, assembling or gathering in 
clouds is an ideological formulation of these ecological phenomena that 
commits one’s thinking to the frameworks of computational media, both as 
a mechanism of identity construction and as a polluting industry. Moreover, 
this technology is identity-constitutive only insofar as humans are both 
positively produced and negative construed through the term ‘user’.151 At its 
most trivial, an individual who pointedly avoids using tools like Google, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and Twitter, or who avoids dumping their 
data in cloud-based repositories, resists their interpellation as a ‘user’ of the 
cloud. The cycle of trends for deleting or de-activating Facebook reveals 
both the pull of this interpellation as a mechanism of identity constitution 
and the mechanism of non-existence that comes into play when one steps 
out of the terms set by digitality. Cloud-based computational media employ 
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clouds as mechanisms for producing the “human.” If we exist in the terms 
of the cloud, we socially exist. In the cloud, we exist as a Timeline. In the 
cloud, we exist in our Followers. In the cloud, we exist as a packet of data 
housed behind a cloud widget on the Apple iCloud Website.  
However, beyond the triviality of existing or not existing in 
accordance with the norms that define what happens in the cloud, Franklin, 
Hu and others reveal that we are all implicitly called into these pervasive 
sociotechnological structures. These structures can call humans into non-
existence. In this respect, it is useful to remember the work of cultural 
theorist Stuart Hall, particularly his open affiliation with the work and 
writings of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. What Franklin and Jameson 
term a ‘cultural logic’, and Durham Peters provocatively terms an 
‘infrastructure of being’, Hall would call a ‘logic of arrangement’.152 Logic, 
Infrastructure, Cultural, Structural; the conflation of terms makes 
transparent the extent to which computational communalism structures 
people into included and excluded roles, operating as binary mechanism of 
being and non-being.153 
I think we can ground this association of clouds with notions of 
being and non-being through looking at artists who use clouds to open a 
collective, aesthetic experience. In 1966, the artist Diter Rot (a pseudonym 
for Dieter Roth, b.1930-1998) began sending sketches and notes to the poet 
Emmett Williams (1925-2007), before later instructing Williams to 
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photocopy the doodles for publication in 1968.154 The DIY aesthetic of the 
finished work follows Rot’s meticulous instructions, to Williams, to ‘keep 
all accidental holes, smudges, dirt, tears, on the films[...] throw the films on 
the printing plate quickly and carelessly and develop and print’.155 This DIY 
aesthetic discloses the process of the book’s production, and serves the 
overall activist agenda that comes through in Rot’s annotations. Rot writes: 
 
169. my pictures – all the stuff i have 
                                         seen ––  , 
let them fight for me, 156 
 
Rot uses clouds to reach out to a community, as a human form of 
communication, in the face of the emerging detached sociality of 
postmodern hyper-individualism. Clouds service the sociality of the work. 
They work across the detachment of the work, to extend the process of the 
work to the reader.  
Rot’s aesthetic overlaps with various 1960s conceptual works from 
Fluxus artists Yoko Ono (b.1933) and Geoffrey Hendricks (b.1931). In 
Yoko Ono’s Painting to See the Skies (1961), she gives the following set of 
instructions: 
 
PAINTING TO SEE THE SKIES 
Drill two holes into a canvas.  
Hang it where you can see the sky.  
(Change the place of the hanging.  
Try both the front and the rear windows,  
to see if the skies are different.) 
1961 Summer157 
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The following year, Ono produced a set of instructions that inverted the 
logic of this work, entitled Painting for the Skies (1962): 
 
PAINTING FOR THE SKIES 
Drill a hole in the sky. 
Cut out a paper the same size 
as the hole. 
Burn the paper. 
The sky should be pure blue. 
1962 summer158 
 
Ono allows participants to enter into a community with one another through 
the outlined actions. This community is formed through the action of tearing 
two holes in a canvas and looking at the skies through these holes. This 
strategy was echoed in Geoffrey Hendricks’ work Erase everything, Paint 
sky on everything (1965).159 A series of cloud-based works by Hendricks 
invite participants into his artistic process of painting or printing clouds onto 
domestic objects: boots, pillowcases, t-shirts, underwear, a VW Beetle and 
even a gun, in Sky Gun (1968). In the work Sky Boots (c.1980), Hendricks 
painted an old pair of boots that he found in a barn, using acrylic blue and 
white, covering the boots in clouds. Hendricks said of his work that it 
represented a ‘density[...] a certain kind of unified poetic way’, elaborating 
that the boots are ‘an embodiment of the person’, and that they include 
himself ‘as a person’ too.160 Kristine Stiles has noted that the work recalls 
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Vincent van Gogh (1853-1890) and his many oil works depicting shoes, 
painted during his time in Paris, and later during his time in Arles (1888-
1890).161 For Jameson, van Gogh’s boots emblematise pre-industrial forms 
of labour, and hence Hendricks’ Sky Boots annul the models of work that 
the boots make implicit.162 With clouds, Hendricks suspends the sense of 
the boots. Where Van Gogh’s shoes once bore the heavy impression of 
human labour, these boot-simulacra shift the sense of the self as worker.  
 This brings into play the relationship between subject-forming and 
the tearing or disassociation implicit in self-transcendence. Hu, in A 
Prehistory of The Cloud, notes the geographical and ideological proximity 
of 1960s Stanford Research Institute engineers and avant-garde artists in 
Palo Alto.163 However, what Hu overlooks is that these drug cultures of the 
1960s are not incidentally nor geographically linked to the pioneering ideals 
of sociality that were drawn from New Communalism, imbued into cold war 
technocracy, and arguably realised in the cloud computing industry.164 Palo 
Alto was not simply a place where technocrats and hippy movements co-
existed, but a place where the LSD-culture included both Information 
Technology researchers and engineers. This fully instates clouds as techno-
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hippy emblems; models of drug-induced communion––or as emblems of the 
psychoactive resonance sought with others through drugs and through 
distributed ‘virtual’ networks.  
It is difficult to overlook the informal links between the use of the 
cloud icon in computing circles and the continued use of cloud icons, 
symbols and metaphors in hippy culture. In From Counterculture to 
Cyberculture (2006), Fred Turner gives a thorough account of emergence of 
network entrepreneurialism and Information Technology in the 1980s, 
referring the ideological roots and concepts of this global movement back to 
‘local, Bay area stories of LSD and countercultural transformation’.165 
Turner gives a detailed account of Stewart Brand’s role, both as a member 
of drug culture, and as an early pioneer of the overlap between of cybernetic 
theories and drug culture. Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog (est.1968 in San 
Francisco) exemplified this social promise of technology, bringing together 
cybernetic theories and software reviews, meditations on future technology 
and ethical debates of environmental issues.166 In a revealing predecessor to 
the Whole Earth Catalog, Brand employed systems principles and 
cybernetic theories to organise ‘Trips Festivals’, devised in 1965 as a 
continuation of the ‘acid tests’, before being monetised by Bill Graham.167 
These acid gatherings were built as ‘an environment, a happening, a 
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laboratory’, with ideals of permeable boundaries, de-hierarchised relations 
and nomadic structures, and sought on the whole to make the transcendental 
and the immanent dialectically navigable for participants, through 
supporting acid trips into and out of one’s own mind.168 Brand developed 
ideals of transcending one’s own mind, as part of a community, whilst 
embedded in this bohemian culture. He and his peers used the psychoactive 
drugs LSD, mescaline, psilocybin mushrooms, and amphetamines to 
attempt to reach a virtual and projected vision of pre-social sociality. 
These drug movements were at large in Palo Alto in San Francisco 
through the mid–late 1960s, in the region that is now home to Silicon Valley 
and global cloud-based social media site Facebook, cloud virtualisation 
software and services company VMWare, cloud content management and 
storage provider Box.net, Internet giant and digital industrial pioneers 
Google, mobile communications company Skype, PayPal and Survey 
Monkey, amongst others.169 Shunning hierarchy in favour of a sense of 
‘anarchic togetherness’, Brand’s countercultural yet technophilial ideas 
echoed the happenings of Allan Kaprow by giving a sense of ‘delicious, 
embodied’ communion.170 These happenings represented the colonisation of 
the Native American peyote cactus, conventionally used in religious 
ceremonies, which Arthur Heffer at the University of Leipzig isolated as the 
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crystal he named ‘mescal’.171 Palo Alto hippies coupled these mind-altering 
drugs, appropriated from Native American religious practice, with Hindu 
teaching in the forms of yoga practice, meditation and cannabis smoking, 
which, as Paul Oliver notes, was brought from India by Allen Ginsberg and 
others, who helped found Hindu religious centres in New York City and San 
Francisco, Haight-Ashbury area.172  
These appropriated practices were active components in forming a 
sense of community in Palo Alto and further afield. For example, Brand was 
an active, if ‘restrained, reflective’ member, of Ken Kesey’s group of Merry 
Pranksters.173 In a passage from the chapter ‘Cloud’, in Tom Wolfe’s The 
Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (1968), Wolfe documents an acid-fuelled 
journey to see The Beatles at Cow Palace, a venue outside San Francisco, 
when the Merry Pranksters take a highly concentrated, barely-visible form 
of LSD they call ‘acid gas’.174 Wolfe describes how the bus, the Pranksters, 
and everything outside the window ‘flow’ to the rhythm of the Beatles, 
playing in the Day-Glo school bus used by the Merry Pranksters. A road 
sign captures this confluence of self and outside world: 
 
––and then in that very moment, they all, the all in one, the one brain flow, 
see the mouldering sign silhouetted against the sky above the building: 
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      CLOUD 
 
Suddenly it seems like the Pranksters could draw the whole universe into . 
. . the movie . . .175 
 
Presumably ‘CLOUD’ appears in an advertisement, but the structure of 
Wolfe’s book also makes it possible that this is an acid-skewed reading of 
‘Cow Palace’. On account of these psychoactive effects of LSD, people at 
drug culture gatherings in the San Francisco Bay area were known 
colloquially as “heads”, as they are throughout Wolfe’s book. Reflecting on 
his own time in controlled experiments with mescaline, in California in 
1953, Aldous Huxley acknowledges the links between schizophrenia and 
the effects of psychoactive hallucinogens, writing that the ‘universal and 
ever-present urge to self-transcendence’ came together with ‘chemical 
vacations from intolerable selfhood and repulsive surroundings’.176 Through 
the concept of clouds, the computing industry idealises vacations from self 
and material surroundings. In yet another entry from Claassen, in cloudbox, 
he writes: 
 
Saturday night, November 6th, 1976 
 
All forms tonight are moonforms. 
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The cloudbox begins to exert an irresistible force on me. Each visit to this 
four-dimensional cube strengthens in me a feeling of moving space. 
The deeper the silence grows in this black cage, the more intensely space 
expands. [...] The cloudbox becomes a YIN-YANG-box, tiny and immense, 
dark and light, earth and heaven, silent and yet full of sounds.177 
 
Claassen’s lucid words sound like the imagined contemplation of what it 
feels like inside the ‘input/output’ of a black box computer. The pre-social 
reification of the cloud computing industry, as a virtual global village in the 
sky, masks over its inherent structures of material exclusion and abstraction. 
Because it is primarily a service, business or economic model, we struggle 
to find language to describe what it looks like or feels like inside an 
input/output system. It is difficult to speak about an open architecture. 
Hence, computing has made use of clouds, as a terminology already 
associated with disassociation from objective, material reality. Computing 
has made use of the communalism implied by clouds, or of the “trippy” 
association of clouds and a deeper, more spiritual social connection. 
The concept that we hold about clouds is thus that they befit 
descriptions of what is difficult to describe. More specifically, we use 
clouds to describe a shift from structured sociality to unstructured 
community, or the tearing of normative social codes to break boundaries. 
The flipside of our concept of clouds is the idea of forming. Clouds give 
form to things, in a continuum with their qualities as tearing forms. There 
are similarities between this paradoxical function of clouds and Catherine 
Malabou’s concept of flexibility, and the related formulation of plasticity, 
																																																								




inherited from Hegel and developed into a critique of capital.178 Malabou 
describes plasticity as the ‘interplay between form and itself’.179 This posits 
capital as a procedure not of economic profit and gain but of the production 
of forms. For Malabou, capital contains form and itself within the related 
models of flexibility and plasticity. This parallels the role of tearing and 
forming, with regard to the social implications of our concept of clouds. We 
think of clouds as not only tearing normative codes but as forming spaces of 
social possibility, as pertaining to the promise of communality and 
communication. Clouds are hence flexible or plastic concepts that contain 
social forming and ostensibly radical tearing. Our concept about clouds is 
that they facilitate a chemical vacation from a given social reality, that, like 
an ‘acid gas’, can become catalytic to a shared chemical vacation from 
selfhood. In this sense, clouds carry an implicit virtualising function. Clouds 
imply the non-conceptual remainder of the making of concepts itself. 
Clouds imply the undoing of materiality, or the tearing of matter toward the 
forming of self-transcendence or the immaterial. 
This remainder should be taken to imply an operation of exclusion, 
taking place through capitalist modes of social production. Even in the 
apparently radical association of clouds with drug trips, not everyone was 
on Ken Kesey’s Day-Glo bus, just as not everyone is welcome ‘in’ or ‘on’ 
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the cloud. However, the ideal of total community hangs on the overlooking 
the realities of the hierarchies of the community, the economics of drug 
abuse and the exclusivity of the group behind the Merry Prankster lifestyle, 
just as we must embrace the ideality of clouds as egalitarian forms if we are 
to embrace what the industry cloud computing is doing for society. Hence, 
Rot’s 246 little clouds, despite their punk, DIY, zine-aesthetic, to some 
extent pre-figure the more explicit sociality of the industry of cloud 
computing as a social structure of exclusion. Rot’s 246 little clouds are 
largely illegible; for readers, what the clouds essentially facilitate is an 
overheard, scrambled or encrypted closed loop of communication between 
Rot and his poet friend and editor Williams. Not everyone is welcome in 
these clouds and certainly not those without some prior knowledge of the 
aesthetic norms into which the book intervenes, permitting them playful 
appreciation for the irony of an illegible, amateurish book that takes clouds 






Chapter One: Gathering 
 
Computational social interpellation takes place in symbolic fields, through 
sociocultural and technical dialectical algorithms that gather up, sublimate, 
and exclude and include persons and texts toward the formation of users 
and documents, information needs and information, and increasingly 
collocated data.180 
Ronald E. Day––Indexing It All: The Subject in the Age of Documentation, 
Information, and Data (2014) 
 
The history of the Greek theatre must be understood as the history of 
bodies.181 
David Wiles, Greek Theatre Performance (2000) 
 
This chapter interrogates the working concept-being of clouds as spaces 
where people can gather together away from social law, looking to critique 
this formulation of gathering by unpacking the social and political history of 
clouds as paradigmatically nebulous rips in the social. The cloud concept is 
inflected with the valorisation of escapist practices as liberating vacations 
from the subject-structuring regulatory, stratifying and legislative orders of 
social form. Within the discursive history of the industrial phenomenon of 
cloud computing this is suggested by the peculiarly compatible techno-
fantasy and critique of digital networks as Greek agora.182 Industry theorist 
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Weinman opens Cloudonomics (2012) by meditating on the history of the 
coinage of ‘the cloud’, before continuing to relate a ‘human history’ of 
resource pooling.183 Weinman looks to this “human” history to justify the 
models of ‘resource pooling’ that are capabilised by ‘clouds’. As a source 
for this “human” history, Weinman cites Digital Capital (2000), by Don 
Tapscott, David Ticoll and Alex Lowy.184 These writers trace digital capital 
to the Greek ‘Agora’, defining that Greek word as follows: 
 
Agora. The agora of ancient Greece was originally the assembly of the 
ancient people, convoked by the king or one of his nobles. The word then 
came to mean the place where assemblies gathered, and this place then 
evolved to become the city’s center for public and especially commercial 
intercourse. We apply the term to markets where buyers and sellers meet to 
freely negotiate and assign value to goods185 
 
The overall suggestion is that the industry of cloud computing is a space of 
open exchange, where buyers and sellers can gather to engage in the 
economic discourse of free market capitalism. In Ancient Greek city-states, 
the agora was a market place where a political elite of men could gather to 
freely exchange goods and engage in political discourse or dialogue. The 
word ἀγορά (agora) means ‘any assembly, esp. an Assembly of the People; 
the place of Assembly, used not only for public debating, elections, and 
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trials, but also for buying and selling, and all kinds of business’.186 This 
style of thinking about the computer industries revisits the techno-fantasist 
content of 1990s Internet hype, such as Howard Rheingold’s Virtual 
Community (1993), which followed from works such as ‘Electronic 
Democracy’, featured in the Whole Earth Review (1991) and Tools For 
Thought (1985). 187  Rheingold proclaimed the potential of information 
networks to become truly democratic spaces for social gathering, comparing 
computational media to Greek agora.188 Equally, Langdon Winner, writing 
in 1985 for the Whole Earth Review, described idealisms emerging in the 
rhetoric surrounding information networks, as a participatory space that 
might promise false ‘prospects for participatory democracy[...] offering all 
the benefits of the ancient Greek city-state’.189 Winner’s contention points 
to the misplaced notions of citizenship and participation at work in the idea 
that computer networks are democratic spaces that can revolutionise the 
broader architectonics of society. 
Yet, the techno-fantasist qualification of a computer industry as 
Greek agora posits an oblique reading of this Greek social space, so as to 
subdue its exclusionary realities and bring to the fore archetypal merits of 
citizenship and communalism. Strikingly, the comparison of the cloud 
computing industry as a sociotechnological arrangement and the Greek 
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agora is not only anticipated by writers lauding the participatory potential 
of the Internet; the parallel between this sociotechnology and the Greek 
agora is reflected in the reactionary work of Kevin Robins and Frank 
Webster, in the article ‘Athens without slaves... or slaves without Athens? 
The Neurosis of Technology’.190 Robins and Webster follow a Habermasian 
critique of the public sphere, critiquing the Internet-as-agora as a ‘virtual’ 
technology for exploitation.191 Hence the epithet for networks: ‘Athens 
without slaves... or slaves without Athens?’ This critique of digital networks 
makes recourse to Greek agora, yet only so as to highlight the violent 
histories that undergird the modes of freedom these spaces permitted.  
It has been widely established in the field of Classics that exclusion 
and exploitation were foundational to the ostensibly democratic structures 
of the Greek city-state. Understanding the Greek city-state through a 
Marxist critique of class structures, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, radicalised the 
field of Classics in 1981, arguing that Greek democracy was founded upon 
class struggles involving ‘the exploitation of unfree [sic] (especially slave) 
labour’.192 More recent work has developed this critique of class struggle 
into a reflection on the architectonics of violence in Greek culture.193 Amy 
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Russell writes that ‘[the] equality of citizens within the agora rested on the 
exclusion or erasure of women, slaves, children, foreigners, and anyone else 
considered unworthy of political participation’.194 In the case of women and 
slaves, the psychosocial, rather than literal, exclusion from democratic 
participation in the agora served to reinforce their violent exclusion from 
participation in the polis. Even under the most forgiving assessment of 
Susan I. Rotroff and Robert Lamberton, who suggest that women’s concerns 
were vocalised in the agora, the contrasting cases of the exclusion of 
women give an overwhelming picture of violence against women.195 While 
some women did occasionally trade in the agora and others fought for civil 
rights, women were generally in the marketplace working as slaves, or, in 
the 4th century, restricted to the ‘women’s agora’ (gynaikeia agora), 
specialising in household goods. The agora was frequently used as a space 
for ‘slave sales’, dividing Greek culture into those who could trade and 
those whose lives were deemed tradable. 196  The Greek agora was 
surrounded by slaves being publicly and openly abused, whipped, hanged 
and threatened.197 To exist on this margin was to be qualified as structurally 
disposable within Greek culture. The marginalised populations who existed 
beyond the Greek agora (or who were being abused, whipped, hanged or 
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threatened in propinquity to its boundary) existed on the peripheries of a 
space where Greek ‘men [were] structurally agents’, barred from political 
participation and denied access to the laws that might otherwise protect 
life. 198  Even if these ‘legal disabilities’, as suggested by Rotroff and 
Lamberton, did not extend to ‘property’, their extension to the body frames 
the Greek agora as an architectonic space for reproducing social relations of 
dispossession.199 These social relations have at all times driven production, 
with marginal lives supporting the speculative praxis of market exchange 
and the accumulation of wealth.200 
In the epigraph to this chapter, Ronald E. Day suggests that 
computational social interpellation takes place in a symbolic field. In the 
1990s Internet hype already described, the Greek agora was being used as 
one such symbolic field, serving as symbolic referent for the cultural 
mechanisms of information exchange, of the ‘sociocultural and technical 
dialectical algorithms that gather up, sublimate, and exclude and include 
persons and texts toward the formation of users and documents’.201 Greek 
architectonics symbolise the idealistic vision of computational media. As 
Robins and Webster highlight in ‘The Neurosis of Technology’, the most 
coherent alliance between the Greek agora and digital networks is the logic 
of lease and exchange, and the concurrent transmutation of life into 
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labour.202  In more recent theoretical writing on the industry of cloud 
computing, these early 1990s views have been revisited and used to align 
clouds with the Greek agora, producing clouds as a symbolic structure for 
computational social interpellation denoted by the idea of digital gathering. 
Yet with the introduction of clouds, the reference no longer needs to be 
oblique. Rather, the history of the agora is occluded by an environmental 
façade. This ecological referent obfuscates the historical realities of slavery 
and ostracism, which underwrite any notion of free, open exchange 
associated with the agora. It veils the afterlife of slavery, discoverable in the 
various modes of dispossession undergirding global digital capital. 
Compounded into the figure of clouds, digital networks and the 
Greek agora undergo a re-spatialisation that reconfigures their realities of 
violent exclusion, expulsion and ostracism. The gathering is no longer the 
literal coming-together of bodies in a space where other bodies are being 
beaten and whipped. Rather, now we are gathering in the skies, where all 
bodies are shifted to a virtual register. In ‘Cloud Computing and Grid 
Computing 360 Degrees Compared’, Ian Foster et al. compare cloud-based 
systems to grid-based systems by using spatial language; they describe 
clouds as an ‘open’ ‘large pool’ of resources, ‘built on top of many existing 
protocols including Web Services’.203 For these writers, a cloud network is a 
nebulous form that traverses the rigid gridwork of the Web. For writers 
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Christopher S. Yoo and Jean-François Blanchette this nebulous form marks 
the infrastructural ‘moment’ in computing, leading them to claim: 
 
As infrastructure, then, the Cloud necessarily becomes the focus of a series 
of policy concerns that deal with issues of market regulation, fairness, 
universal access, reliability, criticality, [3] national security, sharing of 
limited resources, congestion, inter-network competition, national 
economic welfare, capacity planning, monopoly, and antitrust, among 
others.204  
 
The word ‘focus’ is key here, and it marks a thematic of spatialisation 
linking the idea of clouds as an ‘open pool’ ‘built on top of many existing 
protocols’ and the idea of clouds as an infrastructural moment. The cloud is 
not a structure built on top of a structure. It is a focal point for structure 
itself—an axis of structure, where existing issues of regulation, action, 
security, welfare and competition are concentrated. This is further echoed 
by cloud-computing policy theorist William Lehr, who, in attempting to 
qualify ‘where’ the ‘internet cloud’ exists, bypasses any temptation to refer 
to clouds as independent structures, suggesting instead that clouds are 
‘protocol layers in an Information Technology (IT)–architecture sense[...] 
industry/market structure, business processes, and regulatory environment 
																																																								
204 Christopher S. Yoo and Jean-François Blanchette, ‘Introduction: 
Computing’s Infrastructure Moment’, Regulating the Cloud: Policy for 
Computing Infrastructure, ed. by Christopher S. Yoo and Jean-François 





[my emphasis]’.205 Clouds are being conceptualised here as compositions, 
not as original or independent forms—as the meeting of pre-existing 
industries, markets, businesses, protocols and regulations at a focal 
epicentre, at an assembly or gathering. As a symbolic reference for the 
gathering, the concept-being of clouds is more focus than form. 
 The symbolic figure of the cloud is a disruptive focal point of form. 
This quality of the conceptuality of clouds as ‘gatherings’ fascinates me, as 
it finds commonalities with the capacity to model clouds in the General 
Circulation Models (GCMs) used to simulate the climate.206 Though climate 
change is undeniable, simulating the climate to the degree of accuracy that 
would be needed in order to incorporate the full range of variables that 
determine the climate is a near practical impossibility. Concerning clouds, 
authors of the IPCC Report reflect that, modelling ‘all cloud-controlling 
factors’ is unforeseeable.207  
Within this scientific way of conceptualising clouds, these 
ecological forms are figured as nebulous form traversing a more ordered 
grid-like structure. Clouds are the adversaries of the parametrical averaging 
that makes climate modelling possible. Fascinatingly, this extends beyond 
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the computer sciences, suggesting a generalised tendency to spatialise 
clouds as a focal non- or anti-form within a grid-like mesh or net. In the art-
architectural work by architectural firm Diller Scofidio + Renfro, made for 
Expo 2002, the architects constructed an intricate, architectural form over 
Lake Neuchâtel.208 This was then filled with vapour, and became a ‘cloud-
pavilion’––obscuring the bridge and plunging participants into a blinding 
fog or mist. The work is reminiscent of the work of Fujiko Nakaya, who has 
been making fog or cloud sculptures since the 1970s, culminating in her 
Fog Bridge (2015), an installation piece that covered Pero’s Bridge on 
Bristol Harbourside in dense fog, as a celebration of the city’s year as 
European Green Capital. 209  Vittoria di Palma, writing about Diller 
Scofidio’s architectural work, analyses the relationship of mutual 
dependence ‘between cloud and grid’.210 As di Palma writes, the built 
cloud-form: 
 
[...] could not be distilled to a mere question of structure, for the pavilion 
both exceeded and compromised its structural dimension, being composed 
of both structure and vapour, with that vapour veiling and hindering the 
apprehension of the structure.211 
 
For di Palma, the cloud that exudes over the bridge exceeds the rectilinear 
struts and diagonal rods of the building on the lake. This pointedly echoes 
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Rosalind Krauss’s landmark essay ‘The /Cloud/’, where Krauss seeks to 
emphasise the extravagance of clouds as environmental forms that exceed 
the terms of the aesthetic composition.212 Elsewhere, Krauss writes about 
Alfred Stieglitz’s Equivalents, a series of photographs of clouds that 
Stieglitz produced between 1925–1934.213 The critical reflection that Krauss 
produces about this series of photographs is as much an essay about clouds 
as it is about photography, as Krauss seeks to qualify clouds as forms that 
provoke ‘an extraordinary sense of disorientation’, which undermine ‘our 
firm orientation to the ground’.214 She describes clouds as ‘cutting’ or 
‘ripping’ the senses, or as provoking an awareness of ‘being unmoored’.215 
Elsewhere Krauss speaks of the associated ‘content-less’ ideas of the abject, 
formless, or base, which precede and underlie consciousness, and hence, 
which could be thought of through the psychoanalytic model of the 
unconscious.216 In Jean-François Lyotard’s Discourse, Figure, as Krauss 
points out, this unconscious is a corrosive and devolutionary force that 
counters the rational, conscious mind.217 It is this idea of the unconscious 
that is captured in Krauss’s way of thinking about clouds. The excessiveness 
of clouds can hence be thought through the psychoanalytic model of the 
unconscious, as a cutting or ripping force that disorients the rational mind.  
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The paradigmatic ‘nebulousness’ of clouds can be re-interpreted 
through these ideas of the unconscious mind. Clouds have been produced as 
forms that focus the inter-related struts and rods that hold a structure 
together, to the point of disorienting these given orders of being, in a 
procedure of excessiveness and devolution that might otherwise be read as 
the rupture of the unconscious through the rational mind. In this respect, the 
role of clouds in representing digital media is really one of figuring the 
digital as a disorienting, ungrounded or unconscious space. Clouds are as 
such firmly associated, through the psychoanalytic model of the 
unconscious as excessive to structure, with a state of self-disorientation, or 
with the ripping or cutting of the self. Here, then, I might annex Krauss’s 
citation of Lyotard with Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of consciousness. 
Jacques Lacan argued that the self vacillates in an empty gap.218 In this cut 
or opening, the status of the subject is disturbed. That the conscious self 
originates in this vacillation implies, as Roberto Harari aptly highlights, that 
it neither is, nor is not, but rather is a state of becoming.219 The concept-
being of clouds models this psychoanalytic theory of the tear in social 
being, or the self in a state of becoming.  
This provokes a counter-reading of the use of Greek culture as the 
historical backdrop of computational media. Digital networks have been 
spatialised through reference to the Greek agora. Simultaneously, however, 
this turn to develop spatial figures for thinking digital networks has brought 
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clouds to the fore, as spaces that digital users enter and are immediately 
disoriented––as if torn from their social being. While this appears to 
dissolve the reference to Greek culture, I would claim that this working 
concept of clouds as devolutionary spaces makes reference to Greek theatre 
practice. As Edith Hall has suggested, the late-twentieth-century revival of 
Greek tragedy followed from 1970s feminist movements, particularly the 
sexual revolution of open female sexuality, the critique of gender 
conventions, and the representation, in tragic form, of marital breakdowns 
and women’s social and familial roles.220 The orgiastic quality of Richard 
Schechner’s Dionysus in ’69 is exemplary of this revival, as the work 
stimulates a sexual and sensual interpretation of Euripides’s Bacchae.221 
This revived attention for Ancient Greek tragedy hinged upon the 
association of Dionysiac gatherings with orgiastic disorientation of the self.  
The idea of a form of gathering existing beyond the regulatory 
orders of the state makes recourse to this post-1970s reading of Greek 
theatre practice extending from the late-twentieth century. Hence, in this 
chapter, I aim to interrogate the conceptuality of disoriented social 
interpellation that is captured in the figure of the cloud. Figuring forth ideas 
of social disorientation in the concept-being of clouds is not about using 
clouds to illustrate the unconscious self in its state of becoming. This is 
about transforming how we think of social interpellation, from the 
subjection of the self to a given social order or being, to the orgiastic de-
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sublimation of the self into a state of becoming. This is about reconfiguring 
the agora as the Dionysiac. Two key late-twentieth-century theorists, who 
played a hugely important role in this shifting history of conceptuality, were 
Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914–2007) and his collaborator Pierre Vidal-Naquet 
(1930–2006), who helped to move Classics toward analysing the psychic 
states permitted to Greek citizens. Indeed, using the theoretical framework 
of these writers, with a primary focus on Vernant, I am going to critically 
rectify the relationship between the Ancient Greek agora, where a political 
elite of men assemble or gather, and the concept of clouds as disorienting 
spaces wherein the unconscious ruptures through rectilinear or geometric 
orders of the socialised self. What is important here is understanding how, 
in Greek thought, the social function of theatre gatherings and the 
meteorological processes of clouds gathering intersect—or at the very least, 
that this is a junction that was covertly theorised by Vidal-Naquet and 
Vernant in their work upon the Greek psyche. In the interpretation of Vidal-
Naquet and Vernant, how people are gathered into the chaotic Festivals of 
Dionysus is conceptually rich with the image of a mind disoriented from its 
social status, or perturbed from civic order. The way that Vidal-Naquet and 
Vernant imbue clouds with meaning revisits Aristotelian theories at, vitally, 
the junction where the tragic meets his meteorological philosophy of the 
forming and tearing of clouds. 
What is significant about using clouds to denote the unconscious self 
is that it symbolically discloses clouds as running counter to the hegemonic 
orders of the city-state. On this basis, clouds are made to appear relatively 




sort of autonomy that is said to characterise Greek agora, rather, this mode 
of autonomy leads me to Aristotle’s theories of Greek tragedy, to the escape 
from society into the aesthetic vacation of the tragic experience. Malcolm 
Heath has theorised that Aristotle’s Poetics reveals poetry and tragedy as 
autonomous spheres of social life, where ethics are practised, tested and 
performed, and where tragic affects and poetic engagement are contingent 
upon and necessary to the political values of the surrounding city-state.222 
This autonomy ultimately differs from the space of the agora, as women, 
slaves and children were permitted to join the Dionysiac.223 The Festival of 
Dionysus disrupted the social in its governable forms, through ostensibly 
open and genuine modes of social participation. Aristotle was key in 
developing this divergent notion of autonomy, tied to tragedy, poetry and 
the arts.224 
The way Vernant and Vidal-Naquet theorised Greek tragedy brought 
a sense of promise to Aristotle’s ideas about theatre and poetry. 
Accordingly, the Dionysiac has been consistently theorised in 
contradistinction to the agora. The agora is thought to be a discursive space 
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where the cultural norms of bios politikos were normalised, whilst the 
Dionysiac is seen as a counter-hegemonic space where norms were thrown 
into question.225 Following Nietzsche’s contradistinction of tragedy and the 
Appolline in Greek ideology, the Dionysus has in the main been 
sentimentalised as a state of being entirely beyond social law. I think here of 
the work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, whose essays were collected 
in Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form (1994). 226  In the 
preface, Negri and Hardt compare ‘the State’s elaborate practical and 
theoretical apparatuses of control and exploitation’ to ‘the powers that 
subvert and pose a radical alternative to its order’.227 To the latter they 
ascribe ‘Dionysus the god of living labor, creation on its own time’, as 
opposed to capitalist orders of time.228 
For Vernant, and beyond him Nietzsche, clouds have been 
conceptually associated with this creative time, setting a precedent for 
theorists such as Negri and Hardt, in their use of the Dionysiac as a 
conceptual expression of non-capitalist, sensuous, creative time and labour. 
At the opening of the chapter, I worked through references to cloud-based 
computational media as Greek agora. While many theorists have recognised 
this use of the Greek city-space as a discourse for computational media, it 
runs counter to the conventional theorisation of either form to speak of “the 
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cloud” and of computational media as agora. Clouds are associated with the 
Dionysus not the agora, and so clouds are supposedly divergent, counter-
hegemonic form. The cloud concept thus works to create an imaginary of 
creative, non-capitalist labour, but that ultimately subjects life to structures 
of expropriation. The Festival of Dionysus holds the promise of existence 
within the wider forming architectonics of the social, beyond social law, 
beyond the sorts of political participation that are formalised in the agora.  
 This knotted contradiction in the qualification of computational 
media as both agora and clouds is exactly the reason Aristotle is so 
important for interrogating the deep conceptual history of clouds. Aristotle’s 
theories of the Festival of Dionysus and his natural philosophy of clouds can 
be used to unpick the juncture between the Festival of Dionysus and the 
Greek agora. Linguistic analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics opens a critique of 
the fantasy of unified social becoming beyond social law. This linguistic 
analysis is applicable to the terminology he uses to speak about clouds in 
the Meteorologica. Overall, reading Aristotle’s theories about Greek tragedy 
as indicating where social life was brought into being is an opening for 
interrogating the sorts of (dis)union and (dis)embodiment that permit social 
gathering or assembly. 
 
 
The anthropological project of reading Aristotle’s Poetics 
 
In his first monograph, Vernant draws from materials as old as fragments of 




spectrum to understand Greek structures of thought.229 Vernant assesses 
how the Mycanaean militarised social structures became transposed into a 
competitive body politic, centered upon ‘oratorical contest, a battle of 
arguments whose theater was the agora, the public square, which had been a 
meeting place before it was a market place’.230 Vernant emphasises the 
military history of the space of the agora, suggesting that: 
 
[...] the term harks back to the gathering of warriors, the laos joined in 
military formation. There appears to be an unbroken line of development 
from early military gathering to the gathering of citizens in the oligarchic 
states of democratic ecclesia.231  
 
Gathering as a concept of social union has a military history that developed 
through the performance of social, civic interactions in Ancient Mycanaean 
cultural spaces. This line of development continues through the 
appropriation of Mycanaean palace ruins by the democratic commons of 
Greek culture, whereby the expanse of the agora served, at least within 
Vernant’s historical anthropological lens, as an architecture of thought: an 
‘urban framework in fact defined [as] a mental space’.232 The space of the 
polis subjected persons to internal deliberations that remapped their interior 
psyche through the systems of law extending through the social body, on 
account of the fact that, as Vernant argues, ‘[the] art of politics became 
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essentially the management of language’.233 This emphasis on language is 
fundamental to how these architectural spaces might be seen as entailing 
social structures. Greek agora was aggregating, coming together or 
gathering, overtly implying union, while covertly signifying exclusion and 
ostracism. The social structure enforced by the open space of the agora was 
such that individuals reciprocally sought likeness or sameness in one 
another, and Vernant saw this quality as a shift away from the hierarchical 
relations of submission and dominance that were pervasive before ‘open’ 
meeting or market places nucleated and instated the broader logic of civic 
relations.  
 Vernant’s views on the structure of Greek thought echo Aristotle’s 
writings about the structure of the cosmos, influenced by earlier Greek 
cosmological theories of Anaximander and Eudoxus. For Vernant:  
 
The world of social relations thus formed a coherent system, governed by 
numerical relations and correspondences that permitted the citizens to 
declare themselves “the same,” to enter into relations of mutual equality, 
symmetry, and reciprocity, and together to form of unified cosmos. [...] 
Sovereignty passed from one group to another, from one individual to 
another, in a regular cycle[...] the social realm had the form of a centered 
and circular cosmos, in which each citizen, because he was like all the 
others, would have to cover the entire circuit as time went round, 
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successively occupying and surrendering each of the symmetrical positions 
that made up civic space.234  
 
Vernant means to elaborate how the physical arrangement of Greek space 
entailed the shift away from rectilinear hierarchical relations. However, the 
literal, physical arrangement of civic space is somewhat eclipsed by the 
metaphorical register of cycle, circularity and orbit. Where Vernant refers to 
the ‘centered and circular cosmos’ he echoes the homocentric model of the 
universe given by Aristotle, echoing Eudoxus and Callippus. In this 
homocentric model, espoused by Aristotle in the Meteorologica, heavenly 
bodies are attached to spheres moving in a circular motion around a central 
sublunary sphere.235 These spheres move in strata risings outwards from the 
earth at the centre of the cosmos. 
Under the analysis of Vernant, this philosophy of natural forms 
becomes the anthropology of social form, or a human cosmos of cyclical 
regularity and symmetry. By drawing these parallels, Vernant points to the 
way the polis took effect as an encoding of social norms, whereby Greek 
thinkers projected onto ‘the world of nature that conception of law and order 
whose success in the city had made the human world a cosmos’.236 For 
Vernant, Anaximander made the cosmos into theory, spectacle and model 
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(literally making a sphere called a gnomon).237 Equally, Anaximander made 
equality and symmetry of isomania, the law of the city, into the law of 
nature.238 Hence, in Anaximander, Greek cosmology is a political matter, 
and the cosmological model of Anaximander’s work is contextualised, for 
Vernant, ‘within the framework of the institution of the city (the city that 
makes its appearance during precisely the period between Hesiod and 
Anaximander)’.239 Inherited from the Milesians, the instantiation of a Greek 
polis entailed structuring the city-space around an apparently cosmological 
agora, or gathering space, from which all points extend outwards––a literal, 
centrifugal architectonics of polis state control––equidistant from the 
centre.240 It is of course necessary to question the geometrical balance 
implied by the application of a cosmological model to these architectonics 
of civic life. The agora may have been equidistant from all points in the 
city-space, but this by no means implies that this was a space of equality, 
open to all. As mentioned, exclusion was foundational to the performance of 
civic order practised in these nucleating spaces. Vernant himself highlights 
that women were instead enclosed in the dark interiors of domestic space.241 
In his later co-written work with Vidal-Naquet, Vernant further explores 
this notion of a ‘human cosmos’ by referring to an explicitly gendered 
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structure of centre and periphery.242 The social imbalance of leaving women 
in domestic spaces, at the domestic hearth where the procreative seed of 
man is passively housed, allowed men to leave the home and engage in 
political citizenship (in the alternative centre of the agora).243 Vernant 
envisages this social cosmos as a model of cultural and political practice, 
hence, he examines social thought through the idea of centre and periphery, 
of regular cycles around a female hearth (or a domestic nucleus), and as 
civic space extending outwards from a place for gathering (the economic 
nucleus of the agora), intended for meeting, buying, selling and exchanging 
goods.244 Doing so, he states that: 
 
[the] advent of the polis, the birth of philosophy––the two sequences of 
phenomena are so closely linked that the origin of rational thought must be 
seen as bound up with the social and mental structures peculiar to the 
Greek city. [...] If in [Aristotle’s] eyes Homo sapiens was Homo politicus, 
it was because Reason itself was in essence political.245  
 
For Vernant, Greek culture was characterised by an essentialising political 
rhetoric of the human cosmos. Within this anthropological understanding of 
cosmological thought, what came into being with the emergence of the 
Greek city-state was not an architectural arrangement, but the idea of human 
society as centre and periphery or as cycle and strata. This cosmological 
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language of universal cycles, orbits and stratified spheres hence valorises 
the foundational exclusionary social practice of slavery and ostracism, 
known to uphold Greek culture. 
From the outset of his published writings in the field of Classics, 
Vernant was interested in how tragedy might disrupt or rupture through this 
human cosmos. In a paper delivered in 1966 as part of The Languages of 
Criticism and the Sciences of Man seminar series at Johns Hopkins 
university, Vernant performed a close reading of The Seven Against Thebes, 
Oedipus The King, Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone, and Aeschylus’s Oresteia 
trilogy. 246  In this paper, Vernant’s style of revising classicism makes 
contradiction and indeterminacy the essence of these Greek tragic texts. His 
paper, entitled ‘Greek Tragedy: Problems of Interpretation’, sets out to 
promote historiographic close readings of Greek tragedies.247 This allows 
him to explore the indeterminacy of tragedy as the essence of the tragic, as 
if the tragic transcends the historical moment, throwing the human cosmos, 
law and order into a state of self-questioning. 
Vernant thus argues that the dismissal of hierarchical systems and 
enforcement of public law gave rise to the spirit of asceticism associated 
with Greek cults: opposed to the emerging logic of arete [virtue], homonoia 
[unanimity], eunomia [law and order] and epimeleia [a vigilant self-
control], Vernant describes the exclusion of the excessive practices or ‘the 
irrational forms’ of koros [satiety], hybris/hubris [excessive pride toward 
the gods], pleonexia [greediness] as a spirit of eris [strife] that ‘bred’ 
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dysnomia [disorder].248 It is here that Vernant begins to lay the groundwork 
for his later developed arguments about poetry, tragedy and the social 
function of the Festival of Dionysus. He goes on to develop a string of 
synonymous terms for the disordered excesses of Greek society under the 
new public law of the polis, including ‘madness’, lyssa [raging madness, 
raving, frenzy], ‘pollution’ and ‘the appetites of the flesh’.249 The economic 
basis of the exclusion of these excesses is the need to establish a value 
system that injects equality at the level of money, so as to regulate 
commercial exchange and ensure the subordination of lower classes, 
without subjecting these lower classes to injustice.250 The idea of “excess” is 
generated so as to site what is beyond the law, or in other words, what is 
beyond the protection of law. 
These civic symmetries and economic structures hence form the 
basis of Vernant’s theory of social law. Madness, lyssa/lussa and hubris 
each exist beyond the polis because they are outside economic regulation. In 
Vernant’s later publications he conflates these excluded excesses with the 
spatialisation of Greek culture that begins his 1962 publication; such that 
the lyssa, hubris, madness or pollution of the mind takes the place of the 
Greek agora, itself a development of the military gatherings of Mycanaean 
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elite.251 Unlike the agora, the excess is nucleated within yet exceeding 
beyond and disobedient to the order of the city-state. The Festival of 
Dionysus is like an agora, an exemplary focus for cultural gathering. But 
instead of use for trade and democratic assemblies this space was used for 
performing madness, strife, pollution and sexual desire. 
In the co-authored work with Vidal-Naquet, Vernant starts 
developing these assemblies of madness and sexual desire into metaphors 
for darkness, enshrouding, shadowing and obfuscation. For instance, 
Vernant returns to the cosmological works of Empedocles, and suggests that 
in Empedocles, ‘the fall of the daemons precipitates them into a dark cave, 
in the meadow of Ate’.252 Atē, Vernant writes, is descended from night, 
related to darkness, or ‘an image of darkness which enshrouds the human 
spirit suddenly, enfolding it in shadows, hiding from it the straight way of 
truth and justice, and thus dragging it to it’s doom’; atē is a criminal 
waywardness; it is a figure of ‘frenzied strife’ and also a shadow that, as it 
descends on the individual, brings an outcome of strife.253 This imagery 
merges hubris with the Dionysiac moment––both being read through 
Vernant’s cultural lens of excessive Greek cultural practices. That is, Lussa 
and hubris are conflated in the image of atē. 
Later in the text, atē is likened to a ‘cloud’ that envelops ‘man’ and 
‘makes him blind’. The passage where Vernant makes this comparison is as 
follows: 
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When I say that man is presented as confronting his own action, I must add 
that one cannot understand this situation, or the tragic moment, except by 
referring here again to a past time. Just as the institution of the law is 
perpetually confronted with an anterior state, so is man in Greek tragedy 
perpetually confronted with old concepts of action, errors, and guilt––
concepts which are disputed but still weigh heavily on him. The central 
notion is no longer dikè, rather, it is now harmatia. That is, the verb which 
represents error and guilt in the form of what would be errare in Latin—a 
word which means at the same time that one has committed an error, made 
a mistake, and committed a crime. What is harmatia? Harmatia means, in 
its proper [286] sense, blindness. That is, something which surpasses man, 
which comes crashing down on him, which keeps him from seeing things 
as they are, so that he takes good for evil, commits a crime and is then 
punished by this crime. His blindness, his criminal act and the punishment 
are not separate realities. It is the same supernatural power––blindness, atè, 
madness, hubris––which takes on different aspects while remaining the 
same. It is like a cloud in which man is enveloped and which makes him 
blind, makes him criminal, and then punishes him. It is the same power. It 
is a notion (and I will not dwell on it since you are all familiar with this 
concept of harmatia) which is obviously still present, in a way, in 
tragedy.254 
 
This perspective of Greek tragedy seeks to revise conventional views of the 
flawed or ill-fated nature of Greek tragic characters. The idea that 
‘something which surpasses man’ leads characters to commit crimes, for 
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which they are destined to be punished, implies that these characters 
temporarily exceed the cultural logic of the polis, yet do so remaining 
embedded within and subject to its laws. The ‘cloud’ of atē hence embodies 
a disciplinary mechanism of divergence. The ‘cloud’ of atē figures forth an 
idea of moral blindness, as well as the classification of this divergence as 
crime according with the social law from which it diverges and within 
which it is embedded. 
In this sense, Vernant retroactively reads Greek tragedy as a 
disciplinary social mechanism. He nucleates the orgiastic chaos of the 
Dionysiac in the figure of the tragic character, whose actions are 
pathologised as breaking from social norms––and then used to subject that 
character to the apt punishment. This is reminiscent of Georges 
Canguillhem’s contemporaneous historicisation of ‘the pathological’, in his 
1966 work, The Normal and the Pathological. Canguillhem’s discussion of 
the pathological is sparked by his etymological analysis of the Greek root of 
‘anomaly’–stemming from the word ‘anomalia’, meaning unevenness, 
irregularity or roughness, as opposed to ‘omalos’, meaning even terrain.255 
For both Vernant and Canguillhem the vacation of the law-abiding self into 
states of madness, ruin, hallucination or self-destruction stood beyond the 
normative law of social life. For Canguillhem, the normal draws its power 
from qualifying quantitative difference as abnormal divergence. For 
Vernant, the power of the polis is characterised by the power it possesses to 
recuperate it’s orders through the blindness of the cloud of atē. Hence, in 
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both, Greek culture is used to re-theorise what normal means and how social 
codes work in reciprocity with that which is defined as beyond or excessive. 
These parallels could be seen to stem from the contact between 
Vernant and Canguillhem, who both participated in liberation movements of 
1940s France. As Elisabeth Roudinesco documents, Vernant invited 
Canguillhem to join the Resistance movement being organised in the 
Auvergne region in the early 1940s.256 In addition to this companionship, 
Roudinesco hints at intellectual overlaps when she historicises 
Canguillhem’s ideas about political resistance through his foreknowledge of 
Greek tragedy. ‘Heroism,’ Roudinesco reports Canguillhem to have said, ‘is 
a manner of conceiving of action under the category of a universal, from 
which the psychological subject in any form is excluded’. 257  This 
psychological exclusion of the subject from their own actions is remarkably 
similar to the ‘something which surpasses man, which comes crashing down 
on him’, in Vernant’s theories of Greek tragedy. The cloud of atē 
symbolically expresses universal action––‘something which surpasses 
man’––that harbours extreme reflexes of exclusion: of the subject from 
immediate social law and of the subject from their own subjectivity. 
Subjects interpellated into the cloud of atē are de-sublimated from the 
mechanisms of social interpellation previously constituting their 
subjectivity, descending through the anomalous space of the Dionysiac into 
abnormal states of madness, blindness and hubris. Vernant uses clouds as a 
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symbolic referent for encoding this descent into excessive cultural practice. 
For Vernant, clouds are figurations of the anomalous space of political 
resistance, here figured as the Festival of Dionysus. Much akin to 
Canguillhem’s arguments about abnormality and social norms, for Vernant, 
clouds de-hierarchise even while they reassert social law. They re-constitute 
the tragic character as a psychosocial subject, through inclining that tragic 
character toward de-sublimation, which ultimately delivers them into the 
category of the universal. 
In this respect, Vernant’s work echoes the early work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who was equally drawn to explore the psychic states made 
permissible through the Greek tragic gathering. In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche writes of the ‘reciprocal necessity’ of a primal substratum 
(elsewhere figured as chaos or de-sublimation) and the forms that emerge 
from this substratum. He describes this relation between social order and 
chaos as the reciprocity between ‘the Dionysiac and the Apolline,’ which 
co-produce one another ‘in a sequence of renewed births, mutually 
intensifying one another’.258 This understanding of the Festival of Dionysus 
is drawn from Nietzsche’s oblique reading of Euripides’s Bacchae, the 
tragedy that was first performed at the Festival of Dionysus in 405BC, about 
which Nietzsche writes remotely and abstractly. In the Bacchae, Dionysus 
the god appears in human form and possesses the Maenads. At the 
summation of the play, Dionysus possesses Pentheus, who is torn apart in 
the hysteria of the Maenads. Perhaps in light of such eventualities, the 
contemporary theatre theorist Erika Fischer-Lichte has suggestively 
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described these ritualistic Greek theatre events as the ‘sparagmos (‘tearing 
apart)’.259 Nietzsche was drawn to see Greek tragedy as a kind of ‘tearing 
apart’ writing that ‘the veil of Maya had been rent and now hung in rags 
before the mysterious primal Oneness [my emphasis]’.260  
In seeking an apt metaphor for describing the tear of the tragic, 
Nietzsche was equally drawn to use clouds to express his thoughts on Greek 
tragedy. He writes: 
 
The shape of the Greek theatre recalls a lonely mountain valley: the stage 
architecture appears as a luminous cloud formation seen by the Bacchae, as 
they swarm down from the mountains, as the wonderful frame in the 
middle of which the image of Dionysus is seen.261 
 
In Nietzsche’s thinking, it is the Bacchae who descend from the beautiful 
heights of the mountains, flocking and thronging into the cloud-containing 
valley of the theatre sanctuary. This syntactical slippage between the ‘cloud 
image’ (Wolkenbild) and the humans that ‘swarm down’ 
(herumschwärmenden/swarming around) suggests the Bacchanal descent as 
a phase-transition, from solid bodies to vaporous ubiquities, via a material 
process of de-sublimation serving to counteract and dissolve the psychic 
sublimation of socialization. Attending the theatre, for Nietzsche, was thus 
tantamount to the meteoric phase-shift of subjectivity. Descending upon the 
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theatre site as a cloud, ‘the audience looked down not upon their immediate 
civic environment but upon the sanctuary of the god, and upon the 
mountains and sky beyond’.262 Clouds hence illustrate the unknotting of the 
social through the gathering for the Festival of Dionysus, in much the same 
manner that in Vernant clouds illustrate gathering through anti-normative 
social practices of hubris. Figured in clouds, tragedy thereby stands in a 
counter-hegemonic relation to social regulation, or, as Vernant claims, it 
‘does not reflect that reality but calls it into question. By depicting it rent 
and divided against itself, it turns it into a problem’.263 The slippage 
between clouds and human gatherings of hubris qualifies these ecological 
forms as referents for the tragic, figured as a counter-hegemonic rent in the 
social fabric of Greek society. 
In Vernant’s co-authored publication with Vidal-Naquet, he 
elaborates on this de-sublimatory function of Dionysiac orgiastic practices. 
Here he writes of social interpellation and the transcendental orders of the 
Greek polis. Eteocles’ madness, Vernant writes: 
 
[...] envelops him in the dark cloud of atē, penetrating him as a god takes 
possession of whomever he has decided to bring low, from within, in a 
form of mania, a lussa, a delirium that breeds criminal acts of hubris. The 
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madness of Eteocles is presented within him, but that does not prevent it 
also appearing extraneous and exterior to him.264 
 
The figure of the cloud allows Vernant to alienate Eteocles from his own 
madness. This in turn allows Vernant to depict the deviance of Eteocles, his 
criminal act and his punishment, as one formulation of tragic 
characterisation. This echoes Vernant’s much earlier work on Greek 
tragedy. Speaking after his paper at the Languages of Criticism and the 
Sciences of Man seminar, Vernant draws attention the work of Eric 
Robertson Dodds.265 Vernant has obviously been influenced by Dodds’ 
thinking in The Greeks and the Irrational (1951). In this work, Dodds writes 
of madness as a state of psychic de-sublimation that digresses from social 
law, or as he puts it, as a ‘state of mind––a temporary clouding or 
bewildering of the normal consciousness [my emphasis]’. 266  Vernant 
develops this language of ‘clouding’ and uses clouds as symbols for extra-
historical elements of tragedy, through which to stage an anthropological 
investigation into Greek tragic works. Subsequently, that symbol becomes a 
referent for the transcendent self that exceeds the tragic character’s 
historical moment.  
Vernant intends this state of historical excessiveness as a means of 
analysing works such as Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy. Perhaps 
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unsurprisingly then, it is possible to go back to those works and identify the 
theoretical emphases that Nietzsche, Dodds and Vernant later compounded 
in the concept of clouds. At the beginning of the Oresteia trilogy of 
Aeschylus, spectators gather in theatre space, before the old men of Argos 
assemble on stage. The form of what is to come is neither clear to the chorus 
nor to the spectators seated in the concentric arcs around the stage space, 
and hence Aeschylus describes the stage space as ‘a dream that sways and 
wavers/ into the hard light of day’.267 This language of wavering echoes the 
emphases that Vernant places on indeterminacy as the central feature of 
tragedy. Within Vernant’s reading, the theatre space is suspended in 
indeterminate anticipation, marking the dawn of day at sea. Spectators 
waver in the light of the beacons seen by the watchman, just as the chorus 
sway and waver in the sacrificial flames of Clytaemnestra’s ritual fires, 
waiting, worried to know why she has lit these rituals, concerned for the 
unknown course of the tragedy.  
Aeschylus begins the tragedy by transforming the theatre space into 
a model of the cosmos. When the watchman enters the stage and starts to 
speak he draws attention to the surrounding stars of the heavens, ‘our great 
blazing kings of the sky’.268 The metaphorical stirring of these stars sparks 
the fires that burn and signal the victorious return of Agamemnon, which 
likewise kindles the flames of Clytaemnestra’s ritual flames. Clytaemnestra 
lights fires and speaks fire. Her scorching appellation to the ‘god of fire – 
rushing fire from Ida!’ meets with shipping imagery, in the words of the 
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chorus. The fires put the heavens into motion and meet with the waters of 
the sea. And it is here that the soul (ψυχὴ) of tragedy begins to synthesise 
(σύνθεσιν). Aeschylus’ play comes-into-being through the reconfiguration 
of human society into a human cosmos. The excess of tragedy extends from 
this cosmological reconfiguration, as if the human cosmos brings the tragic 
excess into being. 
In a revealing exercise of analysis, Michael Davis highlights that 
rational thought is the basis of tragic theatre, as ‘it looks as though the 
putting together of actions or deeds is the[...] first principle of imitation of 
actions’.269 It is for this reason, I believe, that E. R. Dodds speaks of the 
Homeric atē as ‘a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal 
consciousness’. 270  Dodds formulates psychic obfuscation as a state of 
becoming ‘overdetermined’.271 At least in the case of Agamemnon, who 
ascribes his psychic state to Zeus, moira and the Furies, atē is the 
overdetermination of the hero’s actions that drives him toward guilt and 
apology. Agamemnon may select an action because he feels divined to do, 
yet the ‘cloud of atē’ produces the drama of this selection as contingent 
upon his rationality. He has murdered Iphigenia, yet he could have done 
otherwise; the House of Agamemnon could have been otherwise––things 
could have been otherwise in Aeschylus’s Oresteia. The contradictory 
‘cloud of atē’, as Rosenmeyer alludes, hence offers ‘a full exposition of 
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what is felt always to be the truth’.272 Agamemnon must act, yet how he acts 
is not the only possible course of action. Vernant’s theorem of the ‘cloud of 
atē’ expresses this tragedy as stemming from the overdetermined state of 
Agamemnon’s action. 
Aristophanes’ Clouds offers a further example of this link between 
rational overdeterminacy and clouds. Aristophanes’ Clouds (423BC) satires 
the emergence of a new generation of thought in the late-4th century (BC), 
where the traditional belief in gods was being challenged by Socratic natural 
philosophy. In the play, the philosopher Socrates is satirically characterised 
as the teacher at a ‘Thinkery’, where students learn rhetoric, new morality, 
and the natural sciences of astrology and meteorology.273 Socrates instructs 
students on orders of the universe that challenge the divine cosmos. 
Throughout the play a chorus of clouds mocks Socrates for these beliefs by 
acting to shroud his insight into the fatal (and arguably tragic) demise that 
his ‘Thinkery’ will bring him. The clouds are, in the words of Socrates, ‘the 
celestial Clouds, the patron goddesses of the layabout. From them we get 
our intelligence, our dialect, our reason, our fantasy and all our 
argumentative talents’.274 Socrates parallels the ‘Thinkery’ with the clouds, 
as if clouds were rational spaces. The clouds, on the other hand, do not 
express their form through dialect or reason, but through allusions to the 
Dionysus. The chorus opines: 
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Maids of Rain, come now where Pallas 
     Rules the loveliest of land on earth, 
Rich and shining land of Cecrops 
     Full of men of valiant worth 
 
[...] 
Where stand lofty, beauteous temples 
     Full of gifts beyond all price; 
Where no season lacks its share of 
     Feast, procession, sacrifice; 
 
Where they hold to Dionysus 
     Joyous feast at start of spring,  
Heat the pipes and hear the chorus 
     In melodious contest sing.275 
 
The stacks of beauteous temples parallel the ‘Maids of rain’, both referring 
to the clouds of the chorus. Hence, it is the clouds that ‘hold to Dionysus’, 
which is the festival of ‘Feast, procession, sacrifice’. While Socrates 
proposes that clouds are the source of his ‘intellect’, in an earlier speech to 
Strepsiades he insinuates that his own mind is actually mingled with the 
clouds, reflecting:  
 
Why, for any accurate investigation of meteorological  
phenomena it is indispensible to get one’s thoughts into a  
state of suspension and mix its minute particles into the air  
																																																								




which they so closely resemble.276 
 
Socrates ventures to exceed the law of the gods. Having drawn Strepsiades 
into this venture with him, Strepsiades takes his revenge by burning down 
the ‘Thinkery’ with Socrates inside. The comic content of the above 
mingling of Socrates’ mind with particles of a cloud, depends upon the 
audience appreciating that to mingle ‘one’s thoughts’ with clouds is to 
exceed the law of the city-state and to descend into a tragic state of 
questioning over-determinacy. Indeed, read in this manner, the satirical 
qualities of the passage as foreclosing the demise of Socrates hangs upon 
the audience’s appreciation of Greek tragedy as a “clouding” of the mind. 
The humour of Aristophanes’ work would depend on the audience’s prior 
knowledge of the conceptual overlap between clouds and the psychic state 
of over-determinacy that characterises Greek tragedy. This begins to suggest 
that the elision of clouds and the tragic excess of hubris runs deeper through 
the history of conceptualising these forms. The qualities that Nietzsche, 
Dodds and Vernant condone upon clouds extend a style of thinking already 
at play in the work of Aristophanes. 
For this reason, I will turn shortly to explore how clouds were 
theorised in Aristotle’s subsequent theoretical work on tragedy, looking at 
how his theory of aesthetic form intersects with his natural philosophy of 
meteorological phenomena. In Aristotle’s Poetics (c.335BC), the Ancient 
Greek word for gathering (συνίστασθαι / sunistasthai) is used in the 
																																																								




introduction of the text to denote how a poem puts things together.277 In 
what follows I will be drawn to argue that Aristotle means more than the 
construction of mimesis, but the gathering of bodies for the Festival of 
Dionysus. The term συνίστασθαι (sunistasthai) is etymologically allied with 
συνιστώ (sunisto), which means the act of constituting a State, company or 
institution.  
Building on these linguistic echoes, it is possible to work through 
Aristotle’s Poetics and reflect that the gathering recuperates the state 
because the gathering affirms the order beyond its disorder, instituting the 
polis via a process of social psychic sublimation. This is in keeping with the 
historicist reading of the purpose of the Festival of Dionysus. Robert Fagles 
and W. B. Stanford note that, when Peisistratos founded ‘the Festival of 
Dionysus, the public recitations of Homer and the competitions of the tragic 
poets’, he envisioned that ‘Tragedy, in Aeschylus’ hands, might empower 
the young democracy’.278 The Festival of Dionysus was intended as a 
vacation from the orders of the state, not the total absolution of Greek 
subjects from those orders. This reflects the writings of Vernant, for whom 
myths, royal lineages, and the natural rights of religion, served the purpose 
of tearing the ordered ‘human cosmos’ of Greek society, but were never 
intended to deconstruct it entirely.279  
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Through these gatherings the mythical and the heroic become 
opposed––a conflict that opens a conflict of responsibility in the subject. 
Aristotle’s works do not simply provide the historical backdrop to argue that 
this conflict in the subject is foreclosed as an event in their confinement to 
social law. The Poetics alone could serve to substantiate this theory, through 
the implied autonomy of theatre gatherings from social law and the realities 
of linguistic allusions of the συνίστασθαι (sunistasthai) or gathering. Rather, 
the relationship between the Poetics and Aristotle’s Meteorologica (350BC) 
deepens the history of deploying clouds as appropriate symbols for this 
notion of the theatre gathering as συνίστασθαι (sunistasthai).  
The overlapping language for clouds and theatre gatherings, when 
reading the Poetics and the Meteorologica hand-in-hand, suggests the 
overlapping concept-being of clouds and theatre gatherings. This deep 
history will in turn challenge the late twentieth-century tendency to 
associate clouds with drug-induced, orgiastic, psychedelic vacations from 
the self, as if these were liberating experiences. Rather than liberating the 
self from the social, the idea of becoming “clouded” or “cloud-like” is only 
conceivable through Greek modes of social separateness and ostracism 











Aristotle’s Poetics and Meteorologica 
 
The aforementioned ‘human cosmos’ provides a point of access to the way 
clouds are theorised in Aristotle’s writings. Following Eudoxus, Aristotle 
developed the concentric model of the universe to structure the sublunary 
spheres into four smaller spheres: earth, water, air, and around that, closest 
to the moon, fire (Met.II.II.354b24–5). This allowed him to formulate his 
theory of exhalations, the fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of 
meteorological forms, or ‘ta meteora’ meaning ‘things suspended in mid-
air’.281 Through this theory Aristotle offers a philosophical doctrine that 
determines how natural and physical forms existing above the ground and 
beneath the moon (in the sublunary sphere) come into being and 
decompose. The sublunary sphere at the centre of Aristotle’s cosmos—what 
might be called the earth and the atmosphere—is thus composed of four 
bodies that are constantly changing and transforming into one another, 
through these processes of coming-into-being and corruption: 
 
These four bodies are fire, air, water and earth: of them fire always rises to 
the top, earth always sinks to the bottom, while the other two bear to each 
other a mutual relation similar to that of fire and earth—for air is the 
nearest of all to fire, water to earth. The whole terrestrial region, then, is 
composed of four bodies (I.II.339a11–20). 
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In a more developed reading, Aristotle’s theory of exhalations is a way of 
reconciling the Eudoxan cosmology of concentric layers with Aristotle’s 
anti-Platonic hylomorphism.282 Aristotle does not want to be forced to argue 
for an immaterial realm of forms beyond this universe, and for this reason, 
he has to argue against Plato’s Theory of Forms and Plato’s Realm of 
Forms. Subsequently, Aristotle advocates for forms that exist as 
potentialities in matter. The Aristotelian dictum about matter, given in his 
Physics, is thus that ‘even if it is numerically one, it is not one in form’.283 
Aristotelian hylomorphism is thus the relation between form thought of as 
potentiality (hulê) and actuality (eidos, morphê).  
On this account, the Alexandrine commentator Philoponus (490-
570AD), in his Neo-Platonic commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorologica, 
suggests an Aristotelian substrate of potentiality underlying the actual: ‘the 
body underneath the revolving element above is a sort of matter, potentially 
hot, cold, dry and moist [my emphasis]’.284 This substrate of potentiality is 
the basis of forms in Aristotle’s thinking; it ‘underlies as a substrate to 
qualities and has the potentiality for all [my emphases]’.285 If we take 
nothing else from this dense philosophical idea, it should be that Aristotle’s 
theory of potentiality underlies his thoughts about clouds, as a pervasive 
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concept of his physics of the material world. For Aristotle, cloud forms are 
actualities that gather from potentialities of the sublunary sphere.  
Throughout the Meteorologica, Aristotle conceives of clouds as 
‘gatherings’, using the term συνίστασθαι (sunistasthai) to denote how 
clouds come into being as actualities of form and matter.286 Συνίστασθαι is 
the present middle-passive infinitive of συνίστηµι (sunistimi), meaning: to 
instantiate, to set together or to constitute. The syllable /συν/ (sun) can be 
rendered as ‘plus’, describing cloud nucleation processes as processes of 
gathering.287 In Modern Greek, συστήνω (sustino), the past imperative of 
the ancient συνίστηµι (sunistimi), stemming from the union of συν+ίστηµι, 
carries societal connotations. It means the act of recommending one person 
to another, and is etymologically allied with συνιστώ (sunisto), meaning the 
act of constituting a state, company or institution.  
Where συνίστασθαι denotes this coming-to-be through 
agglomeration, διακρίνεσθαι (diakrinesthai) is the process that undoes that 
gathering. Diakrinesthai means separation. The syllabic unit /δια/ (dia) 
performs as opposing linguistic marker for the diffusion of clouds. It means 
breaking or dissolving, and can be parsed as διαλύω, meaning parting 
asunder, undoing a knot, solving a difficulty, or slackening one’s hold. This 
aspect of Aristotle’s thinking has been frequently visited in critical debates 
about his opposition to Plato, particularly in their different philosophical 
																																																								
286 Aristotle, Meteorologica.  
287 I am following Malcolm Wilson in my inclusion of cloud formation 
within συνίστασθαι: Malcolm Wilson, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica: A More Disorderly Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). See also ‘sunkrisis gathering hê tôn nephôn of 
clouds’, given by Inna Kupreeva, ‘Greek-English Appendix’, in Philoponus, 




positions on our ability to abstract ideas about form.288 Yet the hylomorphic 
theory is clearly an idea with social underpinnings, as the etymology of the 
word suggests. Through these social underpinnings, Aristotle’s thinking 
about clouds overlaps with his thinking about Dionysiac gatherings. 
Aristotle’s Poetics have been critiqued for leaving no space for the 
actual event of a performance, on account of the fact that he theorises 
theatre as a mere matter of dramatic composition. David Wiles notes the 
‘Aristotelian closure’ of theatre theory, critiquing ‘the principle that a play 
should have a clear beginning, middle and end’.289 However, what appears 
now as a limited perspective of theatre could also be seen as the by-product 
of Aristotle’s more general philosophy of forms. To reiterate, Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic doctrine posited that all form extends from matter. On these 
grounds, it is unsurprising that he theorised performance as incapable of 
deviating from dramatic text or, more broadly, dramatic convention. The 
unified matter (hulê) of a play is a whole, in which the form (eidos, morphê) 
is already written, or as Aristotle writes, ‘the plot, as the imitation of an 
action, should imitate a single, unified action—and one that is also a 
whole’.290 The poet is the actualizing function of these forms, that is, ‘the 
function of the poet is not to say what has happened, but to say the kind of 
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thing that would happen, i.e. what is possible’.291 This leaves space for the 
social function of theatre gathering in an otherwise formalist literary 
theoretical text.  
Through the language that he uses to describe theatre poetics, 
Aristotle hence affirms the conceptual association of clouds and psychic 
digressions from states of normality, already alluded to through the 
paralleling of theatre and meteorological phenomena in the doctrine of 
hylomorphism. The following is the Ancient Greek, rendered so as to 
highlight this parallel: 
 
περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα δύναµιν ἕκαστον 
ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι [constructed] τοὺς µύθους εἰ µέλλει καλῶς 
ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις [my emphasis].292  
 
Let us here deal with Poetry, its essence and its several species, with the 
characteristic function of each species and the way in which plots must be 
constructed [sunistasthai] if the poem is to be a success [my emphasis].293 
 
In the theoretical emphasis placed upon the construction (sunistasthai) of 
plot, Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism to theatre, arguing that 
dramatic gatherings actualise matter into form. Theatre poiêtikês (meaning: 
putting together) is therefore a structuration process of making the poem 
from a plenum of potentiality. This gathering of potentiality into form 
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produces the poem––ποίησις (poíēsis)––or the fabrication, creation or 
production.294  That is, for Aristotle, the essence of the art of theatre 
gatherings is the creative act of putting potential matter together such that an 
actual form comes into being. On these grounds, the theatre gathering of 
bodies in a space is metaphysically, conceptually and structurally analogous 
to the gathering of cloud forms, when the synthesis (σύνθεσιν) of a tragedy 
of incidents gathers (sunistasthai) to produce the soul of tragedy.295 
Aristotle’s use of the preposition sun is underpinned by a 
metaphysical theory of gathering and dispersing; yet, when one interrogates 
Aristotle’s source texts, these metaphysical theories appear 
anthropomorphic. Aristotle cites the Ancient Greek philosopher Empedocles 
(490-430BC) as a source text for the Meteorologica (Met.1.4.985a21–5).296 
Taking inspiration from Anaximander (610-546BC), Pythagoras (570-
495BC) and Heraclitus (535-475BC), Empedocles argued that matter forms 
into phenomena (and disperses again) through processes of Love and 
Strife.297 For Empedocles, Love and Strife are forces of interaction. Love is 
what gathers together, while Strife is what separates. This anthropomorphic 
theory humanises natural forms. As the classicist M.R. Wright has noted, in 
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Empedocles, the ‘study of human behaviour enables one to understand the 
nature of the cosmic principles’.298  
In light of the anthropological source of Empedoclean theories, 
Wright notes instances where Aristotle deliberates about his critical 
relationship to this theory of Love and Strife, taken with and yet wary of its 
anthropological underpinnings.299 The theory clearly informed Aristotle’s 
work. The commentator on Aristotle’s text, Laertius, notes that Aristotle 
thinks of Love as ‘a single soul dwelling in two bodies’––a kind of 
gathering of souls. 300 In the Eudamonian Ethics, Aristotle claims that when 
lovers are drawn together, ‘they form a single intermediary unity’––as if 
Love brings a single form into being.301 
Building on Wright’s insight into the underlying dynamic of Love 
and Strife in Aristotle’s theories of gathering, David Furley cites Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica Book IV (6,383a7-13), where Aristotle describes processes 
of sunistasthai, as suggesting a process of contraction (caused by the 
departure of ‘the moist’), meaning that in a process of gathering ‘cold 
squeezes out the hot; the hot takes the moist with it in the form of vapour; 
the substance contracts and solidifies’.302 This he reads as the approximation 
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or affinity between Meteorologica Book IV and the biological works.303 
From here, Furley’s extended reading of Book IV of the Meteorologica 
firmly situates this text as a prolegomenon to biology. He argues that 
Meteorologica Book IV, is ‘primarily concerned with the formation of 
organic homoiomerous tissues’, annexing this with the claim that in De 
generatione animalium, Aristotle ‘makes use of the language and theories of 
Meteor. IV’.304  
I am fascinated to pull this analysis into dialogue with the work that 
Vladimir Janković has done on Aristotle’s Meteorologica, as part of his 
exploration of English enlightenment theories of the climate and weather. In 
a chapter on Aristotle’s theory of exhalations, Janković highlights that 
Aristotle saw sublunary bodies such as clouds as ‘imperfect mixtures’, 
claiming that his perception of imperfection has had a long-standing effect 
on how meteorological phenomena have been perceived. 305  Janković 
insightfully proffers that Aristotle pointedly avoids addressing the 
“vagueness” of his theory of exhalations, and that he completely omits 
discussion of a final and formal cause for meteorological phenomena.306 
The point at which this analysis begins to intersect with Furley’s contention 
that Aristotle’s meteorological theory is a prolegomenon to biology, is 
where Janković contrasts the speculative nature of Aristotle’s work with the 
ontological enquiry that Aristotle’s commentators brought to bear on his 
text:  
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Aristotle addresses these issues [of vagueness and the omission of a 
final/formal cause] by denying that inductive reasoning (epagoge) could 
yield certainty when applied to the realm of sublunary corruption and 
change. The best that could be achieved was speculation based on analogy. 
[...] 
When Hellenistic commentators took up the subject, however, epistemic 
concerns became ontological. Theophrastus and Lucretius stated that 
meteors followed rational order. Seneca argued to the contrary, and Pliny 
distinguished between regular and accidental meteors. Not only were 
meteors considered difficult to account for, but that difficulty was now 
believed to originate in the world, not in the mind.307 
 
Aristotle admits that his work is based on analogy, and that it can at best be 
seen as a speculative theory of how sublunary forms come into being and 
disperse again. This speculative theory is drawn from the Empedoclean 
physics of Love and Strife, a connection that does not trouble the theory 
whilst only engaging with meteorological phenomena through analogy. 
However, when this discursive introduction to biology is transposed into an 
ontological enquiry, what was analogy and speculation becomes ecological 
fact. Hellenistic commentators placed a new emphasis on ontology, being 
and objective validity in their treatment of Aristotle’s text. It is my 
contention that this crystallised the previously speculative relationship 
between humans gathering and clouds gathering into a concrete relation. 
																																																								




The new ontological emphases of Hellenistic commentators 
involved stripping out the Empedoclean undertones of Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica. The commentator Philoponus writes: 
 
‘Nor yet are Love and Strife’, [Aristotle] says, the cause of coming to be 
according to formula, for on his account Love is the cause only of 
combining and Strife, of separation. [...] art is responsible for assembling 
them according to formula and combining to a certain degree. 
Consequently there is something other than Love that is responsible for 
mixing according to formula, and this is what we call ‘nature’, i.e. the 
essence of each thing.308 
 
Philoponus attempts to limit the role that Love and Strife have to play in 
Aristotle’s theories of combination and separation. Philoponus wants to 
delineate physical processes of combination from their anthropological 
equivalent within the speculative metaphysics of Aristotle. Elsewhere, in his 
commentary On Aristotle On Coming-to-Be and Perishing, Philoponus 
attempts to purify the gathering of earth, fire, water and air, of the quality of 
pertaining to the mind. He writes: 
 
So if the soul is from the elements, it will have the same affections as the 
ones that the elements have; but soul has no bodily affection, such as the 
ones undergone by earth, water, fire, air – ‘cultured’ and ‘uncultured’, 
‘memory’ and ‘forgetfulness’, skills and sciences do not occur in any of 
the elements; for these are neither bodily affections, nor perceptible. Nor 
																																																								




again do the properties of the elements occur in the soul – rarity, density, 
heat, cold, lightness, heaviness or any of what is seen to belong to 
bodies.309 
 
Philoponus uses the division of body and soul to extract the concept of 
gathering and separation from its human substrate, located in Empedoclean 
physics of Love and Strife. The ‘cultured’ and ‘uncultured’ are abstracted 
from the bodily affections of earth, water, fire and air. For Philoponus 
properties such as density, heat, cold and heaviness belong to ‘bodily 
affections’ or to physical matter, not to the soul. Classicist Craig Martin has 
duly noted that the focus that Early Modern commentator Niccolò Cabeo 
(1586–1650) brought to Aristotle’s Meteorologica, equally placed this text 
in service of natural philosophy as a field strictly concerned with the 
physical and the sensible.310 These adaptations of Aristotle’s theories sought 
to strip the Empedoclean dynamic of Love and Strife from the theory of 
combination and separation. These post-Aristotelian commentators have 
sought to restrict Aristotle’s συν-compounds to denoting physical processes 
of gathering. 
 René Descartes in his engagement with Aristotle’s theories was 
equally concerned with clarifying what he saw as a blurred boundary 
between the metaphysical and the physical, the mind and the body, in 
Aristotle’s works. Descartes’ The Meteors (1637) sought to purify theories 
of meteorological combination and separation by transforming what 
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Descartes saw as Aristotle’s flawed speculative metaphysical theorem of 
hylomorphism into a mechanical theory.311 This is on account of Descartes’ 
contention that, according to Lucian Pretrusca, ‘the Aristotelians confuse 
things that pertain to the mind with things that pertain to the body and thus 
falsely attribute affections of the mind to material bodies’.312 Descartes 
wished to transpose theories of meteorological combination and separation 
into mechanical terms so as to rescind the speculative metaphysical content 
of Aristotelianism. 
This shift toward ontology, in the field of meteorology that followed 
in Aristotle’s wake, transposes a theory of form that was drawn from an 
analogy between human Love and Strife into a mechanistic theory of how 
physical forms combine and separate. This shines a new light on Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica and its position in the conceptual history of the post-1960s 
tendency to identify clouds with states of chemical vacation from the self. 
Not only does the language of the Meteorologica intersect with the language 
of the Poetics, suggesting that clouds and humans gather and disperse 
through parallel dynamics. The anthropological theoretical underpinnings of 
that text, to which Hellenistic commentators were so utterly resistant, 
suggest that the theory of ‘gathering’ is not a philosophy of corporeal 
“things suspended in mid-air”, but that these bodily affections exist on 
account of the inseparability of mind and body in Aristotelian 
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hylomorphism, as is the contention of Descartes.313 That is, the idea of 
clouds ‘gathering’ is disclosed through a spiritual register beyond the 
corporeal. Clouds do not gather because particles come together in the sky 
and make a cloud. Within Aristotle’s work, clouds are gatherings of the 
mind, of Love or of spiritual conjugation. 
In this respect, I have been equally struck by discovering the 
relationship between sunistasthai (gathering) and diakrinesthai (separating) 
within Aristotle’s text. Under the philological investigation of Malcolm 
Wilson, Aristotle appears to bring diakrinesthai (separating) into play as a 
stage within the meteorological phase-shift implied by sunistasthai 
(gathering): 
 
The cognate verb συνίστασθαι can mean ‘gather’ (I.10.347a27)... More 
commonly, though, the verb refers to the process by which the wet 
exhalation turns into rain and other precipitation (though we should be 
wary of calling it ‘condensation’). The noun, σύστασις, by contrast, is 
never used to describe this process. The verb συνίστασθαι, however, can 
describe the whole gathering process from beginning to end (2.2.354b31) 
or it can refer to any part of the process: air to vapor, vapor to mist, vapor 
into a cloud (3.3.372bI6), mist to cloud, cloud to droplet (3.4.373b20), 
droplet to rain.314  
 
Wilson begins by suggesting that ‘to gather’ is a verb used to describe how 
wet exhalations come together. However, the verb is also used to describe 
how cloud ‘turns into rain and other precipitation’. For Aristotle this water 
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cycle is a ‘whole gathering process’. The moment where clouds become rain 
is the moment when the form of a cloud falls apart and becomes the 
potentiality of matter once more. This contradicts the superficial observation 
that συνίστασθαι (gathering) and διακρίνεσθαι (separating) are opposed in 
the Meteorologica. In fact, gathering and separating are reciprocally related 
because the one is subsumed within the other. This relationship between 
tearing and forming belies the promise that the Dionysiac holds as a 
moment of spiritual collectivity. It dislodges the conceptual association of 
clouds with ideas of spiritual communalism beyond social law, disrupting 
the idea that clouds can be used to refer to vacations from the self. Rather, 
the Dionysiac tear is merely another phase-shift in the sublimatory process 
of social unification. 
Through clouds, every act of gathering is always-already an act of 
separation. This aspect of Aristotle’s text provides a disruptive framework 
through which to approach the ostensible links between digitality and 
psychic states of de-sublimation, connoted by clouds. By way of a working 
example, in 1976, the media theorist Marshall McLuhan wrote a prefatory 
essay entitled ‘Empedocles and T.S. Eliot’, appended to Helle Lambridis’s 
commentary on Empedocles’s philosophy of Love and Strife.315  Here, 
McLuhan celebrates the modernist poetics of Eliot as embodying 
Empedocles’s theory of Love and Strife.316 McLuhan argues that ‘[the] 
ways upward and downward are the same’, or ‘Love, which unites[...] also 
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destroys[...] and Strife, which creates[...] also makes’. 317  Citing 
Empedocles, McLuhan thereby transposes the anthropological theory of 
natural forms as tearing and forming into the context of digitality, as if this 
idea holds revolutionary potential within the emerging cultural logic of the 
network form. Vilém Flusser makes a parallel appeal when he calls on the 
Ancient Greek theory that form and matter are inseparable (ie, Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism), in order to critique the plausibility of ‘immaterial 
culture’.318 Like Aristotle, Flusser argues that form is contained in all 
matter; hence, he challenges the rhetoric of digital culture as ‘immaterial’.  
What is key here, is the very fact that Flusser and McLuhan, and 
likewise, Canguillhem, Vernant, Hardt and Negri, are drawn to Greek 
culture as a historical moment that can focus critiques of contemporary 
transmutations toward digitality and digital capitalism. It is important to 
note that while for a long time critical voices have been using Greek culture 
to critique digitality, affirmative voices have been using Greek culture to 
justify it. In the former case, the sorts of Greek practices and theories 
implied are those associated with the Greek Dionysus, as both a narco-
escapist, counter-cultural practice and as a space where the concept of 
hylomorphism is performed. In the latter case, affirmative voices have 
compared digitality to the Greek agora as if this implies the Internet as a 
democratising form; implying virtual spaces as discursive, open spaces of 
exchange. 
																																																								
317 McLuhan, ‘Empedocles and T.S. Eliot’, doubleness: p.vii, double truth: 
p.xiii. 
318 Vilém Flusser, ‘Form and Material’, The Shape of Things: A Philosophy 




My analysis of the historical association of clouds with these 
Dionysiac practices suggests that the critical position has been firmly 
absorbed into the affirmative. The industry of cloud computing draws the 
cultural aesthetic of social sublimation into the rhetoric of computational 
social interpellation. More, what is singular to the use of clouds as the icon 
for this social sublimation is the attribution of an ecological form to call 
humans into existing within “surplus” or dislocated states of being––a reflex 
of naturalisation that I will examine in the forthcoming chapter. That is, as a 
social mechanism, the cloud concept iconographically reinforces and 
naturalises the idea that humans should be tearing and forming, thereby 
entering every person into the system, as either an affirmed member of the 
interior community or form, or as the struck off “zero degree” of 
marginalised tearing. The cloud concept tears the significations of labour 
and exploitation that are concentrated in it as an emblem of digitality. In 
their place, the cloud concept does not provide a new social medium for 
gathering. It pertains to relate to the ecology, but it is better seen as recourse 
to a set of ideas about who is permitted into acts of social union. Every act 
of gathering is always-already an act of social separation. 
Whilst urging norm conformity through covert threats of expulsion 
can follow literal acts of exoneration, as noted by Kipling Williams, the 
subtleties of ostracism implied by the concept-being of clouds are much 
more coercive, such as the disenfranchisement or interdiction of social 
beings from social life. 319  Marx writes of the presupposed ‘complete 
separation’ of labourers from all property, stating that capitalist production 
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‘maintains this separation[...] reproduces it on a continually extending 
scale’. 320  The continually extending scale of separation applies to the 
separation of bodies from a fabricated and productive idea of the “human,” 
into the embodiment of capital resource, disclosed through covert processes 
of disenfranchisement. Love and Strife are instrumental in binding the 
human to these processes through the conceptual history of clouds as 
spiritual or orgiastic gatherings. That the critique of these processes can be 
achieved though unfolding the deep history of the concept of gathering in 
clouds implies that any critical emphasis on separation must continually be 
met with the interrogation of its inverse, and the symbolic field or locale of 
that inverse, not simply the idea of social union or sameness, but the figures 
and imagery of forming—that metaphorical register of the social gathering 
which veils the implicit operations of capital abstraction and accumulation.  
																																																								




Chapter Two: Pockets 
 
Thought is not entirely the underpinning of thought. In other words: 
thought does not belong completely to itself; or, there is a central void in 
thought, a characteristic zone of collapse (that it uses all its strength to 
mask) that at the same time limits its self-appropriation from the inside and 
ceaselessly renews the movement of self-conquest from outside.321 
 
Alessandro Delcò, Matthew Tiews and Trina Marmarelli––‘Michel 
Serres: Philosophy as an Indeterminate Essence to be Invented’ 
 
Clouds in the present serve a paradigmatic function. Through the production 
of their concept-being, clouds are everywhere being laboured as cultural 
signs with emblematic capacities that extend across computational media 
and outwards into art and theory. This chapter seeks to understand how the 
concept-being of clouds has been input into a machinic construct, thereby 
mechanising their signifying functions through the logic of sameness and 
reproducibility. That is, this chapter tells the deep history of mechanising 
clouds as signs. This is first established in work of late twentieth-century 
theorist Michel Serres (b.1930). Serres generates clouds as topological 
figures in his work, which come to facilitate the absorption or conquest of 
material into what I see as his generalised theoretical move to 
informationalise matter.  
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This function of clouds as signs recapitulates the nineteenth-century 
orientalist reading (via textual mechanics of annotation and absorption) of 
the Sanskrit poem Megha-dūta or ‘cloud messenger’, and the subsequent 
Western visitations, to consecrate the figure of the cloud in that text. The 
writers engaged in these representative circuits do not use clouds as images 
or metaphors, but rather mechanise clouds as aesthetic-sign-functions. From 
here the chapter turns to reflect on the heavily laboured Early Modern stage 
architecture of ‘cloud machines’. Early Modern artists and stage architects 
used clouds to produce the spectacle sometimes known as the deus ex 
machina, involving the delivery of a deity or deific form onto the stage 
space. The ‘cloud machine’ hence masks a complex concatenation of human 
and machine labour needed to lift wood, actor and scenery into their deific 
presentation onstage.  
Arguing through these works I suggest that making clouds into signs 
involves twin processes of abstraction and association. Abstraction extracts 
the surplus-value of labour from the debased nexus of production, while 
association asserts that congruence of force, productivity and movement as 
the spectacle of clouds. Counterintuitively, then, through the mechanised 
significatory function involving twin processes of abstraction and 
association, the paradigm of clouds-as-signs maps onto the twin capitalist 
processes of abstraction and accumulation, or the patterning of life into 
forms of vital energy. The life that is gathered together and transformed into 
the spectacle of digital capital is transfigured as if being input into a 
machine for producing aesthetic signs. The concept-being of clouds embody 




ecological form, shrouding their own mechanical qualities even as they do 
so. 
One of the primary springboards for the analytical framework of this 
chapter has been Marxist theorist and poet, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi (b.1949), 
who has firmly positioned significatory functions within the critique of 
capital. In The Uprising: Poetry and Finance (2012), Berardi contextualises 
the virtualisation of the economy in an age of finance by alluding to the 
poetic strategies of symbolist poets Paul Verlaine, Arthur Rimbaud and 
Stéphane Mallarmé. Rimbaud, writing to Paul Demeny celebrated the poet-
figure as a ‘seer’, appraising the poet’s capabilities as: ‘dérèglement de tous 
les sens [derangement of all of the senses].322 Poetry can derail the senses, 
unmaking or disarranging rule––to follow the various French 
conjugations.323  
For Berardi, a virtualised economy involves the exchange of 
symbolic numbers and figures that have been disassociated with their 
physical referents. Finance is an abstracted economy: it is difficult to 
connect the decimals of economic transfer to the materials of human labour 
and natural resources to which they ultimately refer. Hence the production 
of life into forms of digital capital is a form of symbolist poetry, involving 
the dereferentialisation or derangement of the senses. In this vein, digital 
media re-discloses capital as a purely symbolic or grammatological 
operation. Life becomes the constitutive act of swapping one syntactical 
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unit for another, or of exchanging numbers for numbers, words for words, 
which makes up the very body of a globalised capitalist society.  
Berardi terms this logic of symbolic exchange ‘semio-capitalism’––a 
useful expression, though in need of some grounding. Semio-capitalism is 
best seen as continuing David Harvey’s revitalisation of Marx’s theory of 
primitive accumulation with the theory of accumulation by dispossession.324 
Where Marx describes the transition from feudal society to capitalist society 
as the supersession of exploitative socioeconomic structures, he calls this 
process the ‘separation’ or ‘divorcing’ of workers from their means of 
production. This ‘separation’ transforms the labourer into a wageworker 
through land appropriation and via the transformation of any social means 
of subsistence into the bedrock of economic exchange.325 Harvey’s concept 
of accumulation by dispossession revitalizes this theory of transformation—
depicting it not as a process that precedes capital, nor as a discrete moment 
in the history of economic relations, but as the process that sustains capital 
in its every present.  
Separation, divorcing and dispossession are hence associated 
processes not only in the historical aversion of the crisis of feudalism 
between some nominal period between 1450–1650, where power-relations 
between workers and masters shifted their dimensions toward a new social-
economic system, but also in the daily sustenance of a capitalist economy 
through the subjection of all modes of productivity to the machinic logic of 
																																																								
324 Harvey, The New Imperialism (2003). 




M–C–M’.326 In Volume One of Capital, Marx argues that M–C–M’ is the 
process by which money is turned into commodities and transformed into 
money once more.  
Value is accrued from the surplus value that is extracted from the 
concatenation of human and machine labour. This extraction of value is 
foundational to the process of capital production.327 By turning to French 
Surrealist poetics, Berardi adds dereferentialisation and abstraction to this 
list of associated processes, as if dérègelement has been historically 
transformed from poetic into economic trope. Mediated through digitality, 
the economist poetics of M–C–M’ involves the symbolist strategy of tearing 
signifiers from their material referential bases. This is tantamount to the 
process of accumulation by dispossessing, because it involves separating or 
divorcing labourers from their means of production.  
The industry of cloud computing is a mediating domain of this 
capitalist poetics of tearing. The work of Sean Cubitt is informative in this 
respect, as he relates Berardi’s research into economic virtualisation to the 
sorts of abstractions that are at play in the rhetoric of digitality as a virtual 
or immaterial domain, arguing ‘[in] semiocapitalism, the major form of 
production is no longer of goods but of symbols’.328 This is specifically 
relevant to the production of clouds as symbols, as a poetic strategy of the 
working concept of clouds. Clouds are symbolic domains of capital, and 
information networks are one of many overlapping contexts for this 
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symbolist praxis. Cubitt, in his book Finite Media (2017), argues that the 
very idea of abstract or virtual ‘media’ serves to mediate, and abstract, the 
very real mediation of virtuality through the burning of coal, the use of 
natural and human resources and labour.329 Digitality liquidates capital into 
semio-capitalist forms, potentially occluding the material realities of 
degradation and waste. Hence, rather than looking only to the valorisation 
of computational media as an abstract domain, it is vital to be alert to the 
instantiation and implication of the more generalised tendency to transform 
things into symbols, such as in the cultural wordplay of clouds as signs. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I will argue that semio-capitalism 
allows for the use of ecological forms as conceptual forms that mediate the 
transformation of nature and life into capital. The symbolic content of 
capital involves reframing ecological forms as concepts, in order to verify, 
validate and sustain ideological systems of accumulation by dispossession. 
Counterintuitively, this means that symbolic capital involves grounding 
ecological abuses in the ecology. This provides a refreshed perspective on 
cultural complicity in digital capitalist mechanisms of accumulation by 
dispossession, and the role of symbolic strategies in these tactics of 
complicity. The term semio-capitalism suggests to me concept-based forms 
of complicity in the thought project of semio-capitalism. If capitalist 
ideologies are executed in torn semantics, we do not need to be bankers or 
stock exchangers to be complicit in its execution. We merely have to think 
in and operate on the torn semantic terms of a set of de-regulated concepts. 
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Therefore this chapter is about the complicity that we have in the 
global industry of cloud computing as an ideological mainframe of digital 
capitalism, simply by conceiving of clouds in a certain way. It is about how 
the concepts we associate with clouds actually serve to disassociate us from 
the ecology upon which they appear to be contingent, and within which we 
are equally as contingently embedded. Hence, in this chapter I am thinking 
of the cloud concept as an epic eco-poem that makes the ecological forms of 
clouds subservient to an invented conceptuality serving the ends of capital. 
We know the central conceit of this poem by heart. It is recited on a daily 
basis, in the quotidian rhythms of tapping a cloud icon with the end of a 
thumb. Behind these acts, supercomputers are using energy and producing 
at least 2% of global carbon emissions.330 These acts render legible our 
instantaneous complicity in the idea of a virtual information network, the 
abstracted domain of symbolic exchange. Hu further tangles this knot of 
complicity by criticising the necropolitics of remote computational social 
relations, explaining how a network infrastructure facilitates anonymised 
and one-directional relations of control, passing the sovereign power to 
decide who lives and who dies through a de-contextualised and de-
humanised architecture of information exchange.331 Hu identifies clouds as 
vehicles for these oppressive structures: 
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the cloud[...] turns human labor into a resource[...] making it possible to 
hire Bengladeshi workers to solve one thousand CAPTCHA problems, 
those “enter a word in the picture here” forms that verify a user is human, 
for less than $1.50 a batch.332  
 
These disposable subaltern workers are interpellated into precarity through 
cultural complicity in the production of the concept of clouds. This 
complicity is marked by the linguistic assumption of some natural affiliation 
between the definite article “the” and “cloud.” In the introduction to 
Regulating the Cloud: Policy for Computing Infrastructure (2015), 
Information Studies theorist Jean-François Blanchette uses the terms ‘the 
Cloud’ and ‘cloud ecosystem’ interchangeably, particularising clouds as the 
globalised technology infrastructure that is the focus of this publication on 
policy and market regulation.333  
The introduction precedes a chapter from Weinman, where he builds 
on his book-length publication Cloudonomics, re-writing what the word 
“cloud” means, through the mnemonic C.L.O.U.D. (Common infrastructure, 
Location independence, Online accessibility, Utility pricing, on-Demand 
resources).334 These theorisations of what clouds “are” subtly obscure an 
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operation of primitive accumulation.335 In a subsection titled ‘Capacity 
Inertia’, Weinman writes: 
 
So, human resources are not that different from other resources when it 
comes to increasing or decreasing “capacity.” Some businesses do not have 
these constraints: In employment at will, in many cases for day labourers 
such as, say, some construction work or farmwork, a truck picks up as 
many workers are needed that day [sic], with no commitment and no 
complex skills evaluation or worker selection. This, of course, is not fixed 
capacity, but on-demand capacity acquired from the “labor” cloud.  
[...] 
In short, fixed capacity is problematic, driving an imperative to use the 
cloud.336 
 
In “cloudonomics,” humans and natural resources alike pass through a 
rhythm of surplus and under-development in order to sustain the logic of 
production and recuperation, accruing wealth through the poetics of M–C–
M’. Weinman’s phrasing ‘the “labor” cloud’ is tremendously suggestive in 
this regard, as he attributes the strategies of “cloudonomics” to the demands 
of the ecology. These demands are always prefaced by definite articles, and 
formulated in sentences that are both declarative and imperative. Under the 
law and order of “cloudonomics,” clouds are machines that make varying 
demands on labour. As if clouds have “on-demand” capacities for a 
workforce. As if clouds will not abide inertia in the workplace. As if clouds 
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re-shape sleep into work––casualise, dehumanise, manage and control, 
automate and outsource. 
This grammatology of “cloudonomics” manifests as the precarity of 
living under the logic of capital. Every life realises the semantics of 
“cloudonomics.” Such lived precarity ensures that labour structures map 
onto the so-called “capacity demands” of capital, so that no one person 
exists in a state of “inertia” (i.e., that no person is paid to subsist/exist when 
their employer does not call upon them to do so). Literally defining “what 
clouds are” with the term ‘the “labor” cloud’, Weinman is able to close 
exploitation within the working concept of clouds. That is, “cloudonomics” 
is a circular theory that virtualises exploitative operations, first into a 
sociotechnical infrastructure, then into an eco-philosophical procedure. 
Weinman proceeds towards the “truth” of clouds through this eco-poetics of 
philosophical language, seeking to pin down what clouds truly are. 
Ecological clouds are thus used as a poetic mediator of what Nixon 
has termed the ‘slow violence’ of global environmental structures of 
oppression.337 Clouds are used to naturalise precarity, as if living subject to 
precarious financial conditions is somehow “closer to nature” because 
precariousness is lived “inside the clouds”. The implied primitivism is at 
play in Martinez-Alier’s influential concept of ‘the environmentalism of the 
poor’.338 Writers such as Martinez-Alier, Klein, Federici, Tadiar, Pellow and 
Brulle and have assessed the fact that environmental policy-making has 
been used to platform the global imbalance of civil rights and social justice, 
primarily allowing America and Europe to proceed with industrial and 
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economic expansion, all the while seeming more environmentally friendly 
by outsourcing violent and harmful processes of production to the global 
South.339  
The global North has used the global South as a carbon offset. This 
global relationship of dispossession imposes borders between outsourced 
margin and prosperous centre, while naturalisation encourages the 
perception of these borders as organic orchestration. I thus think here of the 
work of eco-feminist critic Greta Gaard, who notes that in the discourse of 
otherness ‘racism, classism, and sexism are interconnected[...] forms of 
human oppression and the oppressive structures of speciesism and 
naturism’.340 Naturalisation is an inherent form of oppression seeking to re-
route structures of oppression through “natural” difference.341  
From this view, the ecological referent of clouds as an instrument of 
naturalisation recapitulates the historical discourse of otherness. Hence, 
disassociation and naturalisation, which I am here also terming abstraction 
and association, are reciprocal dynamics that co-produce clouds as circuits 
of symbolic capital through which not only accumulation by dispossession 
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is mediated, but also the new ecological morality of capital, or the spectre of 
the “common” good at the heart of environmental justice politics.342 
Critical medial theorists of computational media are equally tied up 
in these processes of abstraction and naturalisation. In The Marvelous 
Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (2015), John Durham 
Peters attempts to separate clouds as computational media from ecological 
clouds by using speech-marks “...” where he writes of digitality.343 Peters 
subtitles a section on the ecology ‘Clouds’, where he separates clouds in art 
from real clouds.344 Sentences that begin ‘For Percy Bysshe Shelley’ and 
‘For Constable’ contrast several declarative sentences that structure the page 
into assertions ‘Clouds are’, ‘Clouds pose’ and ‘Clouds exist’.345 Through 
Peters’ style, the theorists that he engages with are often embedded in these 
declarative sentences, in a manner that frees their theory from the historical 
conditions of its production. 
Most notably, Peters writes, ‘Clouds are “bodies without surfaces”––
a concept Damisch takes from the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, who 
argued that painting should include such elusive objects as ash, mud and 
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clouds’.346 The self-aware prepositions that precede the names of the artists 
Constable and Shelley highlight the circularity between Damisch’s theories 
of clouds and how clouds are theorised. Peters declares Damisch’s theories 
as the nature of clouds. In Peters’ work, theorists such as Damisch become 
parenthetical to their theorisations of clouds. 
The unquestioned assimilation of clouds with technology and 
marketing tools is reconfiguring how we think and speak of these ecological 
phenomena, revising what we mean by “clouds” and placing a new 
emphasis on the “real” of clouds.347 As in Peters’ work, this is discernible in 
graphological markers intended to delineate ecological clouds from the 
infrastructure of the data centres, hard drives, fibre optics, wires, cables and 
user interfaces, described by technology corporations when they speak of 
clouds.  
To this end, Metahaven’s Daniel van der Velden and Vinca Kruk’s 
criticism of clouds, is notable not for the thoroughness of their 
deconstruction of computational media and digitality, but for their 
consistent stylistic tendency to contextually particularise clouds solely 
through their conceptualisation by technology corporations, through the use 
of the definite article “the”, often coupled with capitalisation, when writing 
‘The Cloud’.348 
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Disassociation is one way of describing how the concept of clouds 
has become torn from its ecological and referential basis. Disassociation is a 
useful way to realise that this act of tearing has rendered the concept of 
clouds capable of masking over the mechanism of abstraction implicit in 
how it uses human life and natural resources. Yet disassociation works hand 
in hand with naturalisation––whereby a disconnected concept is reasserted 
as ecological, as natural, as environmental. I will shortly turn to the 1960s 
and 1970s work of Michel Serres (b.1930). Serres is a French philosopher 
whose experimental style of writing has to be situated against the backdrop 
of emerging cultures of digitality, and the countercultural movements in 
which these were embedded.  
In Steven Connor’s extended close reading of Serres, he argues that 
the philosopher is a topological thinker for whom disciplines are 
morphologically contiguous and continuous with one another, rather than 
discrete domains of thought.349 In particular, Connor argues that in Serres’ 
60–70s works ‘a cognitive space in which culture and science might meet is 
being predicted, prepared, projected’.350 Once projected this ‘space’ is put to 
work, as a topological form used by Serres to transgress boundaries and 
fields. Looking to where Serres begins preparing this ‘space’, there are 
several instances where Serres is found to be preparing a corresponding 
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concept of clouds. I am going to interrogate Serres’ preparation of this 
thought-space as the mechanisation of clouds as signs, critiquing his work 
through reading his books as writing machines that input clouds into the 
machinic logic of abstraction and association. 
 
 
Informationalisation, or Clouds in Michel Serres 
 
Serres’ earliest publications comprise his Hermes series, a five-volume 
work. It is generally established that Serres uses the Greek messenger-god 
Hermes to figure the transgression of boundaries and the movement 
between different zones of thought in this five-volume corpus. However, I 
would also claim that the collection provides insight into clouds as 
topological, thermodynamic, atomistic forms. I am interested to begin with 
the following passage, as I think here we find the intersection of Serres’ use 
of cloud imagery and his move toward topology: 
 
Look at Turner’s The Burning of the Houses of Parliament of 1835. At the 
bottom right, the Durande tows a barge almost in place of the signature. 
And once again the world is its image, its reproduction, in a precise sense. 
Turner sees the world in terms of water and fire, as Garrard saw it in terms 
of figures and motion. Believe me, a ship is always a perfect summary of 
notions of space and time––of space, of time, of work, as they are at the 
time––of history. Thus London and the Thames, as well as the steam 
engine. The conflagration divides the cold canvas in two: half is in the 




projected onto a green mass. On the balance sheet: furnace, water, hot and 
cold, matter in fusion, line abandoned in favor of random matter, without 
definition, statistically grouped in parcels. On the one hand clouds of ice, 
on the other clouds of incandescence. Carnot, almost Maxwell, almost 
Boltzmann. Turner understood and revealed the new world, the new matter. 
The perception of the stochastic replaces the art of drawing the form. 
 Matter is no longer left in the prison of the diagram. Fire dissolves 
it, makes it vibrate, tremble, oscillate, makes it explode into clouds. From 
Garrard to Turner, or from the fibrous network to the hazardous cloud. No 
one can draw the edge of a cloud, the borderline of the aleatory where 
particles waver and melt, at least to our eyes. There a new time is being 
fired in the oven. On these totally new edges, which geometry and the art 
of drawing have abandoned, a new world will soon discover dissolution, 
atomic and molecular dissemination.351 
 
There is a small but considerable error in the first sentence of this passage 
from Serres. Serres uses the imperative ‘Look’ to position his reader in front 
of ‘Turner’s The Burning of the Houses of Parliament of 1835’. ‘Turner’ is 
of course the Romantic English landscape painter Joseph Mallord William 
Turner (1775–1851), however, there is no such painting as ‘Turner’s The 
Burning of the Houses of Parliament of 1835’. The so-called painting The 
Burning of the Houses of Parliament is Turner’s work, though it was 
painted by Turner between the years 1834–5, and, rather than being 
subsumed in water, steam and fire, it depicts a clearly legible crowd 
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standing before the Houses of Parliament, which are ablaze in the 
background. Working from pencil sketches of the fire, Turner produced two 
finished works under this synonymous title, and a related watercolour.352 
Judging by the date of 1835 and Serres’ description of the boat in the 
bottom right-hand corner, Serres means to refer us to The Burning of the 
Houses of Lords and Commons, October 16, 1834 (exhib. 1835).  
Collapsing the duplicity of these works into one erroneously dated 
title, Serres overlooks the real events that sparked Turner’s preparatory 
pencil sketches. On October 16, 1834, three day-labourers, Joshua Cross, 
Patrick Furlong and Kirby, were contracted by the Exchequer to dispose of 
an archive of dented and shattered wooden sticks.353 These labourers spent 
the day burning these sticks in furnaces in the basement of the Houses of 
Parliament. This fire became uncontrollable, starting the blaze that Turner 
depicts. The sketchbook that Turner had in his pocket that day contains 
hurried pencil outlines of the smoke rising from the fire, smudged with a 
finger, alongside detail of the boat, the crowd (tens of thousands of people) 
and the bridge. The blank pages at the front of the sketchbook suggest the 
																																																								
352 Turner also painted Destruction of Both Houses of Parliament by Fire 
(c.1835) and The Burning of the Houses of Parliament (c.1834–5), two 
watercolours. Similar watercolours can be dismissed as depictions of the 
burning Tower of London. See Matthew Imms, ‘Fire at the Grand 
Storehouse of the Tower of London 1841 by Joseph Mallord William 
Turner’, catalogue entry, April 2014, in J.M.W. Turner: Sketchbooks, 
Drawings and Watercolours, ed. by David Blayney Brown, Tate Research 
Publication, September 2014, available online 
<https://www.tate.org.uk/art/research-publications/jmw-turner/joseph-
mallord-william-turner-fire-at-the-grand-storehouse-of-the-tower-of-
london-r1148241> [accessed 21 April 2016]. 
353 Labourers detailed in Caroline Shenton, ‘Thursday, 16th October 1834, 7 
a.m.: Novelty, novelty, novelty’, The Day Parliament Burned Down 




haste with which it was pulled from his pocket to sketch, as does the 
smudge of the finger to describe the smoke.354 
It is unlikely that Turner and his contemporaries were immediately 
aware of the full significance of this moment. The “kindling” for this fire 
was a pile of debtor-creditor nick-sticks, or tally sticks. These sticks were 
being burned because the tally office of the Exchequer was devolving to 
make space for a new Bankruptcy Court.355 A tally stick was the mainstay 
of socioeconomic relations of debt and was used globally in pre-modern 
societies where debtor and creditor would split a wooden stick into two 
halves, each half indented with a credit note.356 As David Graeber has 
noted, the act of physically notching a dent in a tally stick is the material 
substrate of the word ‘indenture’.357 Caroline Shenton adds that, in Britain, 
the words ‘cheque’ (from the Latin chacia or scacchia) ‘stock’ and 
‘stockholder’, the phrase ‘tallying up’, and the transactional term ‘foil’ and 
‘counterfoil’, are equally rooted in the tally stick economy that was formally 
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abolished in 1783 and ceased to be practiced in 1826.358 Graeber also notes 
that tally sticks were followed by a system of tearing paper contracts and 
paper bonds: one torn paper half for the debtor, another for the creditor.359 
This transition from stick to paper to linguistic convention emblematises the 
gradual demise of the tally stick economy, the virtualisation of the economy 
and the centralisation of monetary power. In Britain, the economy was 
centralised through documents, ledgers and records that eventually served to 
supplant the sticks as an archive of debt.360  
Turner’s painting indexes this history of economic virtualisation. In 
light of the emphasis that Serres places on shifting paradigms, 
epistemological ruptures, and ‘the new world’, the oversight of this 
indexical role emphasises the lack of space for lacks, errors, events and 
ruptures, within his theory of topological form. Indeed, the whole passage 
seems to me to work through the interplay between paradigmatic 
generalities. The phrasing ‘Carnot, almost Maxwell, almost Boltzmann’, 
condenses events in history of science (signalled by physicists Sadi Carnot 
(1796-1832) and James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879), who were both 
instrumental in the early theorisation of thermodynamics) and in social 
theory (given in the shorthand of the physicist and philosopher Ludwig 
Boltzmann (1844-1906), who was instrumental in the application of 
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statistical mechanics to social bodies).361 The erroneous citation of Turner’s 
work equally suggests a process of condensation, a kind of compression or a 
density of words.  
Serres’ stylistic compression is not about the subject under analysis 
but about preparation of a new cognitive space. This density of writing 
suggests, in accordance with John Limon, that Serres is attempting to 
structure his style of writing through the Foucauldian anti-method of 
genealogy.362 Serres’ dense text appears to me intended to evoke epistemic 
and historical events and movements. He compounds his theory of topology 
into a style of writing, using the colon so as to produce a high-energy 
composition.363  This use of the colon compels the reader through his 
sentences, where a repetitious rhythm of proper nouns brings phrases to 
cyclically overlap. This swell of language is designed to make Serres’ 
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theory feel randomized and non-linear. The unconventional use of 
punctuation signifies to the reader that laws or rules of space and time have 
been overthrown. However, rather than unfolding the epistemological 
conditions of both science and art in history, Serres retroactively reads 
thermodynamics into Turner. Serres’ theory of topology, or even, the 
topology of his theory––since style and subject are so closely linked in this 
passage––works as a de-historicising and de-contextualising driver of his 
work. 
In this vein, Serres rejects linearity and historical fact to such a 
degree that his works are dogged by the tyranny of anti-linearity. Connor 
terms this ‘the monism of the manifold’ or a ‘narcosis of abstraction’ in 
Serres.364 There are strong echoes between Connor’s astute diagnostic and 
the cultural backdrop of the 1960s. Primarily, Serres’ philosophy evokes the 
work of theoretical physicist John Wheeler, whose technophile revival of 
general relativity became a mainstay of a field called Quantum Holography. 
Andrew Smith, writing about the NASA moon landing of 1969, notes that 
Wheeler’s theory of information-exchange between quantum particles 
provided a speculative cosmological backdrop to naturalising the emerging 
perspectives of the information age.365 Lorenz Engell has likewise assessed 
that filtering the NASA project through televisions, into the homes of 
millions of viewers, secured the informationalisation of the world.366 This 
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reached a consensual crescendo in the moment millions tuned in to watch 
the landing and saw the earth in NASA photographs taken from space, 
gazing at ‘maximal redundancy on an epistemic level, and maximal 
information on an aesthetic level’.367 The totality of the images presented 
the earth as a mass of information, flowing back through televisions into 
people’s homes. As Connor makes clear, Serres was equally enamoured 
with the informationist possibility of cerebral traversals, be these 
philosophical, narcotic or perspectival, and he venerated ‘the opportunity 
offered by the society of information to transcend and transform the 
localised conditions of embodiment’.368 Through impelling these ideas into 
his philosophy, Serres is complicit in the maximisation of information and 
minimisation of epistemic unevenness––tantamount to the reduction of 
difference seemingly certified by a broadcast image of “the whole earth”.  
Moreover, in the passage under analysis Serres uses clouds to 
project this informationalisation, where he writes ‘Matter is no longer left in 
the prison of the diagram. Fire dissolves it, makes it vibrate, tremble, 
oscillate, makes it explode into clouds’. Here, clouds are being put to work 
as signs that maximise the relationality of all things. Within this way of 
thinking clouds are ideological offspring of the earth as a total object of 
desire.369 That is, Serres uses clouds to provoke an idea of topologically 
continuous functions or forms from which we are supposed to infer this 
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tantalisingly forming, tearing and re-forming significatory whole of the 
universe, in its final state as information. 
If Serres spends his early works preparing the signifying function of 
clouds, then in the Birth of Physics [La naissance de la physique dans le 
texte de Lucrèce], published in 1977, this significatory value is fully situated 
within the universe of maximal information. Here Serres attempts to revive 
a readership for Roman classical poet and philosopher Lucretius, by 
situating De Rerum Natura as a predecessor of twentieth-century theories of 
thermodynamics. Lucretius’s work is written in poetic form, and he uses 
imagery to convey an atomistic interpretation of the universe. 370  For 
Lucretius, things are ‘flimsy images’, which ‘shed from the outer layer of 
things’.371 Dismantling this ‘flimsy’ outer later, Lucretius writes: 
 
Come now, and learn how thin the texture of the image is:  
For one thing, atoms are beneath detection of the senses,  
Much tinier than the point at which our eyes fail to perceive. 
And I shall demonstrate this briefly here, so you’ll believe 
How fine-spun are the warp and woof of things, all matter’s 
     weave.372 
 
The flow of atoms through the outer layer of things resembles the 
informationalisation of the earth. Flowing through television sets into 
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people’s homes, the boundaries of things appeared to drop away revealing a 
finely spun weave of information.  
Apparently following Lucretius in this use of imagery, Serres calls 
the collection of atoms that make up the universe a ‘chaos-cloud’, 
suggesting that this ‘chaos-cloud’ is ‘the multiple distribution of the great 
elementary population at the heart of the stormy mass’.373 His sustained 
imagery of clouds and storms is hence intended to express the universe, 
rather than composed of “things”, as composed of processes of forming and 
tearing which at their base are processes of whole, solid atoms coming 
together and dispersing. Serres writes, ‘Things which are already formed 
scatter by wear and tear, they disintegrate because they are only porous 
conjunctions [my emphases]’, ‘The world in its globality may be modelled 
by vortices’, and ‘The vortex is unstable and stable[...]it is the formation of 
things [my emphases]’.374 This diverges significantly from Aristotelian 
physics and hylomorphism––or the idea that all matter contains the 
potentiality of form. In Serres’ reading of Lucretius, atoms gather into 
“things” as temporary conjunctions of the most base, absolute, structurally 
synchronic pre-social unit of the atom.375 
This synchronic unit is the basis of topology. When fantastically 
non-temporal atoms come together they produce forms that are 
topologically continuous with all other forms in the universe. Hence, 
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differentiation and difference are rendered arbitrary within Lucretian 
physics and atomism. It is in this sense that atomization sets a precedent for 
the forms of theoretical molecularization found in many strands of new 
ontologies, sci-fi materialisms, and (post-)(vital-)(agential-) realisms. These 
mythic-ontological theories are able to stake a claim to ethical questions of 
the ecology because they use atoms and objects to re-mediate normative 
claims about nature, origins and universality.376 Isolating the problem of this 
‘micrologizing drive’ of fanatical object-oriented ontologies, Jord/ana 
Rosenberg writes: 
  
The ontological turn[...] reshapes an old paradigm, a primitivist fantasy 
that hinges on the violent erasure of the social: the conjuring of a realm – 
an “ancestral realm” – that exists in the present, but in parallax to historical 
time.377 
 
Rosenberg means to highlight the primitivist fantasy that undergirds object-
oriented ontologies. Following Lucretius, Serres atomises the universe and 
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thereby posits a primitivist fantasy that hinges on violent erasures. The 
object-orientation of this ontological enquiry uses clouds as “things” to 
mediate the erasures of atomism and the traversals inherent in topology. 
These traversals are key to Serres’ style of thinking. 378  Connor cites 
instances where Serres uses objects/things to think through transversals, 
such as: ‘skins, textiles, bags, tapestries, kimonos, rivers, coastlines, clouds, 
vortices, mountain-ranges and flames’. 379  These image-objects are 
instrumental to Serres’ atomistic argument. Serving as synonyms for the 
cognitive space he is preparing, they themselves are rendered topologically 
continuous with one another in virtue of his style of writing. The signifying 
function of matter-as-information is hence mediated through image-objects 
simply on account of the style of writing that is brought to bear upon them. 
These image-objects are part of the molecularizing drive. It conjures the 
image-object as a figuration of an “ancestral realm”, ‘parallax to historical 
time’. 
The writer Rainer Guldin has worked upon Serres in a way that 
exposes clouds as taking precedence over other image-objects. Guldin in 
fact situates Serres alongside thinkers such as Leonardo da Vinci (1452–
1519), Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni (1475–1564), Albrecht 
Dürer (1471–1528), Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), Piero di Cosimo 
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(1462–1522), William Shakespeare (1564–1616), Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe (1749–1832), Alexander Cozens (1717–1786) and Ernst Gombrich 
(1909–2001). He uses this conglomeration of thinkers to summarise an 
atomistic reading of clouds in Serres: 
 
clouds are transient formless fields of possibilities, from which new 
information can emerge. They represent one of the central metaphors for 
present day global society. [...]The cloud is, furthermore, an eminently 
interdisciplinary phenomenon which has attracted the interest of all those 
working on theoretical borders.380 
 
These thinkers are grouped under Guldin’s reading through their use of 
clouds as primary object-image mediators of the transcendent perspective 
tantalisingly made possible by the understanding of matter-as-information 
or form-as-function. In Connor’s critique of Serres, and in line with the 
micrologizing effects of atomism, this informationalist ‘monism of the 
manifold’ involves the collapse of space and time.381 The concept-being of 
clouds replicates the conceptual being of mythic-ontological objects. As 
condensates of information, clouds are “before” and “after” all forms 
because they emblematise the topology of form-as-function. 
It is for this exact reason that Serres’ clouds are mechanical not 
metaphorical forms. These figures are not mere metaphors peppering his 
work or colouring his concepts. They are metaphors that are put to work, 
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intended to evoke a predetermined concept of atomism, and at the same 
time, intended to immediately associate that predetermined concept with the 
forms of the sky. Hence these cloud concepts are engaged in a mechanised 
metaphorical textual process of disassociated/abstraction and re-association. 
Clouds mediate the idea of the manifold by serving to refer that idea to the 
ecology, as if a natural construct. Rosenberg has eloquently analysed the 
intensification of settler colonialism that becomes permissible through such 
object-oriented ontologies. The lust for mythic forms that stand beyond 
history empowers the financial moment of capital accumulation, reiterating 
the ‘violent (catastrophic) reopening of the question of the origin’, as per 
Sandro Mezzadra.382 The figural use of clouds naturalises this primitivist 
thesis of object-ontology. It puts clouds to work as a mythic-ontology of the 
origin narrative that is central to settler colonialism. 
Serres’ Angels (1995) [La Légende des Anges (1993)], exemplifies 
this primitivist aetiology. Here Serres continues to be guided by his 
concomitance to Leibniz and to thermodynamics yet turns in his subject 
matter to directly address the problematic nature of globalisation. Doing so, 
Serres introduces additional material used to re-mediate his primitivist 
atomism. Serres’ analysis ranges across the globe to explore issues of excess 
and consumption; the effects of environmental policies on developing 
countries; and even the circulation of images of war. He includes a 
singularly striking photograph of dead bodies on the surface of floodwater 
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following a monsoon near the village of Bahvadar-Palli, Bengal, India, on 
November 19th 1977.383 I am not concerned by the inclusion of these 
materials, but rather by what these social realities come to constitute in the 
progression of Serres’ writing. Serres appends the text with a scripted 
dialogue where he speaks on the part of the reader addressing his style. The 
reader asks him to explain his style, and Serres responds: 
 
Masses of angels, a swarming, multitudes, an army, a troop, a procession, 
a parade . . . a barely ordered chaos, from within which individualities 
may sometimes emerge[...] Their form is generally fairly adaptable. That 
form is the skeleton key which enables them to open the blackest boxes, 
and this wealth of different forms extends to embrace all the different 
aspects that you have just listed and thus enables us to read our present 
era like an open book: our sciences, both abstract and practical, our 
hardware and software technologies––all our activities, both concrete and 
volatile.384 
 
In the above passage, Serres continues to frame the cognitive exercise of his 
writing through a theory of form as gatherings of atoms. Yet here the form 
is not a tapestry, a handkerchief or a river. Here, the projected cognitive 
space that substantiates Serres’ primitivism is the world in its state of 
globalisation––in all its ecological and social realities of oppression and 
exploitation. Indeed, the language of the ‘barely ordered chaos’ and the 
‘generally fairly adaptable’ material describes the data that is input into 
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Serres’ writing machine. The output is a cognitive space that is 
topologically continuous with the shape of clouds in La naissance de la 
physique (1977). Hence, the historical atrocities of globalisation are cited to 
produce Serres’ atomist myth-ontology of form. 
Cary Wolfe has noted Serres’ diffuse quality of writing in the 
introduction to the English-language edition of The Parasite (2007) [Le 
parasite (1980)]. Here she states that Serres is on a philosophical quest to 
fight against clarity.385 Equally, in the introduction to the English-language 
edition of The Birth of Physics (2000) [La naissance de la physique dans le 
texte de Lucrèce: fleuves et turbulences (1977)], David Webb reminds us 
that Serres encourages the reader to swap presuppositions of solid 
mechanics and finite form for instability and fluctuation. 386 Reflecting 
further upon this style of writing, Alessandro Delcò, Matthew Tiews and 
Trina Marmarelli celebrate Serres for having invented the indeterminate 
essence of his own philosophy.387 It is precisely the invention of this 
indeterminacy that should ring alarm bells for scholars working on 
neo/colonialism and settler-colonialism.  
Whilst Leibniz and Maxwellian thermodynamics are the ostensible 
components of the passage from Hermes (1982) and Birth of Physics 
(2000), the book Angels (1995) goes far beyond simply applying science or 
philosophy to history. Instead, this text serves to index politics, culture, 
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society and history, as components that Serres uses to ‘invent’ the 
indeterminate function of clouds. This mythology of clouds aligns with the 
mythological form that clouds take within the working concepts of the 
computer industries. Broadly speaking, through a parallel mechanism of 
disassociation and re-association, ecological clouds are somehow referred to 
through a concept of trans-historical traversals; of turbulent vortices; of 
precarious wholes composed of stable molecules; or of unknown forms 
made up of atoms we know and understand. The primitivist bent of this 
argument is evident upon the interrogation of the atomistic theories clouds 
are mechanised to substantiate. 
In order to build a picture of the much deeper history of this 
mechanisation of clouds, I will presently turn to the nineteenth-century 
British colonial uptake of a poem entitled Megha-dūta, or ‘Cloud 
Messenger’, a narrative poem in Sanskrit, from between 2nd to 5th-century 
AD, generally attributed to the South Asian poet Kālidāsa.388 This poem is 
about a Yaksha who imagines sending a message to his wife by using a 
cloud as a messenger. Perhaps counterintuitively, I do not want to look at 
this poem as a predecessor of how “users” of the cloud can “deposit” 
information in remote data banks. Rather, the forthcoming section of this 
chapter develops an understanding of the poem by situating it within the 
deep history of the colonial imaginary of India. This connection should be 
suggested by Hu’s unearthing of information about Bangladeshi workers 
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solving CAPTCHA problems at $1.50 a batch. 389  By making this 
connection, I by no means advocate for an imperialist model of homogenous 
time where the transition from a British colony to a postcolonial nation-state 
could be seen as smooth.390 That would be akin to suggesting that Kālidāsa 
anticipated the way “users” would engage in the remote networked relations 
of the sociotechnology of cloud computing. That argument is redundant 
within a conceptual history, because it does not pay heed to the long history 
of oppression that has led to a disjunction between the users and the workers 
behind the scene. The Yaksha in the poem cannot be compared to a “user” 
nor the cloud to computational media. Any understanding that we have of 
the poem has been filtered through the colonial imaginary of India. That 
history displaces the presumption of a direct correlation between networked 
relation and poetic trope. 
Hence, in assessing the role that the nineteenth-century orientalist 
reading of the Megha-dūta played in the deep history of dispossession, I am 
indebted to the work of Benedict Anderson, Arjun Appudurai, Francesca 
Orsini and Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee, for their reflections upon what 
Anderson terms ‘print capitalism’.391 These writers collectively allude to the 
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colonial force of nineteenth-century print cultures. The translation of 
Sanskrit texts such as the Megha-dūta goes hand-in-hand with the mass 
production and distribution of a colonial cultural imaginary of India, 
through the manner of annotating and abstracting its literary history. It is my 
contention that this colonial cultural imaginary continues to pervade how an 
industrial arrangement of computing services makes use of Indian subaltern 
workers, through the mechanisation of cloud-as-signs. 
Hence, I will argue that nineteenth-century print cultures can be 
taken as precursors of the oppressive structures of “cloudonomics,” 
structuring the lives of workers through the capacity demands of “users,” 
while presenting these structures as natural. That is, the way clouds work in 
“cloudonomics” echoes the way clouds work in the orientalist translation of 
the Sanskrit Megha-dūta. Both literary strategy and social phenomenon 
depend upon dynamics of abstraction and association. This will draw me to 
conclude that statements about “what clouds are” collude to exploit 
subaltern workers of the global South. As already explored, the ‘calm 
callousness toward the powerless’ or the ‘commitment to a supposedly 
abstract goal – development’ misrepresents what is best seen as an a priori 
commitment to capitalist industrialisation. 392  For Nivedita Menon and 
Aditya Nigam this prioritises the ideologies of the Global North over the 
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environmental concerns of Indian agrarian populations. 393  The semio-
capitalist project of using ecological symbols partakes in this façade of 
global environmentalism. Hence, I have found that analysing the translation 
of the Megha-dūta provides a vital historical access point to understanding 
just how it is that using clouds as symbols could thereby interpellate humans 
into their disembodied status. 
 
 
The Colonial Mechanisation of Clouds 
 
There are numerous Sanskrit manuscripts of the Megha-dūta. I am 
interested in the printing process whereby these manuscripts found their 
way into English-language translations and critical essays. The poem was 
first translated into English by orientalist Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-
1860). In 1813, Wilson published his translation under the title The Mégha 
Dúta; or Cloud Messenger; A Poem, in the Sanscrit Language, by Cálidása, 
working hand-in-hand with Bengalese commentaries of Kālidāsa’s poem, 
studying a manuscript held in the India Office Library, and publishing his 
work in Calcutta. 394  Nineteenth-century Calcutta marks an intersection 
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between ‘the emergence of a world of commercial publishing and 
entertainment, and the creation of a reading public’.395 Orsini and Graham 
Shaw together highlight that nineteenth-century Calcutta functioned as a 
centre of imperial power, key to the colonial literary project of the 
translation, exegesis, typesetting and distribution of Hindi, Urdu and 
Bengalese texts and manuscripts. 396  Wilson’s own English-language 
adaptation went through this system and was then revised and republished 
in 1843 in London. This edition was followed by several other editions and 
was reprinted as late as 1973. 
Looking across these works, Wilson’s orientalist strategies are 
identifiable in long prefatory notes, heavy footnoting and annotations on the 
poem. David Damrosch rather sympathetically attributes these strategies to 
the fact of Kālidāsa’s spatial and temporal distance from Wilson and his 
Western readership.397 By the second edition of 1843, Wilson has revised 
his previously appended annex of ‘Annotations’ into footnotes that 
overpower the poem on the page. He notes in the ‘Preface’: 
 
I have gone over the Notes with more attention[...] I have added some, and 
omitted some, especially those which were designed to place the parallel 
passages of European poets in contiguity with the language and sentiments 
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of the Indian bard. Such analogies will readily suggest themselves to well-
educated minds; and it cannot be necessary to endeavour to prove to them; 
that Imagination, Feeling and Taste, are not exclusively the products of the 
Western Hemisphere [my emphasis].398 
 
In placing emphasis upon linguistic contiguity, Wilson alludes to translation 
as an act of direct transfer. Yet his translation is one of extracting and 
transposing a concept from the Megha-dūta. As Wilson explains, he wishes 
to excuse ‘the apparent absurdity of the Yaksha’s addressing himself to a 
Cloud as to a rational being’.399 We need only look at the density of the 
annotations on the pages of this later edition to realise the way Wilson 
overwhelmed the poem with his own translations in an effort to make this 
concept palatable to Western readers. These dense cultural assimilationist 
annotations re-fashion the poem into Wilson’s own text. The poem at the 
heart of this activity serves as what Edward W. Said might call the ‘living 
tableau’, while the strategies of annotation aim to tame and decode those 
‘absurd’ Sanskrit poetics into comprehensible ideas.400 
The unstated assumption of this method of translation is that there is 
some universal idea of clouds that is prior to the Sanskrit poet, somehow 
open and transparent to Wilson as a Western translator. Writers like Wilson, 
from both Indian and European intellectual circles, collectively brought 
Kālidāsa to the attention of the Western world in the nineteenth century, and 
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the Sanskrit poet came to be a central figure in German Romanticism.401 
The heavy annotations in the Megha-dūta make this text a key instrument in 
the critical praxis of assimilation that defined this movement of intellectual 
imperialism. Broadening Kālidāsa’s relevance to global proportions, and 
jointly contemporising and historicising the poet, Wilson compares the 
Megha-dūta with writers from the Western canon of literature, citing or 
excerpting a large selection of Classical writers, from the Greek poet Homer 
(c.750-700BC) and Greek comedian Aristophanes (c.449BC–386/380BC), 
to Roman poets Ovid (43BC-17AD), Gaius Valerius Catullus (c.82BC-
c.53BC) and Horace (65BC-8BC). These comparisons to writers of the 
classical canon reflect the philological theories of German Orientalist 
Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829). In On the Language and Wisdom of the 
Indians [Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier] (1808), Schlegel 
compares Sanskrit, Greek, Persian, Latin and Germanic languages, seeking 
to suggest that Ancient Greek and Sanskrit were etymologically related 
‘organic’ languages, as opposed to non-inflected, ‘mechanical’ languages.402 
This link between Wilson and Schlegel’s methods of comparison signals the 
processes of cultural assimilation at work in Wilson’s text.403 
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This is especially apparent in the methods employed to decode the 
‘absurd’ poetics of the cloud in the poem. In the world of the poem, the 
cloud is only ever speculatively a messenger, as the poem is in the voice of 
the Yaksha addressing the cloud and describing the potential journey to his 
wife. The ‘message’ is only given at the end of the poem, when the Yaksha 
imagines the delivery of the words ‘What thou to distance driven by wrath 
divine,/ Imagination joins his form with thine’.404 We cannot determine 
whether or not the cloud has delivered this message. We know not if the 
cloud speaks, travels, or if it ever listens. Instead, the poem takes places in 
the imagination of the Yaksha; in this imaginative world (internal to the 
imaginative world of the poem), the cloud acts as an instrument for joining 
the Yaksha with his wife, traversing and collapsing the distance between 
them. 
Wilson’s annotations literalise this collapse of distance, through 
delineating the poem into what Wilson terms ‘the geographical part of the 
poem’ and ‘the region of unmixed fable, the residence of Kuvera and his 
attendant demigods’.405 Outlining a geographical ‘part’ creates a far more 
static image of the cloud as a messenger. Rather than imagining this form 
unfurling out across the collapsed distance between the Yaksha and his 
wife, Wilson compels his reader to see the cloud as a singular unit, picking 
its way across a described landscape. The cloud has ceased to fluctuate 
																																																																																																																																													
Orientalism and the Figure of the Jew (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2015), pp.52–72; Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978), pp.98–9, p.115. 
404 Kālidāsa, The Megha Dūta (1843), p.90 (verse 676). 




indeterminately between message, medium and messenger, and become 
instead a messenger for mediating messages from one point to another. 
Kālidāsa first introduces the cloud in the form of an elephant atop a 
mountain, in a line that Wilson renders ‘one dark Cloud around the 
mountain clung ;/ In form, some elephant’. 406  Wilson builds on this 
association of the cloud with the ‘form’ of an elephant to draw a link to a 
passage from William Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra (c.1605-8).407 
The lines are taken from Act IV, scene 14, where Antony, speaking with 
Eros, says: 
 
Sometime, we see a cloud that’s dragonish ; 
A vapour, sometime, like a bear, or lion,  
A towering citadel, a pendant rock, 
A forked mountain, or blue promontory 
With trees upon ‘t, that nod unto the world, 
And mock our eyes with air.408 
 
In principle, Wilson is using Shakespeare to poeticise the appearance of 
images and forms in clouds. This is supposedly intended to aggrandise 
Kālidāsa by association, in line with Wilson’s efforts to assimilate the 
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‘absurd’ living tableau of the poem into material comprehensible to a 
Western literary imagination. The parallel between his imagery and that of 
Shakespeare qualifies Kālidāsa as a “great” writer, through assigning to the 
Megha-dūta all of the canonical veneration of Shakespeare’s works. 
However, the selection of Shakespeare is not completely guided by 
the canonicity of this writer. Rather, the reference to Shakespeare 
transliterates the cloud into a communication device by inputting clouds into 
a machinic logic. Rhodri Lewis has noted that Antony’s speech suggests 
Shakespeare was familiar with the aesthetic trope of the ‘image made by 
chance’. 409  The ‘image made by chance’ is a Renaissance theory of 
aesthetics signs that randomly appear as if from nature.410 Lewis’ suggestion 
that Shakespeare was versed in the aesthetic theory is supported by 
Shakespeare’s use of clouds in Hamlet, where Young Hamlet uses the 
changing forms of clouds to mock Polonius: 
 
Ham. Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in shape of  
a camel? 
Pol. By th’mass and ‘tis—like a camel indeed. 
Ham. Methinks it is like a weasel. 
Pol. It is backed like a weasel.  
Ham. Or like a whale. 
Pol. Very like a whale.  
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Ham. Then I will come to my mother by and by.–– 
[Aside] They fool me to the top of my bent.––I will 
come by and by.411 
 
Hamlet imagines the changing forms of clouds moving through different 
modes of signification. Each cloud-as-sign remembers the air from which it 
has emerged, in a necessary metaphysical clearing of form for form, camel 
for weasel, and weasel for whale. This is why the clouds ‘fool’ him to the 
‘top of [his] bent’. With this phrase, Hamlet puns on the altitude of clouds. 
Clouds fool him to the highest altitude of his metaphysical relation to the 
world because they are here conceptualised as flimsy images divined by 
pure chance. This parallels atomistic theories of clouds, in that the central 
idea suggests the precedence of a turbulent void of swirling atoms. Wilson 
refers to this aesthetic trope through his allusion to Shakespeare. So doing, 
Wilson translates the ‘absurd’ poetics of the Megha-dūta by making 
reference to the aesthetic trope of ‘the image made by chance’.  
This reference covertly transliterates the Megha-dūta through 
making recourse to an aesthetic trope that is atomistic in nature. That is, I 
would argue that ‘the image made by chance’ does not extend from 
observations of natural phenomena, but from the Early Modern 
transformation of organic form into numbers. Two principal figures in the 
Early Modern theorisation of this move to dissolve matter into numbers are 
the Italian theoretician Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), who wrote De 
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statua [On Sculpture] (1430-1435) and the architect, artist and theoretician 
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), who wrote his Treatise on Painting 
following the distribution of Alberti’s work. 412 In De statua, Alberti models 
classical theories of the image made by chance in natural forms. Alberti 
writes: 
 
§1. I believe that the arts of those who attempt to create images and 
likenesses from bodies produced by Nature, originated in the following 
way. They probably occasionally observed in a tree-trunk or clod of earth 
and other similar inanimate objects certain outlines in which, with slight 
alterations, something very similar to the real faces of Nature was 
represented.413 
 
Alberti here develops an aesthetic theory of natural forms. This paradoxical 
fusion of aesthetics and nature allows ecological phenomena to serve as the 
ground of aesthetic-sign-functions, which the artist works into form. Since 
Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968), Alberti’s paradoxes of naturalising aesthetic 
constructs have been revisited as paradigmatic in Renaissance theories of 
vision and aesthetics.414 De statua, however, was far less influential than 
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Alberti’s other writings, and Janson even goes so far as to suggest that its 
ideas lay dormant, alongside those of da Vinci, until Alexander Cozens 
revisited them in A New Method of Assisting the Invention in Drawing 
Original Compositions of Landscape (1785-86).415 
Da Vinci’s Treatise On Painting post-dates Alberti’s treatise On 
Sculpture, and exists as fragments gathered together in 1540 for 
publication.416 In Treatise on Painting, da Vinci uses clouds to model the 
idea of the image made by chance. The two passages that are relevant are as 
follows:   
Way to augment and stimulate the mind toward various discoveries. I shall 
not fail to include among these precepts a new discovery, an aid to 
reflection, which, although it seems a small thing and almost laughable, 
nevertheless is very useful in stimulating the mind to various discoveries. 
This is: look at walls splashed with colors. If you have to invent some 
scene, you can see there resemblances to a number of landscapes, adorned 
in various ways with mountains, rivers, rocks, trees, great plains, valleys 
and hills. Moreover, you can see various battles, and rapid actions of 
figures, strange expressions on faces, costumes, and an infinite number of 
things, which you can reduce to good, integrated form.417  (II, §79) 
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[...] look into the stains of walls, or the ashes of a fire, or clouds, or mud, 
or like things, in which, if you consider them well, you will find really 
marvelous ideas.418 (II, §76) 
 
Da Vinci brings clouds to the forefront of Alberti’s theory of the image 
made by chance. He thereby inputs clouds into Alberti’s more generalised 
concern in De statua, for theorising an anthropometry of idealised human 
form.419 As Panofsky notes, Alberti aimed to ‘discover the ideal in an 
attempt to define the normal’, by an anthropometry that was attentive to the 
natural variations in the body.420 Alberti sought to perfect the method of 
describing humans through numbers.421 Diverging from Alberti, Panofsky 
notes that da Vinci was attempting to extend the materials that this method 
might be applied to, so as to bring other organic form into numbers.422 In 
making this move, da Vinci’s clouds come to constitute an organic referent 
for the subjection of all organic form to the numerical logic of emergent 
forms. Organic matter is abstracted into theoretically numerical forms, only 
to be re-associated with nature through the use of clouds. 
That Wilson refers to this aesthetic trope merely serves to highlight 
the co-ordinated processes of abstraction and association at play in his 
translation of the Megha-dūta. Wilson makes sense of the Megha-dūta by 
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conceptualising the cloud as a compound of numbers, gathered into a flimsy 
thing. For Wilson, the cloud carries a message because it is an image made 
by chance, in which one can ‘find really marvelous ideas’ or ‘see there 
resemblances to a number of landscapes, adorned in various ways with 
mountains, rivers, rocks, trees, great plains, valleys and hills’.423 In Wilson’s 
adaptation, the cloud hence carries a message only because it is understood 
through this European Renaissance theory of vision and aesthetics.424  
It is vital to remember that interpretation underlies any comparison 
Wilson makes between Kālidāsa and Shakespeare, which has become 
conventionalised within English-language Sanskrit studies.425 Indeed, the 
late twentieth century was instrumental in securing this assimilation, 
specifically in the structuralist field of semantic analysis. In a book entitled 
The Literary Semantics of Kālidāsa (1987), Hira Lal Shukla sets out to 
praise the aesthetic originality of Kālidāsa. The book commences with a 
short comparative exegesis on the inability to ‘prove[...] who was “greater”: 
Kālidāsa or Shakespeare’.426 In what follows, Shukla theorises the Megha-
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dūta in accordance with the semiotic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913) and Roman Jakobsen (1896-1982). He applies information 
theory and word-count mathematics to the poem, quantifying and tabulating 
the ‘pragmatics’ and ‘stylistics’, and limiting its poetics to quantifiable 
processes of ‘aesthetic-sign-production and sign-processing’. 427  This 
semiotic analysis of the ‘aesthetic-sign-production’ of Kālidāsa’s poem 
revisits the Renaissance procedure of using clouds to naturalise a theory 
about numerical organic form. Indeed, Shukla’s semiotic analysis pays a 
direct visit to those theories. A poem with an imagined cloud as its central 
conceit is used to re-route the computational language of ‘sign-processing’ 
and ‘sign-production’ through the ecology. 
Wilson is selective in how he stages his cultural assimilation, and 
what he elides from his annotation is just as important as what he includes. 
These omissions specifically relate the image made by chance to the Early 
Modern practice of building cloud machines. Looking through that 
omission, it becomes clear that the cultural assimilation of the Megha-dūta 
is not the only identifiable moment in the colonial history of mechanising 
clouds. In fact, across the continent of Europe in the Early Modern period 
labourers were being put to work to stage clouds as spectacles often known 
as the deus ex machina. Looking at these machines offers a further example 
of how using clouds as symbols partakes in the abstraction and 








Labouring Clouds within Art Machines 
 
Wilson leaves out a convolution in the speech where Antony clarifies ‘Thou 
hast seen these/ signs?/ They are black vesper’s pageants’.428 The word 
‘signs’ was prevalent in the Renaissance enterprise of meteorology, having 
been introduced into these circuits of knowledge when Averroes, reading 
Aristotle, used the phrase ‘demonstratio signi’ or ‘demonstrations from 
signs’ to describe the meteorological procedure of analysis.429 Craig Martin 
argues that Averroes placed an emphasis on two types of sign running 
through the Meteorologica: semeion and tekmerion.430 These different types 
of signs are referred to across Aristotle’s corpus, and there is a long history 
of debating what falls into what category. 431  sêmeia can be seen as 
contingent signs and tekmêria as necessary signs. This implies that 
Shakespeare’s reference to clouds as ‘signs’ is compatible with the 
Renaissance enterprise of retroactively dividing Aristotle’s corpus along 
these internal fault lines, conceptualising clouds as sêmeia, in opposition to 
other, more ‘certain’ forms and things as tekmerion. This sign-function style 
of interpreting Aristotle demonstrates a broader enterprise of positioning 
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clouds as certainly contingent forms. As contingent signs, Aristotle’s 
meteorological ideas about the forms of the sky were being subjected to 
Platonic and Neo-Platonic ideas about ideal form.432  
Within this Early Modern episteme, clouds ‘mock our eyes’ because 
they resemble forms but are in fact only sêmeia, or uncertain signs or traces 
of form. Shakespeare’s assertion that clouds are ‘signs’, then takes place 
through the semeion/tekmerion rubric. As semeion (contingent signs), 
clouds attained a lexical function and hence could be used to refer to other 
things, re-disclosed as iconographic or even hieroglyphic. Within this 
rubric, matter becomes an atomistic substratum of signification, from which 
aesthetic-signs trace the flimsy surfaces of what ‘is, was, or will come-to-
be’.433 This positions Shakespeare’s text within the Renaissance enterprise 
of meteorology.434 Where Antony asks Eros if he has seen the signs of the 
sky, Shakespeare explicitly engages with questions on the meteorological 
philosophy of clouds as contingent signs. 
This allows Antony to respond by drawing a parallel between 
scientific meteorology and theatrical productions, answering his own 
question about cloud ‘signs’ by way of referencing the Early Modern 
aesthetic enterprise of building cloud machines. In the word ‘pageants’, 
Shakespeare directly refers to the movable theatrical floats of civic pageants 
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and underhandedly to the stagecraft of courtly masques, as two popular 
forms of theatre where clouds would have been familiar to Early Modern 
audiences. Practitioners of civic pageants included Shakespeare’s 
contemporary Thomas Middleton (1580-1672) whose civic pageant The 
Triumph of Truth took place in 1613, theatricalising the allegorical figure of 
‘Error’ with his head ‘rolled in a cloud’. 435  Further to this example, 
theatrical productions of courtly masques and civic pageants oftentimes 
involved cloud machines made up of a complex system of wood, pulleys 
and ropes for transporting clouds and actors across a stage space.436 These 
clouds were painted on fabric, or white wool wadding was stuck on a 
platform transporting an actor playing a divinity.437 The writer Ben Jonson 
(1672-1637) was deeply invested in this Renaissance theatrical enterprise of 
exploring the emerging signifying function of clouds. Jonson’s 
collaboration with Inigo Jones (1573–1652), from 1605-1631, references the 
Italian intermezzi in the use of clouds, while clouds were instrumental in the 
quarrel between Jones and Jonson about poetry and architecture.438  
The Baroque architect and artist Filippo Brunelleschi (1377-1446) 
was a key figure in this experimentation with embedding clouds as 
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components of a working machine. He built a device that would project a 
reflection of the clouds moving across the sky, onto a mirror inside a 
miniature perspectival painting of buildings. The French post-structuralist 
theorist Hubert Damisch (b.1928) has written extensively about 
Brunelleschi’s device.439 Brunelleschi’s device allowed the viewer to see the 
construction of the aesthetic image with clouds performing as a component 
in the perspectival assemblage. When Brunelleschi input clouds into an 
aesthetic assemblage he opened clouds to the very possibility of 
signification, and demonstrated this opening through an instrument 
resembling a miniature theatre, held up to the eye. Brunelleschi’s work 
hence seems to suggest that clouds can be signs if they could be input into 
aesthetic machines. 
This Italian mechanisation of clouds as aesthetic signifying functions 
was transmitted to England, where Brunelleschi’s experiment was scaled 
upon into the perspectival theatrical productions of architectural practitioner 
Inigo Jones.440 Jones was reading the stage design handbooks of the Italian 
architect Nicola Sabbattini (1574-1654). In Sabbattini’s designs for 
theatrical intermezzi, or allegorical interludes, cloud machines are described 
in exacting terms, in passages that are accompanied by hand-drawn 
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diagrams. In a section of the stage design handbook that Jones would have 
read, entitled ‘How to Make the Heavens in Sections’, Sabbattini writes:  
 
Let AB be the cross section of the first section of the heavens, and CD the 
second, and EF a frame as a cloud, placed behind the houses at one side in 
a convenient position.441 
 
I find this passage striking for the way Sabbattini compresses different 
registers into one design. On one level, the notion of the ‘heavens’ carries 
religious overtones. Sabbattini does not use this tone ironically. Later, in 
‘How To Make A Paradise’, he writes:  
 
A little before showing the paradise, these lights will be lighted. The 
shutter may be run to the side, and thus a very beautiful flight of clouds 
may be seen. Truly it will seem a paradise.442 
 
Reading the above passage, it becomes clear that Sabbatini intends to 
describe how to literally construct the heavens in a manner that will amaze 
religiously devout onlookers. This starkly contrasts the language of ‘AB’, 
‘CD’, ‘EF’, ‘frame’ and ‘cross section’. These mechanical terms measure 
the heavens into the sections seen in diagrams annotated with the letters ‘A’, 
‘B’, ‘C’. The idea of convenience, introduced by Sabbattini at the end of the 
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passage, seems to exist on this second, more instrumental register. It is part 
of the mechanics of the writing, which map onto the theatre space as a 
method of allowing its movements to function to produce the divine signs of 
the heavens that move through the text. 
 The passage is a remarkable instance of how clouds can exist as 
spectacles when input into a machinic logic. Clouds are between the register 
of the heavens and the ‘AB’ mechanical system of the design. Turning to a 
handbook from the German stage designer and architect Joseph the Elder 
Furttenbach (1591–1667), the following passage, excerpted from his ‘Civil 
Architecture (1628)’, uses parallel terms: 
 
For the heavens, for cerchie, or curved frames covered and painted with 
clouds, are built and placed one behind the other, each at a lower level than 
the one in front of it. The foremost frame is set 36 feet above the stage 
level at the front pit ; the rearmost rests on the back shutter. Between the 
cerchie are spaces 4½ feet wide to allow deastros, or gods, and triumphal 
cars to be let down from above or moved over the stage.443 
 
What is peculiar about this passage is the fact that Furttenbach is mainly 
describing the smooth mechanisms seen by the audience, though he is 
capable of doing so in the technical vocabulary that exists backstage and in 
the wings. Indeed, Furttenbach has achieved a level of virtuosity in his 
language of machines, so that he is writing in a manner that will help 
convey how the machines should be assembled, where ‘heavens’ easily slips 
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into ‘cerchie’, which are themselves obviously equivalent to ‘curved frames 
painted with clouds[...] built and placed’. These passages from cloud 
machine architects demonstrate that cloud machines are also language 
machines. Clouds machines were taking effect in language, reconfiguring 
the lexicality of clouds. 
The Renaissance practice of building cloud machines opened the 
ecological forms of the skies to the semantics of machines. In ‘The Noble 
Mirror of Art’, of 1663, Furttenbach reveals the implications of this 
opening. He describes subsets of ‘First’, ‘Second’ and ‘Third Clouds’. Each 
subset involves different mechanics: ‘First Cloud’ is a design for making a 
glowing cloud appear, containing a boy, at the rear end of the pit.444 It is an 
arrangement of clouds in a circle surrounding/framing the illusion of a box. 
The box has an opening 3¾ feet wide, while inside are perspective lines to 
make it look deeper than it is, with a real depth of two feet. Clouds are 
painted around the frame of this box, though these clouds are still a part of 
the ‘First Cloud’, that is the box, the boy, the wood, the paint, and, 
presumably, the people working to make it all move around. Furttenbach 
thus demonstrates the manner in which inputting clouds into the machine 
assemblage came to disassociate the referent ‘cloud’ from ecological 
phenomena, and even from imagistic representations of clouds painted 
around the frame.  
Writing against the abstraction of labour involved in these cloud 
machines, Gerald Raunig (b.1963) has argued that Renaissance machine 
assemblages produce divine spectacles through virtualising the actual labour 
																																																								




and workings of the machine.445 For Raunig, the smooth running of a cloud 
machine is a pre-requisite for the production of spectacle. This smoothness 
of illusionism is a biomechanical assemblage, or the serialised 
‘concatenation of human organs, technical apparatuses and social 
machines’. 446  In line with Raunig, the Early Modern period was 
instrumental in associating the forms of the skies with a machine process of 
abstracting and extracting labour. Human labour is abstracted into the base 
material for producing a cloud spectacle. At the same time, the labour of 
clouds as ecological phenomena is abstracted and put to work in producing 
spectacular ideas about these ecological forms. This involves undoing any 
sense that the signifying function of clouds is arbitrary, instead asserting the 
artistic spectacle of clouds as a natural orchestration of form. 
The art historian James M. Saslow (b.1947), describes the amount of 
labour that was abstracted in order to produce a cloud spectacle on stage. I 
want to quote Saslow at length, as his work on this matter is unmatched and 
deserves concentrated critical attention. Saslow analyses the aesthetic and 
social backdrop to the Medici Wedding of 1589. The wedding celebrated 
the marriage of Grand Duke Ferdinando de' Medici and the French princess 
Christine of Lorraine. The event was principally marked by a performance 
of Giorlamo Bargagli’s La Pellegrine, a play with six allegorical 
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intermezzi.447 Working across various sources, Saslow reconstructs these 
intermezzi: 
 
The exact placement of this elaborate machinery cannot be determined, but 
its general structure and the number of stagehands needed to operate it are 
clear from two lists of the crew for each mechanical unit; drawn up in 
December and again in March, they differ in details but agree on the 
overall system of machines and their relative sizes. Approximately a 
hundred names are listed, with many individuals assigned to a different 
crew for each successive intermedio[...] Each of the two clouds farthest 
downstage[...] required its own crew of ten to twelve men, two of whom let 
out the coiled ropes (anguille, “eels”); another single winch or capstan 
(argano) with five more men was jointly connected to both clouds. The 
next pair[...] apparently smaller, were manipulated by a single common 
windlass (verricello) needing eleven men; each had two additional men to 
“fold them up” (ripiegarsi), suggesting that they expanded in some way. 
The three central clouds farthest upstage were for the most important god 
or allegories, all of which “came out of the heavens” of the upper 
background. Of these, the two flanking clouds[...] did not descend to earth 
and seem to have required only six men between them, while the central 
cloud[...], for Doric Harmony and others, required twelve men plus a 
“windlass in the sky” – set above the grid – with six staff.448 
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It is almost difficult to imagine this intricate concatenation of intersecting 
theatrical labour. Building cloud machines was predicated on abstracting the 
labour of the workers who sweated backstage and in the wings to produce 
the spectacle of clouds. This labour of production is necessarily absented 
from the spectacle of producing a cloud on stage. Looking at the handbooks 
of Sabbattini and Furttenbach, it becomes apparent that even theoretical 
writing was complicit in this process of abstraction. More than producing 
clouds on stage, the labourers who worked backstage in these theatrical 
intermezzi worked to produce the very idea of clouds as signs or symbols. 
There are traces of this move to mechanise clouds as symbols 
beyond theatre documents. During his collaboration with Jones, the poet and 
playwright Jonson wrote a scathing poem about Jones’ machine 
assemblages, calling them ‘cloudes of masques’.449 Jonson thereby refers to 
the whole masque as a cloud (paint, wood, cloth, and players included) as if 
clouds are compatible with any machinic assemblage. Likewise, in the 
Baroque and Early Modern visual art practice of painting clouds, clouds 
often appeared as clumps of paint, covering or supporting a deity, flocks of 
white curled around the arms or legs of an angel. Analysing the visual 
works of Raphael (1483-1520) and Correggio (1489-1534), the art historian 
Alessandra Buccheri notes that artists were ‘influenced’ by theatre practice, 
using clouds as ‘platforms’ or ‘bubbles’ for seating deities in the sky of the 
paintings.450 These platforms dissipate the borders of transcendental figures 
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into the blue backdrop of the sky, such that no devout onlooker need see 
their feet unrealistically hanging in the blue. On this account, the art 
historian Christian K. Kleinbub has suggested that ‘cloud putti’, or baby 
angels entangled in clouds, were ways to accommodate the supernatural 
within naturalistic conventions of painting. 451  It would undermine the 
perspectival naturalism of the painting to place a deity floating in the sky. 
Equally, it would undermine the transcendental status of angels and deities 
to stand them on the ground. In other words, both the naturalism of Western 
conventions of painting and the supernaturalism of religious conventions of 
deific form demand that the labour of the artist is abstracted from the work, 
and re-associated with the more “natural” ability of clouds to levitate in the 
sky and divine shapes at will. 
As signs embedded within systems of sign-production, clouds are 
thus used to re-route machinic concatenations through ecological form. In 
Early Modern theatre and the visual arts, clouds are used to virtualise the 
labour of the artist so that the aesthetic-sign-production does not look 
constructed, thereby virtualising the labour of those human bodies entailed 
in the process of the spectacle. Input into a machinic construct, clouds are 
tools for virtualising the actual inner workings and procedures of their own 
signifying powers. These Early Modern displays and spectacles of clouds 
provide a backdrop to the iconographic production in the workings of the 
cloud concept. Ironically, it is when clouds are input into machines that they 
emerge as ecological referents. As exchangeable signs or working icons, 
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clouds gain their appearance as “natural” concepts or as paradigmatic 





Chapter Three: Elastic Flocks 
 
Each organism can be regarded as a hierarchical system of plastic 
controls––as a system of clouds controlled by clouds.452 
Karl Popper––‘Of Clouds and Clocks’ (1965) 
 
I liked the concept of cloud for what one would call its elasticity. (Deleuze 
praised me, jokingly, for having finally invented something 
‘philosophical’: the ‘elastic concept’). It was a matter of dealing with the 
cloud as an object that would circulate from being a stage implement in the 
theatre to being a description in linguistic terms.453 




This chapter is about the paradoxically rigid concept of clouds as elastic, 
fluctuating forms. Examining a consistent history of using clouds to figure 
concepts of elasticity allows me to critique the role of the cloud concept in 
the instantiation of flexibilisation as a structure of labour symptomatic of 
post-structuralist economics. I examine the role of clouds in the art-critical 
writings of the structuralist philosopher Hubert Damisch (b.1928), who 
claims to have invented an ‘elastic concept’, just as he claims to have 
invented a theory of clouds. I determine the racialised history of this elastic 
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concept by looking at Damisch’s early writings and drawing these into 
dialogue with his relationship with the artist Jean Dubuffet (1901–1985). 
Doing so, I expose the racialised terms that permit Damisch to conceptualise 
clouds as the elastic “zero degree” of rigid Western painterly systems, 
arguing that elasticity is a form of primitivism used to justify the logic of 
flexibilisation and precarity in contemporary economic structures. I then 
move to analysing a set of nineteenth-century writers and artists who 
projected patriarchal ideas of agency and freedom into clouds by 
conceptualising clouds as elastic forms. 
The service-oriented architecture of the cloud computing industry is 
an elastic structure that emblematises the elastic economic conditions of 
digital capitalism. Under these conditions, the ‘cybertariat’–the precariat of 
the digital economy–is structured into inescapably flexible forms.454 This 
implies that the biopolitical schema of the cloud computing industry is a 
dynamically scalable network with responsive, malleable and tirelessly 
versatile dimensions. Of course, this convenience comes at the cost of life. 
It is only thanks to the cybertariat that service-oriented computing can be 
rhetorically and conceptually excessively convenient.  
The elastic receptivity and unprecedented convenience of 
computational media are sustained by oppressive global structures of 
outsourced labour and the expulsion of environmental waste and 
degradation to areas deemed less valuable.455 Within the critique of the 
cloud computing industry, these arguments have hinged upon seeing clouds 
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as a ‘veil’ of immateriality that masks the material realities of computing 
industries.456 This chapter argues that it is not the inherent immateriality of 
clouds that veils such operations. There is nothing inherent about the 
concept of clouds as immaterial. Rather, the assumed immateriality of 
clouds is indicative of the concept-being of clouds as elastic forms, and it is 
this quality that serves to sustain the economic structures of the industry of 
cloud computing. Elasticity mediates between materiality and immateriality. 
Elasticity codifies tearing and forming into the concept-being of clouds. 
By way of a leading example, in the essay, ‘Cloud Computing: 
Architectural Policy and Implications’, written in 2011 alongside the 
emergence of computing facilities such as the Amazon Cloud, GoGrid, 
Iland, Rackspace, Saavis and Sungard, Christopher S. Yoo attributed the 
market salience of cloud computing technology to its ‘service oriented 
architecture’. 457  This architecture, led computer scientists such as the 
authors of the earlier 2008 essay ‘Cloud Computing and Grid Computing 
360-Degree Compared’ to suggest that ‘Clouds are developed to address 
Internet-scale computing problems’, that they are ‘dynamically scalable’, 
‘driven by economies of scale’. 458  As a computational medium for 
implementing economies of scale, the ‘service-oriented’ architectures of this 
industry are malleable. In theory, these structures are so because they claim 
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to respond to “user” requirements. They ostensibly allow users to enter into 
a ‘feedback loop’ with technology, where automation optimises the 
responsive output by constantly revising how a system is operating 
according with the input of “user” demand. In the industry of cloud 
computing, elastic feedback thus facilitates alluring flexibility or freedom of 
the “user.”459 
In reality, these feedback loops enforce casualisation and 
exploitation, both within the ‘fringe’ where the “user” operates, and at ‘the 
core, where highperformance [sic] machines are linked by high-bandwidth 
connections, and all of these resources are carefully managed’.460 The 
capacity to access data in any location because it is ‘in The Cloud’, or the 
styles of living capabilised by companies such as Uber or Deliveroo, are 
down to a system that holds at bay a ‘“labor” cloud’ of workers.461 The 
capacity to access email on-the-go and to work remotely in this manner, 
marks a slippage between these elastic structures and the economic 
structures of ‘immaterial’ labour, or the demand for heightened productivity 
that serves to intensify labour exploitation. 462  Demands of labour 
nomadism, or what Johnathan Crary has called the relentless 24/7 logic of 
capital, offer yet another (if privileged) perspective on the unrelentingly 
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intensifying globally distributed structures of inequality implied by digital 
capitalism.463 
Most pointedly, David Naguib Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park 
highlight the precarity of life for labourers who manufacture high tech 
industrial goods like the semiconductor chips found in mobile devices: from 
those who are working at what Naguib Pellow and Park call ‘the core’ of the 
Silicon Valley economy, through those whose lives are endangered because 
they work on PC board and cable assembly lines, or what they call ‘the 
periphery’, all the way to thousands of Filipino, Latino, Vietnamese, Korean 
and Cambodian migrants working on ‘piece-rate pay’ to assemble electronic 
components in domestic settings, often in their own homes.464 Naguib 
Pellow and Park even expose how Lockhart Technologies, Inc., a circuit 
board assembly firm in Lockhart, a Texas prison, employ prisoners to repair 
and build machines for firms such as IBM and Dell.465 This research is 
drawn from a set of interviews carried out by investigative journalist Reese 
Erlich, who reveals that though ‘federal law prohibits domestic commerce 
in prison-made goods unless inmates are paid "prevailing wage"[...] the law 
doesn't apply to exports’.466 On the open market of global capital, exporting 
and outsourcing are two sides of the same coin. Through activating both, 
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labour can be flexibilised to a maximal degree, such that global capital can 
abstract and accumulate with an elastic responsiveness that will morph and 
warp in and around prospective barriers to what is effectively slave labour, 
such as federal law protecting incarcerated persons from exploitation.  
Considering this crystallisation of flexibility within the economic 
structures of digital capital, the journalist Karen Southwick has dubbed 
Silicon Valley the ‘birthplace’ of the ‘permanent temp’.467 The oxymoron of 
the ‘permanent temp’ gives way to the more generalised paradox of 
crystalized flexibility. Our love affair with the industrial phenomenon of 
cloud computing is thus, first and foremost, as Richard Maxwell and Toby 
Miller have suggested, our complicity in the ‘dirty’ and destitute elastic 
structures of capital, allowing temporary and capricious modes of life to 
concretise into permanently temporary ways of being for assembly line 
workers, migrant domestic labourers and the incarcerated who are working 
behind the scenes to sustain the spectacle of digital capitalism.468 
Under the guiding notions of the digital economy, elasticity has been 
sited, conceptualised and automated into a precarious state of permanence. 
Accordingly, for several writers ‘flexibility’ and ‘elasticity’ have become 
keywords for current trends in social, aesthetic and economic norms. For 
Ursula Huws, for instance, flexibility is a key word for thinking about the 
‘restructuring of organizations to make them leaner and better able to 
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respond quickly to market changes’.469 Equally, flexibility is a key word for 
reading domestic and remote labour; as atomizing work into temporal units 
which people must move between elastically in rapid, imperceptible 
passages between work and leisure.470  
Indeed, this logic of elasticity is not limited to the sphere of the 
digital economy and its diagnostics. Rather, I am struck by the proximity 
between the words flexibility and elasticity, and comparable terms from art 
and theory. In 1996, Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois co-authored Formless: A 
User’s Guide, a catalogue for the Centre-Pompidou in Paris, offering 
‘formlessness’ as a paradigm for contemporary art practice.471 Hal Foster 
suggestively prefaces his Bad New Days (2015) with a paraphrase of Bois 
and Krauss, suggesting that the formless has been central to post-1970s 
restructuring processes in aesthetic conventions and art institutions. 472 If the 
‘formless’ is now a programme of art, as Foster claims, then this programme 
overlaps with the social programme of elasticity. In the art world, this 
programme of elasticity mobilises an entire alphabet of aesthetic operations 
of the formless, running from ‘base materialism’ through ‘dialectic,’ 
‘kitsch,’ ‘liquid words,’ ‘part object[s]’ to the ‘uncanny’. To these I would 
add the terms: ‘diverse,’ ‘dynamic’ and ‘ephemeral,’ along with the 
‘manifold,’ the ‘multiple,’ and the ‘transient’. These art-critical terms are 
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concurrent with the catalogue of terms synonymous with a state of 
elasticity. 
These semantics were instated in the early 1970s, Ricardo Antunes 
purports, following the student and worker uprising of May 1968 in France 
and Italy’s ‘Hot Autumn’ in 1969. 473  In the late 1960s, what István 
Mészáros calls the ‘structural crisis of capital’ led to social and intellectual 
‘experiments’ with flexibility and structural instability, in the early 
1970s.474As Robert Brenner, critical analyst of economic turbulence and 
neoliberalism purports, we are living in the post-1970s wake of these 
experiments with elasticity.475 Elasticity thus puts crisis into play––elasticity 
programmes crisis as the logic of capital. That is, elasticity articulates the 
crisis of break, rupture, tear or rent, as a structural programme of already-
tearing, already-rupturing, already-irrupting flexible forms.476 Elasticity is 
crisis in its structural becoming––the becoming-structure of crisis. 
Looking at contemporary forms of labour under the conditions of 
globalisation, Antunes calls the ideological programme of elasticity a 
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‘freeze-dried flexibility’, following Juan Castillo’s suggestion that labour 
processes have undergone ‘organisational lyophilisation’.477 Both Castillo 
and Antunes imply that elasticity has been systemically implemented and 
crystallised, somehow, paradoxically, into a rigid form of work. That is, 
elasticity is imposed upon the individual to help eliminate unproductive 
labour, thereby intensifying exploitation.478 Flexibility fixes tearing and 
forming into a formula of what a bodily form is conditionally capable of 
doing, and mediates the intensification of exploitation that a flexible market 
requires, passing this into an ontological category of subjectivity. 
This aspiration toward elasticity hence conditions the digital 
precariat, or what Huws has termed the ‘cybertariat’, into the perpetual strife 
of being. 479  In one manner, the logic of elasticity entails the 
molecularisation of crisis. It does do by securing the totality of the market-
as-elastic by nucleating insecurity and instability to the individuals who 
perform subject to its dominant logic.480 This atomisation of structural 
tearing means that the inevitable crisis or tear of Marxian dialectics of value 
falls to the individual. Flexibilised or casualised individuals perform these 
atomic crises in their daily life: moving from job to job, descending 
constantly into unemployment status; people living on “zero hours” 
contracts; or working in unseen and invalidated ways exist in an elastically 
uncertain state of becoming. This ideology of flexibility lends weight to the 
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entrepreneurialism of employment in the global North (free-lancing, 
‘perpetual training’, and creative labour), inviting subject-formation 
through a self-disciplined flexibility of work and life, even while it 
maximises exploitation in the global South.481  On a macro-scale, the 
ideology of elasticity allows for a flexible market, where turbulence, crisis 
and fluctuation have been gradually integrating into the global economic 
system since the early 1970s. 
Just as Judith Butler has claimed that some lives must accord with 
the metaphysical programme of precarity, and just as Achille Mbembe has 
purported that humans live or die by a necropolitical logic of being and non-
being, I would argue that the globalised capitalist logic of ‘flexible 
accumulation’ implies that the elastic concept become automated as a 
working metaphysical framework for making sense of the world: as 
conceivable, as thinkable, and as a site for human action.482 Precariousness 
is resolved into a fixed form when we think of life as inherently elastic. In 
such thinking, elasticity becomes the continuum within which individual 
instances of exploitation are foretold, and thus certain to go unquestioned. 
The socioeconomic model of ‘flexicurity’ (a shorthand for flexible-
security) serves to demonstrate how the machinations of flexibility can be 
paradoxically secured and fixed through this projective content. Introduced 
by the Danish social democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in 
the 1990s, this emerging rhetoric has been celebrated by economists Peter 
Flaschel and Alfred Greiner, as a means of reconciling the post-1970s ideal 
																																																								
481 For ‘perpetual training’ as facet of the flexible world, see Deleuze, 
‘Postscript’ (p.5). 
482 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence 




of ‘flexible accumulation’ with the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.483 They propose using the welfare state of educational 
provisions as an egalitarian base for society, in order to secure flexible 
working and living conditions. This is intended to bypass the violent 
structuring of social bodies into uneven and unequal forms, so that society 
can be elastic yet equal. Flexicurity is an elastic socialism, which 
compounds security and flexibility by leaning on the welfare state to 
support atomised dynamism. The portmanteau linguistically compounds 
social-critical demands for security and art-critical demands for autonomy 
into a dualism of governable, securitised self-determination.  
As an iconic form with an ideological content, the cloud concept 
figures the paradox of flexicurity, of structural instability, and of regimes of 
self-determination. Clouds are fixed images of unstable forms. This 
iconographic content of clouds is so stabilised that it is difficult to separate 
clouds from ideas of becoming, change, fluctuation, precarity or instability. 
These ideas are perpetuated by the industry of cloud computing, which 
markets the implementation of dynamically scalable computational logic as 
an object of neoliberal desire. What is absent from the ideological content of 
the cloud concept is any clear bridge between this computational logic and 
its social and political histories and implications. Hence, in the forthcoming 
work, I will turn to the writings of French philosopher and art-critic 
Damisch. Damisch was embedded in the late twentieth-century milieu of 
French post-structuralist thought, to which Antunes attributes the 
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beginnings of ideological experiments with elasticity.484 Damisch is most 
famous for his theorisation of the role that clouds have played in the history 
of art. I will work through Damisch’s oeuvre tracing an elastic concept that 
appears in his thinking about clouds and across his other writings about art, 
culture and philosophy. Doing so will permit me to re-tell the social and 
political history of this idea of elasticity, building a bridge to the latter part 
of the chapter where I look at nineteenth-century art, art theory and science. 
 
 
Primitivism and Clouds as the “Zero Degree” 
Part One: Damisch’s Elastic Concept 
 
Yve-Alain Bois reflects on being urged by Roland Barthes to attend 
Damisch’s seminar series in Paris, first on Bauhaus between 1971-72, then 
on semiology between 1972-73.485 In conversation with Stephan Bann, 
Damisch fondly remembers this time in Paris as the period through which 
he developed his philosophy of the ‘elastic concept’.486 He reminisces: 
  
I liked the concept of cloud for what one would call its elasticity. (Deleuze 
praised me, jokingly, for having finally invented something 
‘philosophical’: the ‘elastic concept’). It was a matter of dealing with the 
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cloud as an object that would circulate from being a stage implement in the 
theatre to being a description in linguistic terms.487 
 
Damisch speaks of clouds as concepts with elastic qualities, before 
suggesting that he invented this concept, this model of clouds. There are 
salient similarities between this projection of an elastic concept in Damisch 
and his contemporary Serres, who featured in the previous chapter. Damisch 
describes a semiological project of preparing and projecting a philosophy of 
elasticity captured in a grammar of clouds––as if clouds are abstractable 
from the ecology yet remain operable as ecological referents. Elasticity is 
the object-ontology of clouds in Damisch’s work, such that both elasticity 
and clouds can become operable as a unified linguistic term. Damisch hence 
disassociates clouds from the ecology, permitting him to re-assert elasticity 
as ecological fact, of clouds as objects. Doing so, Damisch also alludes to 
the central paradox of the fixity of elasticity. In fact, this structuration of 
clouds commands a further conjunction to the material under analysis in 
chapter one of this thesis. In conversation with Bann, the way Damisch 
relates elasticity and linguistics is reminiscent of Vernant’s 
contemporaneous work on clouds as a constitutive tear in the social—a 
connection that will become ever more apparent as I delve deeper into the 
history of Damisch’s thinking about clouds.  
This chapter hence engages directly with the idea of elasticity, but 
engages more covertly with the work that I have been doing in chapter one 
and two. It is worthwhile noting these connections. These connections begin 
to allude to the fact that elasticity runs across both the aspect of the cloud 
																																																								




concept as a socially transgressive tear where all humans co-exist or in its 
mechanical function as a tool that abstracts labour into a spectacular 
production. As I will analyse much further, in the conclusion to this work, 
these conjunctions exist on account of the overall concept of clouds as 
tearing and forming. The assumption of a transgressive tear that gives form 
to humans implies that just as clouds are tearing they are forming, or giving 
form. Likewise, the tool that abstracts labour is equally the tool that tears 
labour, or the tool that re-associates labour with divine edict, giving form to 
the spectacular production. Elasticity or flexibility must to some extent be 
thought of as the sum of this paradoxical concept. A concept that can tear 
and form must be an elastic or flexible procedure. Hence, the following will 
perhaps deal most exhaustively with the social and political realities of 
accumulation by dispossession, as inclusively argued throughout this thesis 
thus far. 
Damisch first established this inseparable relationship between 
elasticity and clouds in 1958, in a long essay published in the Revue 
d’esthetique, entitled ‘un “outil” plastique: le nuage [a plastic “tool”: the 
cloud]’.488 The title implies that clouds are ‘plastic’––malleable and open to 
material manipulation without danger of permanent warp or weft. The 
opening claim is that of breaking the solid mould of art historicism. 
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Damisch is resistant to what he sees as the reduction of art to historicist 
critique. He gives a broad assessment of the problem of historicism––‘la 
variété même des méthodes dont usent les specialistes pose un problème’––
stating that the problem extends across art criticism, before framing this 
problem as a failure to capture ‘la réalité essentielle’––the essence, the real–
–of artistic form.489 Damisch thereby questions the rigidity of critique and 
historicist hermeneutics because, even with a variety of methods and 
‘spécialistes’, art criticism is failing to capture the ‘purement formelles’, 
‘comme système’ or ‘la langue’ of visual art, as Henri Focillon seeks in Vie 
des formes (1947), and that Ferdinand de Saussure has ostensibly realised in 
his structuralist semiotics. 490  Having meditated thus, Damisch then 
dramatically introduces what will become the ecological emblem of his 
structuralist hermeneutics of visual art for the next 30 years: 
 
Comment il nous est possible de la lire, pourquoi l’éstheticien ne peut se 
satisfaire d’analyses strictement internes ni se contenter d’<<éclairer>> les 
œuvres de divers points de vue exclusifs, mais doit s’efforcer d’intégrer les 
différents moyens d’approche dont il dispose en une seule méthode 
totalisante, c’est ce que nous sous proposons de rechercher dans les pages 
qui suivent, en étudiant un élément essentiel du système figuratif élaboré 
par les artistes de la Renaissance : le nuage.491 
 
																																																								
489 Damisch, ‘un “outil” plastique: le nuage’ (pp.104–148). 
490 Damisch, ‘un “outil” plastique: le nuage’ (p.105–6). Cf. Henri Focillon, 
Vie de formes, 3e édition ([Paris: Press universitaires de france,] 1947), p.9, 
p.29, p.16; Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique générale ([Paris: 
Payot, 1931]). p.30. 




Clouds or ‘the cloud’ (‘le nuage’) make it possible to read (‘lire’) across the 
figurative system (‘système figuratif’) of Renaissance artists. This is 
because clouds are an ‘élément essentiel du système figuratif’, meaning a 
non-figurative form occasioning a generalised analytical condition of 
Renaissance art. For Damisch, clouds are essential elements. Hence, this art-
theoretical essay seeks to brutalise clouds as base origins of art. The object-
ontology of clouds as plastic is key to this origin narrative. Damisch 
continues to elaborate that:  
 
En effet, le nuage n’est seulement un élément du vocabulaire plastique, 
dont nous contenter de retracer l’évolution morphologique, depuis les 
strato-cumulus qu’on observe dans les mosaïques byzantines jusqu’aux 
cumulo-nimbus gonflés comme des ballons qu’on trouve dans les toiles 
cubistes de Léger ou de Delaunay. Autant qu'on accessoire pittoresque ou 
symbolique, il est –– au sens où les linguistes parlent d'<<outil> 
linguistiques – un outil plastique que définit une certaine valeur d'emploi. 
Il n’a pas seulement une valeur lexicale, de désignation, mais a souvent été 
utilisé pour sa valeur syntaxique –– en tant, par exemple, qu'il permettait 
de relier des éléments distincts, de les intégrer en un discours cohérent. 
L'étude de la fonction que remplit un outil plastique dans un système 
figuratif doit nous donner accès à ce system lui-même, s'il est vrai qu'un 
signe n'a pas de valeur en lui-même, mais en tant seulement qu'élément 
d'une totalité’.492 
 
The plasticity of clouds is a tool for traversing the totality of art as a 
representative system. By asserting clouds as elastic forms, Damisch begins 
																																																								




to theorise about the inelastic, rigid systems of conventions of Western art. 
More, Damisch here speaks on the register of the concept or language-being 
of clouds thereby seeking to argue that clouds are the origin of art in its 
representative forms, as if art springs from clouds, and it is for this reason 
that clouds can be transhistorical tools for reading or interpreting art. 
Indeed, reading how Damisch theorises clouds in both his own work and in 
conversation with other art historians, one is continuously struck by the 
crossovers between these works and the essentialist language of 
dispossession and expropriation.  
In a 1998 conversation, Damisch tells his ex-student Bois, ‘the cloud 
is the zero degree of painting[...] a theoretical object[...] exceptional within 
the system’.493 Borrowing this phrasing, Stephen Melville explains that 
Damisch’s ‘theoretical object[s]’ are the ‘vanishing point’ not of painting 
but of the visible, which is elaborated or unfolded through ‘a hole, a boring 
through material depth’.494 If we annex this onto Damisch’s work then the 
idea seems to be that clouds are essential objects in an otherwise systematic 
field of perception; that only clouds are not true to the system that 
determines how we receive the visible––and that this non-truth is the 
essential truth of clouds. This essentialism has trickled from Damisch’s 
work into its critical reception, with Melville referring to the ‘essential 
object’ of the visible, and Krauss, often in dialogue with Damisch, arguing 
that clouds are ‘unanalyzable’, surfaceless, ‘immeasurable’, too ubiquitous 
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to be definable, ‘a differential marker in a semiological system’, 
‘unknowable and unrepresentable’ or ‘the lack in the centre of that 
knowledge, the outside that joins the inside in order to constitute it as an 
inside’. 495  Krauss has evidently been captivated by Damisch’s theory, 
suggesting that clouds are the ‘undepictable element’, clarifying that ‘we 
need to grasp it as a structure not as a referent’.496  
This mode of thinking depicts the system as a construction that rises 
up around the venerated base of a surfaceless and essential centre. Writers 
such as Robinson, Patterson, Melamed and Singh have worked to draw out 
the racialised logic of this veneration of the “zero degree”, whilst the likes 
of Alys Eve Weinbaum, Federici, Nicole Cox, Leopoldina Fortunati and 
Saidiya Hartman have further analysed the gendering of racialised 
production of abjection, through the critique of domestic, affective or 
informalised labour.497 
The very concept of ‘form [as] the condition of possibility for 
structure’, as Damisch describes clouds, hence echoes the language of 
expropriation analysed by the aforementioned theorists as participating in 
																																																								
495 Melville, ‘Object and Objectivity in Damisch’, p.189; Krauss, ‘The 
/Cloud/’, pp.155–165. 
496 Rosalind Krauss, ‘The Grid, the True Cross, the Abstract Structure’, 
Studies in the History of Art, 48, Symposium Paper XXVIII, Piero della 
Francesca and His Legacy (1995), 302-312 (pp.309-311). 
497 Robinson, Black Marxism (1983); Patterson, Slavery and Social Death 
(1982); Melamed, ‘Racial Capitalism’; Singh, ‘On Race, Violence and So-
Called Primitive Accumulation’. Alys Eve Weinbaum, ‘The Afterlife of 
Slavery and the Problem of Reproductive Freedom’, Social Text 115, 32.2 
(Summer 2013), 49-68 (pp.53–54); Silvia Federici with Nicole Cox, 
‘Counterplanning from the Kitchen (1975)’, Revolution at Point Zero, 
pp.28–40; Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, 
Prostitution, Labor and Capital (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1995); 
Saidiya Hartman, ‘The Belly of the World: A Note on Black Women’s 




capitalist accumulation by dispossession.498 It is hence equally striking how 
much Damisch has come to the attention of the arts over the last decade, 
gaining much attention in secondary literature, with no suggestion that his 
cloud concept might map onto the primitivist discourse of the structuralist 
writers to whom he refers in ‘un “outil” plastique’.499 This critical reception 
of Damisch’s work centres on his book-length treatment of clouds, namely 
Théorie du /nuage/: pour une histoire de la peinture [A Theory of /Cloud/: 
Toward a History of Painting (2011)] (1972). This much-cited work is best 
read as an extension of the 1958 essay about clouds in Renaissance art, 
expanded schematically to include art from the Baroque period to the early 
twentieth century, with an afterword to non-Western artists.500 In the title, 
Damisch places slashes around ‘/cloud/’ to syntactically purify clouds into 
surfaceless lack (creating the ‘purement formelles’ that Focillon 
appraises). 501  As such, clouds are conceptually crystallised into anti-
systematic exceptions. As conceptual forms, clouds guarantee their role as 
the elastic event of non-form. This book hence signals both the expansion of 
and Damisch’s retreat away from his 1958 essay, as Damisch moves toward 
the implementation of clouds as a programme of understanding all 
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structured perception.502 In this work, clouds are no longer a method for 
drawing together Renaissance artworks, but a categorical ‘subterfuge that 
introduces into the representational circuit a direct reference to external 
reality’.503  
This schematic extension of the central concept of the 1958 essay 
intensifies the overlay between Damisch’s language and the language of 
expropriation. Damisch’s extended meditation on clouds is so over-run with 
phraseology that unmitigatedly chimes with the discourse of dispossession, 
the task of selecting an exemplary passage proves arduous. Here is a text 
where ‘/cloud/[...] marks the closure of the system[...] through its lack of 
any strict delimitation, its “surfaceless body.”504 This conception of the 
constitutive body that is beyond surface is reminiscent of Robinson’s 
analysis of the joint dynamic of negation and unity at work in ‘the 
ideograph of Blacks’, signifying a ‘different species, an exploitable source 
of energy (labor power) both mindless [...] and insensitive’.505 Through this 
language, the conceptual production of clouds in Damisch maps neatly onto 
the conceptual production of abject-subjects that Robinson argues grounds a 
capitalist logic of exploitation: via the production of human form as 
negation, mindless and insensitive, or, in the words of Damisch, as ‘the 
most diverse [of] forms’; form with ‘no reality apart from that assigned to it 
by the representation’; the epitome of the ‘ambivalence of the sign’; ‘that 
which is unsayable (undepictable) but which nevertheless, as such, 
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continues to “work within” the system’ as a definitive outside that 
constitutes the inside as structure.506 This rumination on the elasticity or 
plasticity renders clouds as the “zero degree” of painting. The preparation of 
this idea of clouds replicates the prototypological production of abject-
subject as the “zero degree” of the concept of “human.” It hence carries 
connotations of how the ‘conception of humanity was molded’.507  
These overlaps are not an accident of language. Rather, the 
historiographic qualities of Damisch’s writings serve to explain the 
racialised conceptual texture of his work. Damisch wants to trace his elastic 
concept to the concept-being of clouds, as if the idea of a plastic “zero 
degree” had sprung from the ecological reality of clouds. However, in citing 
Damisch’s elastic concept, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari refer their 
readers elsewhere. In Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? [What is Philosophy?] 
(1991) Deleuze and Guattari reference Damisch’s elastic concept, citing 
Damisch’s 1967 preface to Prospectus (Vols. 1/2, 1967), a collection of 
writings by the artist Jean Dubuffet, edited by Damisch. They write: 
 
... le plan, le vide, l’horizon. Il faut l’élasticité du concept, mais aussi la 
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They append this with the following note: 
 
Sur l’élasticité du concept, Hubert Damisch, Préface à Prospectus de 
Dubuffet, Gallimard, I, p.18.19 [On the elasticity of the concept, see 
Hubert Damisch, preface to Jean Dubuffet, Prospectus et tous écrits 
suivants, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), pp.18-19].509 
 
The work, to which Deleuze and Guattari refer, is entitled ‘Le véritable 
Robinson [the real Robinson]’, a preface written for publication in 
Prospectus and later reprinted in Damisch’s Ruptures Cultures (1976).510 
Here, Damisch celebrates the anti-aesthetic/anti-academic qualities of “art 
brut,” the art movement pioneered by Dubuffet, literally translated as “raw 
art.” The preface celebrates Dubuffet for liberating himself from the 
restrictions of academic art, and for discovering “raw” aesthetic practice. 
Through the title ‘Le véritable Robinson [the real Robinson]’, Damisch 
means to align Dubuffet with the fictitious exile Robinson Crusoe, who is 
shipwrecked on a Caribbean island in Daniel Defoe’s The Life and 
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719).511 Damisch asks, ‘isn’t playing at 
being Robinson the very pinnacle of art or philosophy each one of us tries 
for?’512 In this veneration of Robinson Damisch paints this ideographic 
figure of settler-colonialism as a model of de-institutionalised creativity, on 
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account of his working so creatively with the “raw” materials of the island 
where he is shipwrecked. 
Damisch depicts Robinson as a wandering artist, producing art from 
“raw” materials that he surreptitiously chances upon. For Damisch, 
Robinson is an isolated artist free from the academic constrictions of art, 
creatively using land, resources and indigenous people. Undermining this 
idealistic depiction of Robinson, Derrida has critiqued the dialectics of 
racism that produce the native figure of Friday, a critique that could be 
broadened to highlight the settler-colonial attitude that Robinson first adopts 
toward land and resources, prior to Defoe’s introduction of Friday.513 In 
accordance with Derrida’s work, Stephen Hymer has since claimed that in 
order to accumulate commodities and vital labour, Defoe depicts Robinson 
as producing a concept of Friday, ‘not as a person but as a sort of pet, a 
mindless body that is obedient and beautiful’. 514  Robinson equally 
conceptually basifies the island and its resources, within Defoe’s depiction. 
The fictional Robinson appropriates land and resources as ‘mindless’, 
savage, ‘obedient’ and “raw”, just as he produces the native figure of 
Friday. Robinson is hence isolated only insofar as he is shown to perceive 
himself as existing in isolation, through conceiving of land, resources and 
people as “raw” materials for designing and pursuing his own prosperity.  
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This reading of Robinson could be subjected to analysis under 
Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation.515 As noted previously, Marx does 
not so much describe the historical transition from feudal to capitalist 
society, as allude to a sustaining process of expropriation, or rather, the on-
going necessary conditions for capitalist production. This involves the 
usurpation of land and property and the expropriation of populations, who, 
degraded and displaced, are thereby produced as the labour embodiment of 
capital.516  
In conversation with Bois, Denis Hollier and Krauss, Damisch 
reflects upon the Robinson he describes in the 1967 preface, stating that 
‘[when] Robinson Crusoe is beached on his island he has very few things, 
but importantly, not nothing: a rifle, nails, a hammer. And he has to start 
from zero’.517 This idea of the “zero” is shot through with the language of 
settler-colonialism, already seen in Damisch’s theorisation of clouds. He 
produces an image of the Caribbean island as the ‘primordial ground for 
humankind’, depicting the island as a pre-historical, ‘elementary’ space.518 
For Damisch, just as the representative system of painting emerges through 
the working “zero degree” of clouds, Robinson’s Empire on the island, 
which he builds over the course of some twenty-eight years, starts with 
eliding Friday’s status as human and appropriating his land, turning both 
into the living embodiment of a subterfuge.519 Both Friday and the island 
are the venerated and submissive “zero degree” that is hence unspeakable. It 
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is this brute and unsayable beauty of Friday that helps Robinson to prosper 
on the island. 
As with Damisch’s 1958 essay, the unspeakable is bound to 
Damisch’s working theorem of elasticity. Where in the 1958 essay the 
elastic concept is a figuration of clouds, here Damisch prefaces the elastic 
concept as a resistance to the Hegelian “Idea,” which Damisch also terms 
‘the concept’.520 Expressive of Hegel’s subordination of art to culture, the 
concept is the ‘true function’ that delimits art, and hence, ‘art then becomes 
an object of mere representations’.521 With the figures of Dubuffet and 
Robinson typographically articulating an ideal image of the new ‘man of 
culture’ who can operate beyond ‘the concept’––as man moving away from 
an institutionally disclosed being toward an artistically entrepreneurial 
figure––Damisch introduces the elastic concept as a theorem of form ‘freed 
from the socialized forms of art and its official norms and methods’, or as 
‘outside the usual circuits of cultural production and consumption’.522  
The historical realities behind this idea of Dubuffet as a liberated 
artist reveal the undergirding settler-colonial structures that permitted “art 
brut” to be born as an art form. In Kent Minturn’s historicisation of “art 
brut,” he details Dubuffet’s correspondence with Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1908–2009), describing Dubuffet’s trips to Algeria between 1947-1949.523 
In Dubuffet’s correspondence and essays from this time, the anti-aesthetic 
of “art brut” is informed by an appropriative stance toward indigenous 
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cultures, such as the Bedouins of the Saharan region, whose language he 
hears as ‘Arabic jargon’ and later transposes into French phonetics.524 In 
this vein, Dubuffet developed the register of “art brut” through the dialectics 
of bestiality and sacralisation, primitivism and value-conferral that 
recapitulate the paradoxical modes of thought found in Lévi-Strauss’s 
contemporary ethnographic writings.525 Evidently, any ostensible “freedom” 
of “art brut” depended upon ensnaring indigenous cultures into Dubuffet’s 
utilisation of their life as “raw” material for his aesthetic practice. 
The elastic concept is hence appended to the conceptual-personae of 
Damisch’s construct of Robinson and Dubuffet. Robinson in fiction and 
Dubuffet in aesthetics, visit a land and population disclosed as primordial in 
order to operate in a “raw” margin, beyond the usual circuits of cultural 
production. These fictional–colonial registers are compounded in Damisch’s 
theorem of elasticity. At the end of the 1967 preface, Damisch anticipates 
how he would later think of clouds as the elastic “zero degree” of painting, 
by extrapolating the terms of the elastic concept into an image of a 
primordial ground of philosophy, art, culture, work and history. The section 
is titled d’une philosophie qui saurait tirer avantage de l’élasticité des 
concepts et notions [concerning a philosophy that would know how to make 
use of the elasticity of concepts and ideas].526 Here he writes: 
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Fold over fold: Today the job of philosophy, which is that of art itself, 
comes down to suggesting another arrangement of folds, of imposing on it 
an ever newer and more antagonistic type, so that its domain will finally be 
filled with a thousand networks, meshes, creases, cracks, crevasses, 
furrows, hollows, pleats of every type. This is how we could imagine a 
philosophy that would be able to take advantage of the flexibility of the 
concepts and ideas it uses and of their spongy character–the very one that 
Dubuffet denounces–and which would take as its object the constitution, 
by means of the terms whose repetition constitutes its discourse, a certain 
number of constellations within which certain ones would mean something 
only through reference to the totality of the others––and nature, for 
example, only in relation to culture, but also only in relation to art; and 
philosophy: well, philosophy in its own turn in relation to art, and nature, 
and culture––all the work of the mind in need of reflection aimed at 
measuring, by means of a series of fictions and variations, the specific 
resistance of each of these concepts, its necessity, its elasticity, and its 
capacity of retention, in order to test the resources of their oppositions and 
combinations, in order to multiply the shared boundaries and lines of 
communication among them. What about art, or philosophy, if the 
recognized extension of culture tends to swell and to block the whole 
horizon of the concept? What about philosophy, or culture, or even mind, 
if what's left to art shrinks to the point of taking up only a barely visible 
margin on the frontiers of thought? And what other terms––work, 
history.... ––do we need to introduce into such an arrangement, or to 
subtract from it, to guarantee its balance, to stabilize it–-or overthrow it?527 
 
																																																								




Damisch describes a folding horizon of thought where art, culture, nature 
and philosophy co-exist and co-extend as receptive forms. In this space, art 
and philosophy meld into one another, with all systemic discretion lost. This 
primordial space must make use of the elastic concept, which is the “zero 
degree” through which its networked relations of folding folds are realised. 
Damisch speaks of the resistance of ‘art’, ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ to one 
another. The elastic concept is an oblique revelation with a diagonal shape, 
the beauty of which extends from its primordial and frictionless quality, and 
its ability to traverse these defined zones of thought. The elastic concept 
hence breaks through or ruptures the rigid categories that have so far limited 
art, culture and nature to their historical structures of expression. 
 While this passage celebrates the elasticity of the concept for its 
anti-Hegelian qualities, the prior passages reveal at what cost an elastic 
concept is inserted into a rigid structure of thought. The categories of art, 
culture and nature ‘take advantage’ of the elastic concept, the flexibility of 
which ruptures through these proximal zones, folding one into the other. 
While Damisch offers this theory as a concept about concepts, this depiction 
of how structured thought relates to itself through elastic or plastic forms 
revisits the racialised modes of perception that sustain economic structures 
of exploitation. I think here of the work of Tadiar, who writes that ‘surplus 
human life can serve not only as flexible labor’ but that doing so these lives 
serve as ‘risk-absorbing collateral’.528 Damisch’s elastic concepts are the 
risk-absorbing collateral that allow for the experimental rupture of art, 
culture and nature into one another. 
																																																								




The passage, then, enriches existing understanding of how 
expropriation is realised through concepts. Firstly, the passage opens 
questions of legitimacy, reflected upon elsewhere by Angela Davis when 
writing about black American slave women and their delegitimised socio-
cultural surroundings.529 Where Damisch writes of the elastic concept as 
‘freed from the socialized forms’, or ‘outside the usual circuits of cultural 
production and consumption’, this highlights the slippage between that 
which is unable to flourish because it has been delegitimised and that which 
is liberated from social law.530 In Davis’ work, she is speaking about law in 
terms of validity, rights and justice. However, the laws of representation are 
equally salient. Damisch prefaces the elastic concept with his frustration 
that the Hegelian idea confines art to an object of ‘mere representation’.531 
The elastic concept that is “freed” from legitimacy is hence also liberated 
from the regular circuits of representation. This is of course how Damisch 
thinks of clouds, as the “zero degree” of Western painting and the 
perspectival construct. And here too, Damisch’s work is revealing when it 
comes to the critique of deligitimacy and dehumanization. Damisch writes 
that clouds possess ‘no reality apart from that assigned to it by the 
representation’.532 In this it becomes clear that whatever is liberated from 
the circuits of representation is not freed into elasticity, but rather in that 
state of flux, depends even more deeply on the legitimised concept and on 
valorised representation for its assignment of sense. 
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I quote the above passage at length so as to highlight the striking 
parallels between this thousand-way folding space and what became of the 
geophilosophical spatialisation of Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored anti-
capitalist works of the 1970s and early 1980s.533 Damisch’s vision for 
thought much aligns with the concept of space that came to articulate 
Deleuze and Guattari’s radical agenda for philosophy. This brings new 
significance to the above analysis of the fantasy of freedom and the realities 
of delegitimisation and dependency encapsulated in the elastic concept. It 
would be overstated to claim the centrality of any one citation or one 
concept to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who engaged so variously and 
often unsystematically with sources and materials. However, it seems 
appropriate to ask to what extent Damisch’s elastic concept went further 
than the footnote in What is Philosophy?, running into the articulation of 
their anti-capitalist philosophical agenda. Siting the elastic concept within 
anti-capitalist philosophy could forge a connection between this theoretical 
discourse and the aforementioned contemporaneous economic experiments 
with elasticity.534 This would bring clarity to the elastic concept in its 
contemporary iteration, suggesting that a settler colonial dynamic of 
dehumanisation undergirds what might otherwise appear as a philosophy of 
flexibility, or as the innocent celebration of “fleeting” forms such as clouds. 
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Consequently, I will presently turn to explore the constitutive role of 
elasticity in the anti-capitalist philosophical programme of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work. This might suggest that Damisch’s elastic concept, 
conceived in the 1950s, had some role to play in their development of a 
rhizomatic philosophy. More than intervening into the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, this will facilitate a more integrated discussion of the nineteenth-
century materials analysed in the latter half of this chapter. Deleuze and 
Guattari specifically deploy elasticity as part of a radical move to de-
stabilise given structures, just as Damisch deploys the elastic concept as a 
primitive form. In the latter half of this chapter I am going to interrogate 
these ideas, through the nineteenth-century conception of clouds as agentic 
forms and of the artist as a free agent. John Ruskin (1819–1900) afforded 
artists a state of elasticity, conceiving of artists as beyond the political 
economy of quotidian work. Ruskin uses Turner to try to collate labour 
elasticity and ecological elasticity, as if Turner’s artistic agency is indicative 
of his closeness to the elasticity of ecological clouds. This concept of clouds 
venerates the idea of freedom from representation, even while that which is 
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If sympathetic to the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, as are critics Robert 
Bernet and Todd May, then it would appear that elasticity sits constructively 
within their anti-capitalist agenda.535 For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘elasticity of 
the concept’ is a prerequisite of the plane, void or horizon of thought, a 
central concept within Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborations, especially to 
their two-volume work Capitalisme et Schizophrénie, published as L’Anti-
Oedipe (1972) and Mille plateaux (1980). In this second volume of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, various forms or figures of thought seem to 
offer different places to identify how Deleuze and Guattari propose or 
formalise the rupture of the Urstaat, Capital or State-form.536 The ‘State-
form’ is the ‘crystallization’ of capital; capitalism is the ‘forming’ procedure 
of crystallisation.537 Or, as they elsewhere write, ‘Capitalism forms[...]’;538 
and this forming is the ‘organizing conjunctions of decoded flows’.539 
Moreover, since ‘Forms and substances, codes and milieus are not really 
distinct. They are the abstract components of every articulation’, capitalism 
is not just the forming procedure, or the crystallization process of the State-
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form, but the forming procedure of form in and of itself.540 On the face of it, 
then, these structuring processes of form articulate whatever might be 
antithetical to fluidity, elasticity, mobility, movement or life. They are 
procedures that ultimately crystallize non-elastic orders of form. 
Interpellated into these non-elastic orders of form, ‘[we] are 
continually stratified’, into the three ‘great strata’ of ‘the organism, 
significance, and subjectification’.541 Oppressive systems thus freeze the 
fluidity of life and thought, seizing elasticity into these three rigid forms.542 
It is helpful to look at Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense [Logique du Sense] 
(1969) for an understanding of how we are interpellated into these processes 
of forming. Here Deleuze associates the process of ‘forming’ that in Mille 
plateau underlies how capitalism performs a crystallization of the subject 
and the State, with ‘metaphysics and transcendental philosophy’, which 
impose an alternative on us: ‘either an undifferentiated ground, a 
groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without differences and 
without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely 
personalized Form’.543 Metaphysics is a process of forming because it 
personalizes and individuates form. 
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My echo of Nietzsche’s Gay Science (1882/8) is intentional.544 
Noting how central the ‘order/chaos’ binary is to metaphysical thinking, as a 
process of crystallization, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate a close critical 
attention to Nietzsche’s later writings, where he formulates his most incisive 
critique of metaphysics. What Nietzsche sees in metaphysics, Deleuze and 
Guattari contend with as the procedure of capital. Capitalism articulates us 
into personalized forms. Capitalism thus proposes that without these forms, 
or the beings that it makes, we ‘will have only chaos’.545 This influence of 
Nietzsche’s work could be attributed to Deleuze’s input. As François Dosse 
records, in the years preceding his work with Guattari Deleuze was at the 
university of Lyon finishing the doctoral thesis that would become 
Difference and Repetition (1968) and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 
(1968).546 In these works, Deleuze is working through reconfiguring what 
philosophical concepts can mean and how they can exist, on account of his 
sympathetic analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of philosophical concepts as 
methods of crystallising subjectivity into given forms.547 In Difference and 
Repetition, ‘the modern work of art’, such as Mallarmé’s Book or Joyce’s 
Finnegan’s Wake, indicates to philosophy a path leading to the 
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abandonment of representation’.548  This abandonment decries Cartesian 
doubt, Nietzsche’s neurasthenic of creativity. 
Deleuze and Guattari were jointly motivated in discovering methods 
of bypassing the order/chaos binaries that ground the imposition of 
psychosocial orders of the organism. This applies equally to signification or 
subjectification. In A Thousand Plateaus, the ‘Body without Organs’ 
intervenes into the given structuration of the ‘organism’, as ‘the BwO is that 
glacial reality[...] It swings[...] it submits[...] it unfurls, and opens to 
experimentation[...] the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that 
stratify it and the plane that sets it free’.549 The BwO disassembles the 
organism, taking with it the biopolitic of personalized subjectification and 
the crystallization of State-form. This dissembling function of the BwO 
makes it a figure that partakes in (performing) what Deleuze and Guattari 
describe as: 
 
[...] tearing the conscious away from subject in order to make it a means of 
exploration, tearing the unconscious away from significance and 
interpretation in order to make it a veritable production.550  
 
This action of ‘tearing’ interrupts the procedure of the BwO, as a swinging, 
unfurling, opening or glacial reality. Tearing makes space for the nomad or 
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the plane of consistency, as roughly synonymous non-conditioned tears or 
rips in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. 
Deleuze and Guattari thus jointly recuperate Nietzsche’s 
philosophical contention with metaphysics as a procedure of forming. They 
do so through their shared question of how to intervene, both academically 
and as activists, into the biopolitical structures of capital. Building on 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, they to some extent conflate capital with Western 
metaphysics, jointly introducing ‘tearing’ as a psychological rupture of the 
conscious from the subject or the unconscious from significance. To this 
end, tearing not only articulates the radicalism of Deleuze’s philosophy but 
also the philosophy of Guattari’s radicalism, in his psychoanalytic practise 
at experimental psychiatric clinic La Borde, his work as a founding member 
of the Left Opposition Group, the March 22 Movement, and a revolutionary 
militant in the April–May 1968 social revolts across France.551  
Appraising these non-conditioned possibilities of thought, Deleuze 
and Guattari oppose tearing to ‘[organization] and development’, or to 
‘form and substance: at once the development of form and the formation of 
substance or a subject’. 552  The BwO, the nomad and the plane of 
consistency thus appear diametrically opposed to the ‘forming’ of substance 
as a metaphysical procedure of sense, capital and subjectivity. As Guattari 
writes, ‘Capitalism’ is a ‘method of Capital’, ‘semiotization’ or ‘indexing 
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system’. 553  The BwO and the plane of consistency are opposed to 
significance and signification, or what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘the 
regime of signs of the State: overcoding, or the Signifier’ as the inscription 
of meaning in form: ‘the abstract components of articulation’.554  
Deleuze’s own writing, in the Logic of Sense, and Guattari’s 
thinking on the semantics of capital, are additionally useful in this vein. To 
reiterate, for Deleuze metaphysics and transcendental philosophy imprison 
singularities in intensely individuated beings because these are diametrically 
opposed through the strict binary of form and formlessness.555 Deleuze and 
Guattari do not opt into this binary by presenting the ‘organism’ and ‘BwO’ 
as opposites; nor do they present ‘the plan(e) of capital’ and the ‘plane of 
consistency’ as ‘alternatives’. 556  The non-conditioned form that they 
appraise as a procedure of ‘tearing’ is instead a procedure of forming; 
insofar as rigid forms are procedures of forming that the formless pass 
through. This is equally why, for Guattari, ‘a-signifying points of rupture’ 
are equally complicit in the semantics of capital as a mode of articulating 
the world, as are sense- and meaning-making processes.557 Attributing the 
‘a-signifying rupture’ to the forming of capital may appear to contradict the 
appraisal of the arguably ‘a-signifying rupture’ of the BwO or the plane of 
consistency. Yet simply stated, when Deleuze and Guattari speak about 
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‘tearing’ this rupture is totally different to the rupture of a-signification that 
is entailed in the semantics or the ‘semiotic chains’ of capital.558 The tearing 
they are attempting to articulate counteracts forming from within. It is a 
non-conditioned tear––this is why it is a performed action of ‘tearing’ and 
not the already-performed, already-supposed event as ‘rent’ or irremediable 
fissure in Derrida.559 The idea of tearing with which Deleuze and Guattari 
are grappling is a necessarily non-conditioned event of forming. 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari express the 
philosophical implications of this anti-capitalist vision of ‘tearing’, as a non-
conditioned movement in thought. In this book they describe philosophy as 
an ‘art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’.560 This once more 
revisits Nietzsche, and once more maps the co-ordinates of philosophy 
through their insights into capitalism. Yet in this text, the ‘elastic concept’ 
comes to serve as the BwO and the plane of consistency did so in the earlier 
works. In a passage that echoes Damisch’s 1976 preface, Deleuze and 
Guattari write:  
 
Le plan de la philosophie est pré-philosophique tant qu’on le considère en 
lui-même indépendamment des concepts qui viennent l’occuper, mais la 
non-philosophie se trouve là où le plan affronte le chaos. La philosophie a 
besoin d’une compréhension non-philosophique, comme l’art a besoin de 
non-art, et la science de non-science. [...] Pensée non-pensante qui gît dans 
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les trois, comme le concept non-conceptuel de Klee ou le silence intérieur 
de Kandinsky.561  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, elastic concepts occupy a plane that is the “zero 
degree”, or ground, of philosophy. This ground is pre-philosophical, 
because it exists independently of those concepts. Hence, what is at stake 
here is not nonconceptuality or non-thought per se, but nonconceptuality in 
its instrumentalised function, where it is used to execute a structure of 
exclusion through the production of exploitable human capital. What is at 
stake is the manner in which the emancipatory associations of elasticity can 
be instrumentalised in the production of perpetual precarity. This is why the 
philosophical appraisal of forming elastic concepts is a highly politicised 
project, even when it is asked under the guise of a question about 
philosophy. The philosophical project of forming elastic concepts takes 
place within the given metaphysical order of the concept (hence, it remains 
necessary to retain the fixities of the concept through the intervention of 
elasticity). The ‘elastic concept’, cited to Damisch yet hardly reducible to 
his thinking at the time, could be framed as an attempt to reclaim the 
‘concept’ from Western philosophical constructs of metaphysics and 
transcendental philosophy. As Guattari writes, ‘formulas organizing social 
life, work and culture[...] can be made to bend’.562 But in order to serve an 
anti-capitalist agenda, the elastic concept must be de-politicised and un-
rooted from its historical operation as a mechanism of capital, State-form or 
the Urstaat. If Deleuze and Guattari’s work has become foremost in how 
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neoliberalism is articulated, then this involves the re-organisation of the 
elastic concept through its racist history, and in that, of anti-capitalism 
through capitalist modes of production and the implied usurpation and 
expropriation.563 The elastic concept, key to a radical anti-capitalist project, 
has been re-rooted into the colonial history that gives it meaning. 
So far I have established the racist ontology and the colonial history 
of Damisch’s ‘elastic concept’, and expanded the implications of the elastic 
concept through Deleuze and Guattari. The elastic concept claims to be a 
philosophical invention that tears capitalist modes of production, 
specifically in the production of the subject. The following section of this 
chapter analyses how ideas of elasticity became associated with clouds 
through the nineteenth century, critiquing this association on similar 
grounds. I will turn to this period to continue the interrogation of how 
elasticity condenses emerging concepts of cloud-formation and subject-
formation. I will argue that clouds became a physical embodiment of ideas 
of liberation and self-determination, key to the model of agency at play in 
the art theory of Ruskin. I will then look to nineteenth-century classification 
system for clouds, developed by the amateur meteorologist, Luke Howard 
(1772-1864). I will argue that nineteenth-century systems of classification 
structured clouds through social norms, and iconographically linked clouds 
with the elasticity of male, artistic freedom, and the mobility and flexibility 












The Creative Self-Discipline of Elasticity 
 
Ruskin’s ideas about freedom and discipline are tied to his ideas about 
artists and the arts. In Ruskin’s The Political Economy of Art (1857), later 
developed into A Joy For Ever (1880), the writer takes up the question of 
disciplinary orders of the state, in the specific context of how labour 
organises socialised individuals:  
 
The value of the man consists precisely [in the fact of your being able to 
put a bridle on him.] If you can bridle him, or which the better, if he can 
bridle himself, he will be a valuable creature directly.564  
 
For Ruskin, the best system for constraining a society is a system of self-
discipline and self-organised labour. This theory of a political economy is 
founded upon the belief that ‘idleness does not cease to be ruinous, because 
it is extensive, nor labour to be productive because it is universal’.565 Unlike 
‘productive’ labour, the artist’s labour is creative––it is the business of 
‘special genius’ of the ‘art-intellect’––and so an alternative work 
organisation must protect the artist from usual economic structures.566 To 
allow his labour to be structured through the political economy would 
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compromise the creativity of that labour. It would interfere with the 
‘freedom of the patron or artist’.567 Ruskin thus attempts to negotiate terms 
for protecting (male) artists from the political economy.  
Ruskin’s five volume Modern Painters is covertly concerned with 
the creative labour of the artist and with questions of how this creative 
labour presents itself in the forms of art. In the first volume of 1843, Ruskin 
prefaces the work as a response to the ‘shallow and false criticism’ of the 
artist J.M.W. Turner (1775-1851) in reviews of Royal Academy exhibitions; 
his work will revive a new appreciation for ‘great living Masters’ such as 
Turner.568 This appreciation will be argued on largely formalist terms, as 
Ruskin believes that ‘Form is form, bonâ fide and actual[...] not an imitation 
or resemblance of form, but real form’.569 Ruskin wants to develop in his 
readers, an appreciation for the forms that are beyond the ‘technicalities, 
difficulties, and particular ends’ of convention.570 In terms of creative 
labour, this is intended to protect artists like Turner from economic 
devaluation, protecting the logic of creative labour from the logic of the 
economy, and thus ensuring true forms and truly valuable forms of creative 
output. To this end, what Ruskin calls ‘art-intellect’ and I am calling 
‘creative labour’, we might more accurately term anti-capitalist labour. For 
Ruskin, art is an anti-capitalist form of work.571 
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Accordingly, Ruskin’s Modern Painters explores the idea of the 
‘truth of art’ as a theorem that relates to his thinking on the creative labour 
of the artist. In the 1873 edition of Volume Three (1856) of Modern 
Painters, he writes that the ‘naturalist ideal’ of art follows the ‘rule’ of the 
‘real’ of nature, such that the artist follows the arrangement of natural forms 
in the arrangement and invention of their work.572 He goes on to state:  
 
The great men never know how or why they do things. They have no rules; 
cannot comprehend the nature of rules; do not, usually, even know, in what 
they do, what is best or what is worst: to them it is all the same; something 
they cannot help saying or doing,––one piece of it as good as another, and 
none of it (it seems to them) worth much.573  
 
The above exegesis can be positioned in dialogue with Ruskin’s theories of 
the special labour of the artist. For Ruskin, art should have ‘no rules’ and 
should not be aware of its own content or direction. Rather, the anti-
capitalism of the artist produces true artistic forms that are closer to the 
unruliness of nature (note the assertion of his own lawlessness using the ‘/,–
–/’ punctuation construction, as if his own writing is too creative to 
command into full sentences).  
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An artist who is ‘led to dwell’ on profit and wealth ‘gradually loses 
both his power of mind and his rectitude of purpose’.574 An artwork that has 
not been created by an artist liberated from the political economy will lack 
the ‘truth’ of form that goes beyond given conventions of aesthetic form and 
that operates outside the structures of the political economy. Ruskin’s repeal 
of Turner’s work in Modern Painters thus aimed to make the artist appear to 
diverge from convention and from the political economy of the state. More, 
the ‘wholesome truth’ of ‘invention formal’ accomplishes perfection 
through the conjunction of ‘sight and sincerity’, and thus ‘it is only the 
constant desire of and submissiveness to truth, which can measure its 
strange angles and mark its infinite aspects; and fit them and knit them into 
the strength of sacred invention [my emphasis]’.575 For Ruskin, art and 
creativity submit to what lies beyond theoretical understanding, beyond 
theory. It would be reductive to suggest art submits to nature, yet insofar as 
nature produces organically beautiful forms that cannot be reduced to 
economic modes of production, Ruskin roughly comes to align nature and 
art with non-economic creativity. 
Volume Two (1843) of Modern Painters contains compatible 
concerns with how creative labour evades the economy, submitting art to 
the non-theoretical in nature. Ruskin writes, ‘the Theoretical faculty takes 
out of everything that which is beautiful, while the Imaginative faculty takes 
hold of the very imperfections which the Theoretical rejects’. 576  The 
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nonconceptual truth of art realizes itself through work that is not merely 
modelling a concept. Hence the strange paradoxical style of passages such 
as: ‘all art is, in some sort, realization; it may be the realization of obscurity 
and indefiniteness, but still it must differ from the mere conception of 
obscurity and indefiniteness’. 577  For Ruskin, the artistic realization of 
obscurity differs from the need to conceptualise obscurity.  
It is possible to position this resistance to conceptualisation against 
the backdrop of emerging nineteenth-century systems of information. In 
accordance with the extended critique of disciplinary regimes in Foucault, 
Ian Hacking has argued that the nineteenth-century technology of the 
printing press facilitated the reproduction of social statistical norms as a 
disciplinary system of social codification.578 These forming social norms 
effected labour arrangements, through organising the social into maximally 
capitalist structures. To this degree, capitalist development has been 
historically sited in information, as Alistair Black and Dan Schiller have 
highlighted. 579  According with what Peter Burke has called ‘print 
capitalism’, the technology of the printing press was one of many 
facilitating devices in the implementation and concretisation of statistical 
structuring of humans into socialised beings, giving substance to how 
capital must predicate its abstract forms on social norms.580  
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Ruskin’s work abounds with the tensions of numeration, as a system 
that reduces the individual to a norm and as a system that reduces art to its 
exchange value. In fact, his reactive ideas of truth and liberated labour are 
most explicitly theorised in relation to clouds. Volume One (1843) of 
Modern Painters contains ‘Section III: Of Truth of Skies’, a five-chapter 
meditation on both the true forms of the skies and the truest forms of 
painted skies in modern works of art (namely, those of Turner). Volume 
Five (1860), which followed many years later, demonstrated Ruskin’s 
continued appraisal of clouds as encapsulating the truth of art. In Volume 
One, Ruskin gives a long meditation on the elastic capacities of upper-level 
clouds, as forms that are ‘of great flexibility and unity at the same time, as if 
the clouds were tough, and would hold together however bent’.581 These 
clouds are ‘disciplined’.582 They have ‘a plan and system’; ‘a relative and 
general system of government’. 583  They abide by ‘symmetrical 
discipline’.584 Counterpoised to these clouds, the feminine force of nature is 
aligned with ‘the violence of the wind’. 585  Every cloud follows the 
disciplinary violence of these feminized winds yet no cloud is subordinate 
entirely to the wind. Instead, the dichotomously male gendered clouds 
remain individual subjects created by divine forces ‘appearing to have had 
distinct thought occupied in its conception, and distinct forces in its 
production’.586  
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Upper level clouds are the primary forms that Ruskin describes as 
‘elastic’, while lower forms break and tear and rupture with more precarity. 
On these grounds, Daniel Williams has suggested that Ruskin ranks the 
skies in order of the visible agency of form, or the capacity of form to 
perform with or against the wind; arguing that since upper-level clouds are 
more elastic, these clouds possess less agency and hence render the wind a 
covert force of control: a ‘passive and peripheral’-seeming violence.587 
Ruskin venerates the overall elasticity of clouds as indicating self-discipline 
through displays of flexibility. What Williams makes clear, is the extent to 
which Ruskin’s thinking about clouds was led by a notion of “truth” tied to 
his theory of the male artist as “liberated” from the political economy. 
 In keeping with this interpretation, in Volume Five, Ruskin 
describes the forms of clouds in a manner that brings to mind his veneration 
of the ‘uncontrollable’ mysteries of the artist at work. He states that he will 
say nothing ‘dogmatic respecting clouds’, continuing: 
 
I will assume nothing concerning [clouds], beyond the simple fact, that as 
a floating sediment forms in saturated liquid, vapour floats in and with the 
wind (as, if you throw any thick colouring-matter in a river, it floats with 
the stream), and that it is not blown before a denser volume of wind, as a 
fleece of wool would be.588  
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Ruskin’s statement of open-mindedness correlates with his efforts to stand 
artists beyond the political economy of the state. As the passage from 
Volume Five continues, Ruskin instructs the reader to stand by a window 
with Samuel Rogers’ Poems (1834), containing engravings from Turner’s 
watercolours.589 Doing so, he emphasises the ‘excessive sharpness of every 
edge’ in the engravings, before emphatically imploring the reader to see 
these edges ‘melting away’, as the clouds ‘melt back into the recesses of the 
sky’, ‘all its spaces melting and fluctuating’.590 Turning the reader to the 
window, he asks them to ‘test [the engraving] by nature’s own clouds, 
among which you will find forms and passages[...] apparently the actual 
originals of parts of this very drawing’.591 He uses these directions to 
establish the symbiosis of the ‘melting and fluctuating’ forms in the 
engraving and the forms beyond the window. For Ruskin, the creative 
labour of the artist is inimitably bound to clouds, mirroring their fluctuating 
patterns. Hence, the type of agency Ruskin constructs for an artist is figured 
in his idea of clouds as elastic forms. 
Rather than drawing his ideas about the truth of Turner’s skies from 
the actual forms that clouds and storms take in his artwork, I would proffer 
that Ruskin formulated this opinion on the basis of Turner’s working 
patterns. Ruskin’s Political Economy of Art (1857) post-dates Turner’s 
death and follows from the permission that Ruskin was granted by Ralph 
Nicholson Wornum (1812-1877), Keeper and Secretary of the National 
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Gallery, to archive and arrange the Turner Bequest to National Gallery, 
including ‘seven tin boxes[...] upwards of nineteen thousand pieces of 
paper[...] About half, or rather more[...] in flat oblong pocket-books’.592 
Turner had died in 1851 and bequeathed the contents of his studio to the 
National Gallery in London. Ruskin arranged these from Autumn 1857 until 
May 1858.593 Ruskin notes, with romantic vehemence, the disarray of these 
pocket-books, which are ‘dropping to pieces at the back, tearing laterally 
whenever opened’.594 Carmen Casaliggi noted the importance of Ruskin’s 
time spent in this archive, as informing the centrality of clouds in his 
writings.595 I would additionally emphasise Ruskin’s quixotic relationship 
with the bequeathed archive, chasing his fictional Turner through the 
scattered, ripped and disregarded notebooks. 
On inspection, these pocket-books paint a picture of Turner as a 
frantic and disorganised artist. He often ripped pages from books, opening 
sketchbooks to start in the middle or turning a sketchbook over to work 
back-to-front and upside-down. This disregard for structured labour––the 
spontaneity and lack of care for the pocket-books––must have confirmed 
Ruskin’s beliefs in the uncontrolled and creative modes of production 
inherent to art, as theorised in The Political Economy of Art, delivered as 
two lectures in June 1857 and developed into the work, Unto This Last in 
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The Cornhill Magazine (1860).596 In light of this overall confirmation of 
Ruskin’s emerging ideas about labour, the economy, and the arts, I am 
interested to reflect upon how Ruskin would have read the sketchbook 
labelled ‘79. Skies’. (1818-19) and the posthumously named Finance 
Sketchbook (c.1807-1814).597 
Turner did not always label his sketchbooks, however, he had added 
numbered labels to help differentiate a series of similarly designed 
sketchbooks from his time in Italy in 1819-20.598 Imagine Ruskin’s joy on 
discovering the sketchbook Turner labelled ‘79.Skies’.599 This sketchbook is 
dedicated nearly entirely to watercolour studies of storming clouds.600 As 
Ian Warrell has noted, the sketchbook contains a study of the London home 
of Walter Ramsden Hawksworth Fawkes (1769-1825), a major patron with 
whom Turner was dealing from at least 1807.601 Turner was financially 
invested in Fawkes. Not only did Fawkes owe Turner a substantial amount 
of money for over forty watercolours he had painted for the patron, but the 
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sketch from 79.Skies. is contemporaneous with a popular showcase of 
Turner’s work in Fawkes’s house. Upon inspection, the watercolour studies 
of 79.Skies. demonstrate a focussed attention on visible form- and colour-
chronology of idealised natural storms and clouds. In this respect, 79.Skies. 
adheres to Ruskin’s theory of ‘naturalist ideals’ in art, as the formalist 
conflation of creative labour, creative form and natural form. 
Yet the demise of Ruskin’s veneration of Turner has been 
historically associated with the disillusionment that the writer encountered 
upon his time spent ordering these sketchbooks and tin boxes in 1857-8, 
specifically upon discovering nudes amongst the collection.602 Turner’s 
biographer George Walter Thornberry (1828-1876) in his 1861 biography, 
made public a letter from Ruskin to Wornum corroborating rumours that 
they had colluded in 1858 to set fire to most of the nude ‘erotica’ in the 
Bequest; and Ruskin had since been publically received as a puritanical 
censurer of art, a reputation that was not helped by his dismissal of James 
McNeill Whistler (1834-1903) in the Fors Clavigera of 1877. 603  Any 
material that suggested Turner’s art was driven by the arousal of form over 
geometric form, by desire rather than desire-for-truth, was thus antithetical 
to Ruskin’s idea of creative labour. For Ruskin, sex was beyond the 
theoretical beyond––too unruly even for the uncontrolled genius of the 
artist. 
In this process of censorship, I am surprised Ruskin left the Finance 
Sketchbook intact. For one, it contains ‘erotica’, readily over-interpreted in 
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the British Art Journal as a ‘couple having sexual intercourse’.604 This 
reading is not at all as obvious as implied, whilst the insinuation that this is 
a ‘couple’ co-opts a knotted confusion of six muscular limbs into the neat 
suggestion of a committed relationship. It is the fact of the impossibility of 
reading the image with accuracy, because of the jumble of limbs and the 
flurried pencil markings around the penis, that make it a counterpoint to 
Ruskin’s truth of art. Moreover, the drawing appears in a finance ledger, 
evidencing an economically driven artist who ordered his labour through the 
cost of materials and the sale of paintings.  
The Finances Sketchbook extends across months and months of 
creative labour, and was clearly a revered object as it is made from 
expensive ‘velvet’ patent notepaper with a soft surface designed for use 
with a stylus not a pencil. As Matthew Imms has suggested, echoing John 
Gage, the sketchbook has an integral pocket inside the cover containing: a 
London coaching inn receipt, with a delivery note on the reverse; two pre-
printed Bank of England slips with manuscript additions; and a folded sheet 
of accounts, containing reference to Liber Studiorum.605 Turner kept stocks 
with the stock-broker William Marsh on Sweetey’s Alley in London and 
would cash in these stocks when he needed money.606 He had begun 
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accumulating stocks of Government Funds in the late 1790s, and notes these 
transactions in the Finance Sketchbook using the abbreviations ‘C’ or 
‘Consol’ for Consolidated stocks, ‘R’ for Reduced stocks, and ‘N’ for Navy 
stocks.607 There are also details of economic exchanges with patrons, such 
as the name ‘Fawkes’, in a note that Imms transcribes as:  
 
2129 . 19.10 Bt Fawkes 304 19 1 
            [?9] 2 
      2334 . 6 . 11 Bt Sir John 204 12 
      2335 2 2 Ld Eg 600 
      2935 2 2 70 Fawkes[608] note 20 Feby 
      3005 9 2 
 
The various stock-keeping systems of the Finances Sketchbook are 
punctuated with pencil sketches of clouds, and a watercolour study of the 
sky. Looking at this otherwise, flipping through the sketchbooks and the 
Finberg catalogue reveals that his entire preparatory practice of studying 
clouds was punctuated with stock-taking and financial concerns. 
The labour of Turner’s life and his creative practice are co-
dependently encoded through a practice of keeping stock of money and 
preparing paintings of clouds. Indeed, in the Swans (or ‘South Wales’) 
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Sketchbook (c.1798-9), I have noted a similar coding system to the one used 
for Turner’s stocks being used by the artist to encrypt a sketch of a storming 
sky of clouds. Turner places an ‘R’ on top of a cloud that is in front of the 
sun, with shafts of light underneath marked with the letter ‘B’.609 This frees 
the creative labour of clouds from any puritanical proposition of their status 
as uncontrolled, non-financial forms of creativity. Turner’s studies of clouds 
are not signs of his anti-capitalist ‘art-intellect’ or ‘special genius’. They are 
signs of the cultural attentiveness that allowed him to sustain at least a 
portion of his livelihood on artist’s wages.610 On the terms that Ruskin sets 
out for art, then, Turner’s financialised clouds embarrass his status as a 
nationally celebrated artist, even to this day.611 Turner’s studies of clouds 
are materially bound to the economic structures of his work, as signs that he 
knew what would sell and what was relatively cheap to study. 
This problematisation of the creative labour of painting clouds is 
equally identifiable in the cloud studies of John Constable (1776-1837). 
Constable is known to have owned a copy of Thomas Forester’s Researches 
about Atmospheric Phenomena (1812), containing the emerging scientific 
classification of clouds. He carried Forester’s Researches with him to 
Hampstead Heath when he went ‘skying’, and annotated the classification. 
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612  This practice of studying clouds demonstrates an insight into the 
economic value of abiding by emerging abstract structures of the skies, as a 
new abstract ideal of art. Going ‘skying’ was relatively cheap as an artistic 
practice. Unlike still life studies carried out by academicians, a sky of 
subjects was freely available to sit for the artist hour upon hour, day after 
day. But in order to develop as an artist, Constable had to submit to the 
forms and formation processes of the skies as described and valued in the 
emerging formalist discourse of the sciences. On the reverse of many 
studies, he notes the time, day and direction of the wind.613 The more and 
more various studies of clouds he could accumulate, the more his work 
would accord with the structuring of the skies, and the more his art would 
be valued and sold. 
In a lesser-known example, the artist Thomas Kerrich (1784-1828) 
would leave his house in the middle of the night to study the halo effects of 
moonlight refracting through high-altitude clouds. Like Constable’s notes 
on the back of his cloud studies, Kerrich annotates each sketch with the time 
and date of his meteorological observations, echoing the method of 
meteorological journaling found in nineteenth-century magazines and 
popular journals.614 These artists were not just influenced by the advancing 
science of meteorology; they advanced the advancing science of 
meteorology by structuring their creative labour like a scientific practice. 
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Meteorology as a system of thinking about the skies thus facilitated or urged 
artists to capitalise upon cloud forms. Even if Constable was ultimately 
more concerned with producing artwork than mapping scientific data in art, 
his dedication to the study of clouds demonstrates his commensurate 
investments in the emerging cultural capital of clouds as structured forms.615  
Beyond the visual arts, Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832) wrote 
‘Cloud Poems’ and produced a poem entitled ‘The Shape of Clouds 
According to Howard’ (1820). It is even reasonable to position Ruskin 
alongside these artists, as his work equally demonstrates a profiteering 
insight into the study of the structural forms of clouds. In Coeli Enarrant.: 
Studies of Cloud Form and of its Visible Causes (1885), Ruskin gathers 
sections on clouds extracted from Volumes Four and Five of Modern 
Painters. Though the “cloud” work is scheduled to be third in the series of 
extracted essays, after “rocks” and “trees,” Ruskin rushes the “clouds” 
ahead of “trees.” He justifies this by suggesting that ‘I am desirous of 
placing these cloud studies quickly in the hands of any one who may have 
been interested in my account of recent storms’.616 The conception of clouds 
as elastic was hence tied into the production of the artist as free from 
economic structures, which itself had a role to play in a capitalist schema of 
aesthetic production.  
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For Ruskin, the height of clouds denoted their flexibility, which was 
tied to their degree of freedom.617 The highest forms of clouds, for Ruskin, 
were both the most altitudinous and, in that, the most elastic, the most 
creative, artistic and flexible. Goethe, like Ruskin, believed that ‘the clouds 
ascended not according to altitude but according to spirituality, culminating 
in the highest cirrus clouds’.618 These spiritual theories of ascension were 
dramatically widespread even outside religious circles, on account of the de-
sacralisation of ascension in the post-Enlightenment period. During this 
time, non-religious theories of ascension emerged through the practice of 
mountaineering. As Peter H. Hansen writes, ascending to the summits of 
mountains with meteorological equipment, early meteorologists would 
return with new data and new knowledge of the atmosphere. 619  This 
philosophical attention to the ascension hierarchies of the sky can also be 
traced to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who long before working on the 
Critique of Pure Reason (published 1781), wrote on ‘living forces’ (1747), 
environmental fate (1754), emergent evolution (1755) and wind dynamics 
(1755-58).620 
The artistic attention to clouds in the nineteenth century can be 
situated in relation to these movements in science and philosophy. So doing, 
it begins to become apparent that the idea of elasticity is not solely a 
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theorem of clouds in art or of the artist painting clouds. Instead, this is an 
idea that primarily runs through the scientific formalization of a language 
for clouds. In the forthcoming section, I hence find it necessary to 
interrogate the scientific morphological language of clouds that came to 
light in the nineteenth century. Just as I worked earlier in the chapter to 
expose the primitivist language of Damisch’s theories of clouds as elastic, I 
will presently expose how the scientific conception of clouds as elastic 
confines these forms to Eurocentric and androcentric circuits of 
representation, even as it seems to “liberate” clouds. This will imply the 
deep dependency of clouds on nineteenth-century social-numerical systems 
of information for sense and meaning. Whilst this language primarily takes 
hold in the sciences, it should be apparent by now that the meteorological 
concept of clouds as morphological forms carries implications for 
philosophy and the arts. Drawing on the work that I have already carried out 
to analyse the role of the elastic concept in Damisch, Deleuze and Guattari, 
this chapter will close by analysing the role that clouds had to play in the 
philosophy of Nietzsche. Reconstructing the historiographic context of 
Nietzsche’s writings, I am going to argue that Nietzsche medicalises the 
scientific elasticity of clouds to the point of enmeshing the human body in 
their morphological language. This will expose how his works in particular 








Erotophobic Objects of Desire 
 
The amateur meteorologist Luke Howard (1772-1864) formalised the 
epistemic hierarchy of clouds, in their relation to the force of wind, by 
instating a morphological language for cloud forms. In 1802, Howard gave 
a lecture outlining the basic forms of the structures of clouds, entitled ‘On 
the Modifications of Clouds and on the Principles of their Production, 
Suspension, and Destruction’. Howard delivered the lecture at the Askesian 
Society in London, before publishing the work as three separate articles in 
Vols. 16-17 of Alexander Tilloch’s Philosophical Magazine (1803).621  
From the outset, Howard attempts to reassure his reader that clouds 
are not the mere ‘sport of winds’.622 He derides the pejorative description of 
cloud studies as a ‘useless pursuit of shadows’, while his coarsely 
philosophical phraseology of distinction, cause, effect, necessity and 
observation, is intended to substantiate this derision.623 This brings scientific 
import and weight to the contribution of Howard’s essay, which outlines 
Latinate terms for the forms of clouds. The three basic terms are ‘cirrus,’ 
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‘cumulus,’ and ‘stratus’. For Howard, these terms imply ‘simply the 
structure or manner of aggregation, not the precise form or magnitude’ of a 
cloud. 624  Howard effectively develops ideal abstract forms for clouds, 
following a nineteenth-century move to link and classify phenomena.625 
Accordingly, the syntax ‘stratus, cumulus and cirrus’ are best seen as 
reductive norms for structuring all variables of clouds into three basic 
forms. 
However, Latin was a choice language for this abstract syntax, not 
only because it afforded translatability, but it also meant that Howard could 
develop a nomenclature with ostensibly elastic qualities on account of its 
linguistic morphological composition. For Howard, the ‘modifications’ of 
clouds as simple structures, admit of ‘intermediate and compound 
modifications’. 626  The terms ‘cirrostratus, cirrocumulus, stratocumulus, 
cumulostratus’ describe what he envisaged as the transitional forms of 
clouds. These are forms that exist in the liminal space between the basic 
structures of ‘stratus, cumulus and cirrus’. 
Since the sky is full of transitional forms and basic structures, 
Howard is drawn to delineate the atmosphere according to a hierarchy of 
ascent and density. A predecessor to Ruskin’s theories, Howard’s hierarchy 
of the skies runs from the common forms of low ‘cumulus’ clouds to the 
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unruly, capricious forms of high ‘cirrus’ clouds. Clouds in their higher 
forms ‘appear to have the least density’; are threaded, thinned and branching 
structures; are ‘sometimes perfectly indeterminate’ of ‘uncertain’ duration; 
and ‘intimately connected with the variable motions of the atmosphere’.627 
Clouds in their lower forms ‘are commonly of the most dense structure’ or 
have a ‘mean degree of density’.628 Visible signs of the strictest degree of 
the law of averages, these low clouds are ‘periodic’ forms that appear and 
disappear ‘apace’ with the atmosphere; and ‘belong’ to the day (cumulus) or 
the night (stratus).629  
Observing the formation of this entire hierarchy of the skies, 
Howard describes how vapour rises from the Earth and gathers through a 
process of ‘nubification’:  
 
The vapour thus thrown into the atmosphere is diffusible therein by its own 
elasticity, which suffices for its ascent to any height in a perfect calm. Yet, 
as in this case the inertia of the particles of air considerably resists its 
diffusion, so in the opposite one of a brisk current, the vapour, by the same 
rule, must in some measure be drawn along with the mass into which it 
enters.630 
 
According to Howard, all gathering vapours possess a quality of ‘elasticity’, 
which contest and contend with particles of the atmosphere and the system 
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of winds. The elastic force of a cloud allows it to resist or ‘be drawn along’ 
by currents of air. In a ‘perfect’ world, any elastic vapour can ascend to any 
height. In a ‘perfect’ world, elasticity would allow a cloud to self-determine 
its shape and form. Yet, considering the laws of the wind, in order to ascend 
through the strata of the atmosphere, clouds must exert and exercise 
capacities of elasticity against forces. Clouds must willingly be drawn along 
with the winds in order to ascend to the heights. Higher clouds are so 
because they allow their forms to be teased into thin, threaded, 
indeterminate structures. Lower, common clouds are a static balance of 
vapour. They lack the elasticity to yield to force with a resilient and flexible 
form. 
Due to this emphasis on the elasticity of clouds, Howard’s 
classification system surpassed all previous efforts to classify clouds 
according to ‘basic’ structures.631 This, and Howard’s enterprising nature, 
serves to explain the wide distribution of his work. The modification essay 
appeared in 1804 as a 32-page pamphlet; in 1811 in William Nicholson’s 
Journal of Natural Philosophy; in 1812 in Forster’s Researchers (later 
owned and annotated by Constable); in 1817, 1818, 1837 and 1843 as a 
reproduction. Howard would later develop the essay as an opening to his 
analysis of urban meteorology, The Climate of London (1818) and in his 
Seven Lectures on Meteorology (given in 1817, published in 1837, revised 
in 1843). In the Seven Lectures, Howard explicitly formulates the 
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classification through his research into the altitude of clouds.632 Through 
this disseminated material, Howard successfully rebutted the efforts of other 
writers to ‘name’ clouds, demonstrable in the uptake of his work by artists 
and scientists, public figures and amateur practitioners.633  
The transitional forms that move between the established strata of 
Howard’s atmosphere, thus mediate between visual hieroglyphs of the 
abstract syntax or ‘basic’ structures. The transitional forms move between 
these structures, as if liberated from form. The continued success of these 
ideas starkly contrasts the reception of other efforts to classify clouds. In his 
Annuaire Météorologique (1801-2), Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had published a 
French-language system for naming clouds according to appearance.634 The 
nomenclature reads: 
 
List of cloud types   Rough Translation635 
brumeux   thick fog, haze or mist 
en voile   overcast 
en labeaux   shreds of clouds 
boursouflés   puffs of cloud 
en barres   bars of clouds 
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en balayures   thin bars of cloud 
pommelés   dappled with small clouds 
attroupés   flocks of clouds 
coureurs   running clouds 
groupés    group of clouds 
de tonnerre    thunder clouds 
 
The more generalised Lamarck’s system became, the less it seemed capable 
of describing clouds in the universal manner demanded for scientific 
classification. Howard’s system made it appear that there were elisions 
between the forms of shreds, puffs and bars, in Lamarck’s system. That is, 
both the success of Howard’s system and the failure of Lamarck’s system 
enforced a codification of clouds as transitional forms that evade generic 
structures of classification. Clouds were emerging as essentially elastic, 
truly transgressive and fundamentally flexible forms.  
Yet beginning to interrogate this normative syntax of basic abstract 
forms, it transpires that Howard hierarchised clouds on Eurocentric and 
androcentric terms. Howard inflects the second-declension nouns ‘stratus’, 
‘cumulus’ and ‘cirrus’, by swapping the masculine nominative, singular 
case of the suffix ‘/–us/’ for the masculine, ablative case of the suffix ‘/o/’. 
The singular terms for basic modifications and the compound terms for 
transitional modifications of clouds are thus gendered masculine. These 
compounds are only possible within the inflected grammatical system of 
Latin that permits Howard to capture transitional forms in his discourse (for 
example, the non-inflected English grammar has no ablative case, and hence 




Jürgen Leonhardt emphasises that by the mid-nineteenth century 
Latin had receded from practical applicability, and was instead being 
described by grammarians as an ideal language for ‘grammar and logic’, 
especially for instructing students in the methodologies of the natural 
sciences, and denoted a Western idea of ‘culture’ and ‘education’.636 The 
choice of Latin generalises the linguistic denotation of Empire into a 
universal language for structuring the skies. If indeed Howard’s language 
brought clouds into being as ‘romantic things’, as suggested in the work of 
Mary Jacobus, then this coming-into-being took place because the language 
of clouds threaded their ontological qualification through two centres of 
power.637 The stem nouns qualify clouds as scientific forms through their 
capacity to be thought of through the language of Empire.  
This problematises the contemporary tendency to read clouds 
through Howard’s language, such as found in the work of Alexander 
Harries, who asserts that ‘clouds take their identity from process rather than 
permanence’.638 This reference to Howard and his theory of elastic forms 
does much more than simply recognise an “important” figure in the history 
of meteorology. Howard’s role in the history of climate studies dictated 
which centre of power would have sovereignty over the conceptual 
composition of the atmosphere and its forms. Harris continues, citing 
Hamblyn:  
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The world seemed suddenly to have been pulled more sharply, more richly, 
into focus’. The whole idea of ‘order’ was changed: order need not be a 
static system, but – like the clouds – constantly moving.639 
 
Such writing vivifies clouds through the objective “fact” of elasticity, 
through the sense of form as process. That is, in order to think of clouds as 
“fleeting” forms, then our conceptual framework hangs upon the British 
inheritance of the Roman Empire. Any romanticism of clouds as elastic 
“fleeting” forms that morph between basic structures is predicated on this 
imperial history.  
Furthermore, clouds are thinkable through these frameworks because 
of the gendered declension of their language-being. Howard figures clouds 
as basic forms and as transitional interstice in form. These interstices are 
ascribed with the ‘/–o/’ suffix, while the basic forms are ‘/–us/’ forms. This 
gendered declension is only necessary due to the drive to classify, and to the 
guiding rubric of clouds as elastic. Indeed, under the assessment of Samuel 
Randalls, Kristine Harper and Paul N. Edwards, even Howard’s drive to 
‘name’ clouds was eventually eclipsed by the scientific emphasis on 
“objective” numerical processing, statistics and calculus.640 
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Providing a critical framework through which to appraise this drive 
toward an objective language, Sandra Harding has written against the 
historical androcentrism of scientific pursuits for objectivity. 641  In 
particular, Harding has drawn attention to the conceptual violence of 
androcentrism in the maturation of nature’s symbolic meaning.642 Adopting 
a parallel ecofeminist position, writers such as Plumwood, Gaard and Salleh 
have subjected the symbolic content of the ecology to this critique of 
androcentrism in the natural sciences.643 In Plumwood’s Feminism and the 
Mastery of Nature (1993), she argued the case that the content of western 
culture’s domination of nature is contingent upon inter-related 
nature/culture, male/female structures of negation.644 Gaard, in her later 
work, contributes white/nonwhite, reason/erotic, financially 
empowered/impoverished and heteronormative/queer as salient dualisms.645 
Colonial erotophobia, or fear of the erotic, was hence vital to the ‘colonial 
assault on sexuality’ that was staged in the nineteenth century, wherein: 
 
The native feminized other of nature is not simply eroticized but also 
queered and animalized, in that any sexual behavior outside the rigid 
confines of compulsory heterosexuality becomes queer and subhuman. 
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Colonization becomes an act of the nationalist self asserting identity and 
definition over and against the other—culture over and against nature, 
masculine over and against feminine, reason over and against the erotic.646 
 
The idea of “mother nature” is brought into play by colonial erotophobia, 
where power is sustained through the gendered construction of male 
superiority, which in turn instates the normative sexual dominance of the 
masculine over the feminized, animalized and eroticised other.647 This 
draws me to reflect back on what is at stake in Ruskin’s erotophobic 
censorship of the cloud sketches and financial ledgers in the Turner 
Bequest. Ruskin did not just tear out pages he conceived of as lewd and 
non-artistic. In doing, he asserted an idea of creativity and the artistic as 
over and against the erotic. Clouds were ideal forms of truth within this 
regulated idea of the artistic imagination. Ruskin excluded the erotic from 
the production of clouds as elastic forms. The gendering of the wind as 
female is brought into play in this erotophobia. While the feminized nature 
of the wind is animalized as unruly and subhuman, clouds are given the 
agency to bend at will to the wind. If we follow Gaard in her queer 
ecofeminist argument, then Howard’s language for clouds as elastic forms is 
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equally complicit in this colonial erotophobic construct. 648  Howard’s 
androcentric clouds are colonial erotophobic objects.  
This goes a long way to explaining why clouds have been valorized 
as agentic forms, whilst the wind has been subsumed and excluded as a 
disorderly force of “mother nature.” Eve Sedgwick in Epistemology of the 
Closet (1990) has asserted that, within normative dualisms, ‘the 
ontologically valorized term A actually depends for its meaning on the 
simultaneous subsumption and exclusion of term B’. 649  This analytic 
framework renders the suggestion that Howard ‘made [clouds] real’ a point 
for serious concern. 650  ‘On The Modification of Clouds’ ontologically 
valorized clouds as elastic forms, and thereby disseminated the very idea of 
gendered or racialised structuration as an epistemology of the skies. This 
secured the assimilation of elasticity with human forms of agency whilst 
critically subordinating that agency to a sovereign power from which sense 
or meaning can be drawn. 
This directs me towards nineteenth-century climatological health 
tourism, as a subsector of post-Enlightenment medical sciences.651 The 
social practice of climate health tourism suggests links between emerging 
conceptions of the ecology and contemporaneous conceptions of the body. 
These links are equally suggested by siting the codification of clouds within 
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Hacking’s understanding of the emergence of social statistical norms, as a 
disciplinary system of social codification.652 Katherine Anderson and Harro 
Maas have extended this work to looking at clouds as statistical norms.653 
Both Anderson and Maas emphasise the statistical substrate in the visual-
paradigmatic shift in working concepts of clouds in the nineteenth century. 
Anderson argues that ‘typical pictures of clouds’ performed as visual 
mnemonics, arguing that these drew the scientific community into 
consensus about the predictably unpredictable nature of these forms.654 That 
is, to be predictably unpredictable replicates the aforementioned elusive and 
ultimately fantastical escape from rigidity or fixity. 
This assimilation of cloud and body comes most clearly into view 
through the writings of Nietzsche. I think here of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, where he writes that ‘Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as 
taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky’.655 Deleuze cites 
Nietzsche’s use of the sky to his descriptions of the ‘chance-sky’ and 
‘innocence-sky’, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (written 1883-1885).656 Yet as I 
will demonstrate below, Nietzsche’s use of the sky to model the rupture of 
metaphysical form is not limited to one passage in one text. Rather, clouds 
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repeatedly reappear within the otherwise multifarious imagery of 
Nietzsche’s works.  
It appears that Nietzsche identified clouds as imagery for illustrating 
his philosophy from the books in his personal library. The German edition 
of Tyndall’s Forms of Water was purchased and owned by Nietzsche, 
alongside German editions of Friedrich Schoedler, Book of Nature: A 
Popular Cyclopædia of the Natural and Physical Sciences (1814) and Pierre 
Foissac, De la météorologie: dans ses rapports avec la science de l'homme 
et principalement avec la médecine et l'hygiène publique (2nd Edn. 1854, 1st 
Edn. [n.d.]), who also published l’Influence des climats sur l’homme 
translated into German as Über den Einfluß des Klima auf den Menschen by 
August Heinrich Ludwig Westrumb (1840).657  As Gregory Moore has 
noted, Nietzsche did not read these books for their philosophical merit, but 
because he was ill and so he was approaching his own body pragmatically 
as someone obsessed with finding a cure.658 Between the years of 1871 and 
1889, Nietzsche was chronically ill, comprising of headaches and poor 
digestion. Moore narrates how this illness brought Nietzsche to obsess over 
the weather:  
 
during the 1880s Nietzsche began to realize that experimenting with diet 
was not the only way to improve his poor digestion and headaches. 
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Climate and the weather played an increasingly important role in his 
thinking about his body and his various illnesses [... p.80] he spent the rest 
of his intellectual life wandering Europe in search of the perfect climate 
[...] Nietzsche’s letters are filled with detailed, almost obsessive, 
descriptions of the weather. 659  
 
Having worked in The Nietzsche Archive, Weimar, Moore describes the 
aforementioned texts contained in Nietzsche’s personal library. Nietzsche’s 
late writings post-date the publication of these studies in the natural 
sciences, with Daybreak written in 1880, The Gay Science between 1881-
1882, Thus Spoke Zarathustra between 1883-1885, and Ecce Homo, the 
semi-autobiographical work, in 1888. R.J. Hollingdale has detailed 
Nietzsche’s movements during this time, describing his illness from 1871, 
and his subsequent climate health trips to Sils-Maria in the Alps, from as 
early as 1881, where he cites Nietzsche as pronouncing, ‘I know of nothing 
more suited to my nature than this piece of high land’.660 In Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche describes a visit from Heinrich von Stein at Sils-Maria, 
describing his feeling:  
 
as if transported by a storm-wind of freedom, like one suddenly raised to 
his own heights and given wings. I kept telling him it was the result of the 
																																																								
659 Moore, ‘Nietzsche, Medicine and Meteorology’, p.79. 
660 Nietzsche cited in R. J. Hollingdale, ‘Introduction/Chronology of 
Nietzsche’s Life’, in Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes 
What One Is, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 




fine air up here[...] that you could not stand 6,000 feet above Bayreuth and 
not notice it.661 
 
If we triangulate this trajectory, that Nietzsche took to and from Sils-Maria 
to experience the clear air, with Moore’s fascinating work in The Nietzsche 
Archive, then it seems entirely reasonable to surmise that Nietzsche’s 
celebration of the air at Sils-Maria is related to his readings in climate and 
the weather. If this is the case, then the aforementioned texts in the natural 
sciences are background material in Nietzsche’s conception of the body.  
Fascinatingly, each of these texts contains passages that either 
directly repeat or visit Howard’s classification of clouds. Schoedler, in his 
Book of Nature, describes Howard’s classification of clouds, writing that, 
‘[v]arious names have been given to the clouds, according to their form and 
mass: thus there are the feathery cloud or cirrus, the dense cloud or 
cumulus, and stratified clouds or stratus, which again merge into a variety 
of others, such as cirro-cumulus, cumulo-stratus, &c’.662 He also describes 
‘violent winds’ that will ‘often tear away with them all moveable 
objects’.663 Schoedler thus subscribes to the dichotomy of winds and clouds, 
and to the intersecting structuration of clouds into the Latinate forms. In his 
introductory remarks to Forms of Water, Tyndall suggests that, ‘the human 
mind is not satisfied with observing and studying any natural occurrence 
alone, but takes pleasure in connecting every natural fact with what has 
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gone before it, and with what is to come after’.664 This claim about the 
human tendency to impose causality on nature, frames a later passage 
regarding the perception of clouds: 
 
You frequently see a streamer of cloud many hundred yards in length 
drawn on from an Alpine peak. Its steadiness appears perfect, though a 
strong wind may be blowing at the same time over the mountain head. 
Why is the cloud not blown away? It is blown away; its permanence is 
only apparent. At one end it is incessantly dissolved, at the other end it is 
incessantly renewed: supply and consumption being thus equalized, the 
cloud appears as changeless as the mountain to which it seems to cling.665 
 
Tyndall belies any apparent permanence of clouds as forms, alluding to the 
illusion of constancy. The seemingly permanent cloud streaming from the 
end of the Alpine peak is in a state of becoming. The cloud that we see 
before us is not “real,” insofar as the impression we have of a single, static 
cloud is a fabrication. Clouds are not beings, for Tyndall; the becoming of 
clouds is their reality. 
Foissac’s De la Météorologie, equally qualifies clouds as constantly 
changing forms in nature. Foissac writes, ‘Les formes des nuages sont très 
diversifiées et souvent très capricieuses [The forms of clouds are very 
diverse and often changing in shape]’.666 He continues: 
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Ces nuages ont fourni au génie des poëtes les plus riches descriptions, leurs 
formes capricieuses représentant tous les êtres de la nature ; car, on le sait, 
l’âme vivement émue est disposée à la superstition ; elle change en êtres 
réels ses rêves fantastiques, croit ce qu’elle désire, et prête de la couleur, 
une forme, un corps aux conceptions vaporeuses de son imagination 
 
[These clouds have provided richer descriptions to the genius of poets, 
their shifting and transforming shapes representing all the beings of the 
natural world; because, as we know, the deeply moved soul is predisposed 
to superstition; it changes to real beings fantastical dreams, believes what it 
wants, and will lend colour, a shape, bodying forth conceptions 
transforming fantastical dreams into real beings.]667 
 
He continues this passage with a reference to Howard’s classification, 
acknowledging scientific fact, following this reflection on poetic shifting 
and transforming fantasy. It is difficult to overlook the connection between 
Foissac’s description here, and the ‘image made by chance’ explored in the 
previous chapter.668 What has shifted in this passage is the move from this 
previously aesthetic construct toward the idea of scientific objectivity. 
Clouds now abide with stochastic law, and this law allows them to perform 
according to chance dynamics, shifting and transforming their shapes as if 
predictably unpredictable. In this respect, it is significant that this passage 
features in a text claiming to deal with the science of man (la science de 
l’homme), principally with regard to medicine and public health 
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(principalement avec la médicine et l’hygèine publique), through 
meteorology. Nineteenth-century natural sciences were not hermetically 
discreet from contemporaneous conceptions of the body. Rather, Foissac’s 
work suggests a porous boundary between these fields. Indeed, works that 
thread together medicine and meteorology exploit the human body as a site 
for thinking through the emerging stochastic law of clouds. Bound to 
climatic changes, variations and fluctuations of the human body are brought 
into dialogue with the elasticity of clouds.  
Appreciating this overlap is key to understanding the commensurate 
project of formulating variable climatic dynamics within meteorology, and 
codifying the human body as a site of social norms. Nietzsche’s readings at 
this overlap were for pragmatic purposes, and hence while meteorology and 
medicine inevitably extended the metaphorical resources of his writing, as 
Moore has highlighted, Nietzsche was not seeking abstract imagery but the 
application of meteorology to his own body. 669  As Moore highlights, 
Nietzsche followed the nineteenth-century trend for conceptualising the 
body as a machine or engine that needs vital energy for consumption and 
renewal, with the nervous system as a mediating sensation-motor of this 
body-machine––a boundary between mind and body.670 Using the body-
machine as a critical key to Nietzsche’s works, it becomes apparent that his 
critique of religious asceticism, neurasthenic debility and Cartesian 
rationality, was Nietzsche’s diagnostic of prevailing social pathologies. The 
dominance of the mind over the body was a European pathogen caused by 
Cartesian doubt of the body. Moore notes that ‘his late notebooks 
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obsessively list the pathologies he sees afflicting European civilization’671 
Metaphysics was to Nietzsche one such ‘pathology’: an epidemic of reason 
over vitality, a social sickness that drew the mind away from the reality of 
the body.  
Where Nietzsche becomes enraged about this pathological affliction, 
clouds illustrate his desire to cure European civilization of Cartesian doubt. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes: 
 
O sky above me, you pure, lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that 
there is no eternal reason-spider and spider’s web in you – 
that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to 
me a god’s table for divine dice and dicers!672 
 
Here clouds model Nietzsche’s repugnance toward the social sickness of 
metaphysics. Through clouds, he models his alternative conception of 
nature as ‘chaos––in the sense not of a lack of necessity, but of a lack of 
order, form, arrangement, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there 
are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms’.673 This conception of the world 
as chaos valorises chance and unpredictability, as a ‘nonpurposive 
becoming’ or a ‘game of chance and necessity’, according to Christopher 
Cox.674 Hence, through his work, Nietzsche re-identifies the body with an 
idea of nonpurposive becoming, which he here illustrates with clouds. 
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Clouds illustrate the indeterminate nature of the human body—its general 
flux of vital energy. Fascinatingly, F. D. Luke has highlighted the eroticised 
dimension of Nietzsche’s cloud imagery, arguing that ‘the images – height 
and depth, stair-climbing and cloud-like hovering’ illuminate Nietzsche’s 
sexual fantasies and ‘Dionysian euphoria’’. 675  Reading passages from 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it becomes clear how Luke came to 
identify erotic euphoria with Nietzsche’s cloud imagery: 
 
Alas, there are so many things between heaven and earth of which only the 
poets have let themselves dream! 
 And especially above heaven: for all gods are poets’ images, 
poets’ surreptitiousness! 
 Truly, it draws us ever upwards – that is, to cloudland: we set our 
motley puppets on the clouds and then call them gods and supermen. 
 And are they not light enough for these insubstantial seats? – all 
these gods and supermen. 
 Alas, how weary I am of the unattainable that is supposed to be 
reality. Alas, how I am weary of the poets!676 
 
The euphoric repudiation of metaphysics positions reason above the 
phenomenal world, in a space of desire. Where Zarathustra says ‘truly, it 
draws us ever upwards’, he qualifies surreptitious metaphysical images as 
fabrications or ‘motley puppets’ that are set upon the clouds. In the 
following enunciation, ‘they’ refers to the ‘light’ gods and supermen; the 
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‘insubstantial seats’ refers to the clouds of cloudland. This assimilates the 
lightness of the gods with the acclaimed insubstantiality of clouds. This 
carries with it the metaphoric association of the gods, supermen and the 
clouds. Nietzsche is thus here individuating distinct forms of the 
insubstantial metaphorical vehicle of clouds to ‘seat’ the tenor of ideals. 
Through this metaphorical interaction of clouds and ideals, and the language 
of appeal or desire, Nietzsche asserts the role of the body in the production 
of metaphysics. He seeks to undo both the stability of metaphysical ideals as 
world-form and of the body as subject-form. 
So the role that clouds play in Nietzsche’s writing is one of 
illustrating his desire to pull apart metaphysical ideas, in an effort to cure 
the sickness of European rationality and re-assert the indeterminate body. 
Nietzsche hence uses imagery that evokes cloud dispersal and cloud 
deformation processes to refer to the power of his writing. Zarathustra is 
lightning: ‘near the seat of the clouds: is it waiting, perhaps, for the first 
lightning?[…] Yes, Zarathustra[…] you are the lightning’.677 The thought of 
eternal return visits Zarathustra who is figured as a cloud ready to burst with 
lightning, ‘like cloud heavy with lightning and like swelling milk-udder – 
ready for myself’.678 Zarathustra is ‘a prophet and full of prophetic spirit[…] 
like a heavy cloud[…] pregnant with lightnings which affirm Yes! laugh 
Yes! ready for prophetic lightning-flashes’.679 Zarathustra is thus associated 
with meteorological phenomena symbolic of the dispersal of congested 
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cloud forms, through being constantly appositionally associated with clear 
air and cloudless skies––‘a prophet of the lightning and a heavy drop from 
the cloud [my emphasis]’.680 He arrives as a storm that dispels clouds: ‘the 
tension of my cloud has been too great: between laughter-peals of lightning 
I want to cast my hail showers’; ‘with the storm which is called ‘spirit’ I 
blew across your surging sea; I blew all clouds away [my emphasis]’.681  
For Nietzsche, the instability of clouds becomes a symbolic medium 
for illustrating the breaking or tearing of metaphysical ideals and for 
asserting the nonpurposive becoming of the human body. What this posits is 
a model of the body as creative and indeterminate, recapitulating the 
formula of agency in Ruskin. As Deleuze writes in his seminal work on 
Nietzsche, the main teachings of Zarathustra are ‘creation and joy’: 
 
Against the fettering of the will Nietzsche announces that willing liberates; 
against the suffering of the will Nietzsche announces that the will is joyful. 
Against the image of a will that dreams of having established values 
attributed to it Nietzsche announces that to will is to create new values.682 
 
The medicalization of meteorology is not just a backdrop to this 
Nietzschean ideal of a liberated will. Nietzsche modelled indeterminacy, 
creativity and joy, through his experiences reading meteorology, such that 
the ‘chaos’ of clouds became a method of curing or liberating the creativity 
of the will. While Deleuze sought to highlight the critical potential of this 
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idea, as tantamount to deconstructing the ‘established values’ of capital, this 
notion of indeterminacy or nonpurposive becoming is equally grounded in a 
dynamic of primitive accumulation. The very idea of elastic creativity or 
freedom carries the effect of delegitimizing and de-sublimating, through the 
erotophobic desire for “native” form. Where clouds are ideographic of 
freeze-dried flexibility, this paradigm does not represent the “fleeting” 
freedom of clouds as forms liberated from the very confines of form. 
Rather, it re-routes clouds through the deep conceptual history of the elastic 
“zero degree” that promises to bind the human body to processes of 






      Figure 10: Catherine Opie, Self-Portrait/Cutting (1993) 
 
Conclusion: Little White Fluffy Cloud 
 
But this difference between the instrument as a whole and its daily wear 
and tear, is much greater in a machine than in a tool, because the machine, 
being made from more durable material, has a longer life; because its 
employment, being regulated by strictly scientific laws, allows of greater 
economy in the wear and tear of its parts, and in the materials it consumes; 
and lastly, because its field of production is incomparably larger than that 
of the tool.683 
 
Marx––Volume One, Capital (1867) 
 
																																																								




But if our vision halts there, let the imagination pass beyond. It will be 
more likely to weary of forming ideas than will Nature of supplying the 
material for them.684 
 
  Pascal––Pensées (1670) cited in Damisch, A Theory of 
/Cloud/ (1972) 
 
In Catherine Opie’s Self-Portrait/Cutting (1993), she disfigures the 
normative family construct by lacerating her skin with an image of a “happy 
family” such as a child might draw, yet with two stick-figure women 
holding hands.685 For me, the physical vandalism of this work suspends its 
meaning within an extraordinary poetics of disfigurement, a terrible paragon 
of the perceived queer mutilation of heterosocial and heterosexual binaries. I 
have wondered about the role clouds have to play in this haemorrhaging of 
sense and meaning: above the stick-figure women, in the sky beside the 
house, a cartoon cloud escapes from Opie’s skin. This “little white fluffy 
cloud” has affected me profoundly over the course of this project, a talisman 
for what might be possible to say about clouds and an antecedent to 
accruing so much thinking on the conceptual history of an oft-unremarked 
“accessory.” Opie makes absolutely palpable the fact that clouds cannot be 
overlooked; that as much as clouds may figure in the doodle of a child, 
clouds are contiguous with the constantly disfiguring limits of discursive 
coherence. Clouds are part of the metaphorical register of Opie’s work, the 
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metaphorical register of the social, participating in the image-sum through 
which the subject is articulated into social form. 
This is not the same as saying that humans have an “intimate 
relationship with the skies.” Rather, the anthropic history of the skies is a 
select narrative of restriction, of delimiting whose histories and exactly 
whose future we are talking about when we speak through the “human 
relationship with the skies.” There are many concepts of clouds that have 
been dislodged from any hold they have on anthropomorphism, human 
representation or veracity in order to reify the concepts that best serve the 
ends of capital. Why do works like Opie’s not feature in the consecrated 
canon of clouds, I wonder, where Howard’s ‘On the Modifications of 
Clouds’ is read and circulated, repeated and quoted, as if its idiomatic 
function served anything more than to re-disclose the literary imaginary of 
colonialism? Maybe Opie’s bleeding cloud says more about the “human” 
relationship with the skies than does Howard’s essay. The mutilation of a 
body that assumes the inclusion of a “little white fluffy cloud” carries the 
deep impression of a conceptual history not about imagining, day-dreaming 
or drift, but about scarring, the mental and spiritual barrenness of finding 
oneself incapable of identification, of being dislodged from the presumptive 
bases of social subject-constitution. 
In my thinking, clouds are not mere accessories to the metaphorical 
register of the social. Rather, the twin physical processes of capital 
abstraction and accumulation are sustained through the continually 
extending scale of separation that clouds are mechanised to reinforce. Marx 




their labour, such that they become a waged worker.686 For writers such as 
Vora, Robinson and Singh, this process of primitive accumulation is better 
thought of as the racialised and gendered separation of life from its vital 
energy, such that life becomes a resource for the accumulation of wealth.687 
More expansively, drawn along the lines of race, gender, sex, sexuality, 
religion, ethnicity and age, global environmental politics have become an 
arena for this process, or what Nixon calls the ‘slow violence’ of primitive 
accumulation.688 Lisa Vanhala and Cecilie Hestbaek argue that the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), only 
agreed to adopt the 2013 Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) on Loss 
and Damage, following initial contention between the 77 developed states 
and NGO allies, because of a consensus to subscribe to the political rhetoric 
of ‘loss and damage’.689 The concept of loss and damage is, for Vanhala and 
Hestbaek, subliminally structuring global environmental justice politics into 
questions of liability and compensation. This economic logic has come to 
determine which technocratic policy solution or institutional prescription 
will ‘minimize’ environmental injustice, and whose environmental values 
can be over-looked as irrelevant or even harmful. 690  In this way, 
environmental justice law makes indigenous concepts for the ecology 
subservient to the modus operandi of accumulating wealth. 
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The idea of the anthropocene is a facet of this institutional paradigm 
shift in global justice politics. The anthropocene is what Marco Amiero and 
Massimo de Angelis term a ‘grand narrative’, which posits a global 
“movement” as if to combat the effects of global warming, but that leaves 
no space for the critique of structural injustice.691 These structural injustices 
are not merely the occlusion of one set of environmental values by another, 
as opined by Martinez-Alier, indicating the victory of the rich over the poor 
in global policy and law.692 The structural injustices elided from the Grand 
Narrative of Global Warming exist as motors of primitive accumulation. 
These motors run on the salient historical dualisms of nature/culture, 
white/nonwhite, reason/erotic, financially empowered/impoverished and 
heteronormative/queer.693 The transformation of life into a representational 
field for global environmental “justice” takes place through these historical 
dualisms. For this reason alone, it has become a priority to command the 
rhetorical paradigms of global environmental policy. Controlling emissions 
through conceptualisations of the ecology is not about finding a “happy 
ending” for the Grand Narrative of Global Warming. Commanding these 
concepts is about dominating the political sphere of environmental values. It 
is about inducing, proliferating and naturalising the social separatism that 
capital needs to function, through historical binaries allowing all living form 
to be continually opened to accommodating the extending logic of capital. 
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Even as the imagined “we” of global environmental discourse 
debates the future of the ecology, concepts are brought into play that 
promise not only to re-assert the industrial patterns of production and waste 
that have brought “us” to where “we” are, but that also carry the promise of 
expropriation. Humans have to become less and more than they already are, 
in service of the ecology. The representative effect of corporate and State 
policies regulating the hazardous regime of petrochemicals were subject to 
the critique of the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
leading environmental historians such as Chris Sellers, Jo Melling, Paul 
Erker, Nancy Langston and Stefania Barca to map global configurations of 
environmental injustice onto the production of ‘sacrificial zones or 
disposable bodies’.694 Environmental values work in the service of these 
regimes, abstracting bodies and entwining their corporeality into something 
far “greater” than them. The appraisal of an ecological form as a concept in 
which all cultures can have their “share”, creates a plenum of false 
collectivity captured in the iconicity of that form. The ecological icon is the 
conceptual medium through which the sacrifice of land and resources and 
the disposal of bodies are transformed into the promise of Green Salvation. 
Through the concept-being of the ecology the hazardous regime makes its 
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clandestine passage into treaties, law and trade agreements––the false 
promise for the future made in the service of the few. 
Maintaining this balance of care and corruption is a delicate act. In 
order to sustain both the inner workings of capitalist production and the 
antithetical anterior of ecological salvation, every structure of labour has to 
become spectacular, mysterious, or even divine. It would be too much to 
punch through the surface and see the dirt, sweat, squalor and smog of 
profit.695 Outsourcing is a way to hide the structures of labour, not only so 
that the assemblage can become morally sustainable, but so as to imbue the 
production with an aura of the ecologically pure, the desire of the 
environmentally divine. The spectacle of industrial cloud computing is a 
conceptual production fronted by this ecologically divine façade of 
desirability. Backstage, subaltern Bangladeshi workers are solving ‘one 
thousand CAPTCHA problems[...] for less than $1.50 a batch’. 696 
Meanwhile, thousands of migrant Filipino, Latino, Vietnamese, Korean and 
Cambodian migrants are working either on production lines in Silicon 
Valley or in domestic settings on the periphery of this technological haven, 
or even in prison, to build high tech industrial goods like semiconductor 
chips or PC boards.697  
These domestic migrant workers in America exemplify a 
sociotechnical twist in the deep history of economies of care, which can be 
critically contextualised through the work of Federici, Fortunati, Mariarosa 
																																																								
695 Bryan Walsh, ‘Your Data is Dirty: The Carbon Price of Cloud 
Computing’; Richard Maxwell and Toby Miller, ‘Our Dirty Love Affair 
with Technology’ (p.115–126). 
696 Hu, ‘Conclusion’, p.146. 
697 Naguib Pellow and Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, pp.73–82, p.166, 




Dalla Costa, Selma James and more recently Jennifer Morgan and Tadiar.698 
In particular, Federici has written extensively about the emergence of capital 
from feudal society as and through the mystification of housework, family 
life, child-raising, sexuality, male-female relations and the relation between 
production and reproduction. 699  For Tadiar, at each phase-shift of 
globalization, the way that this mystification has unfolded can be 
summarised through the ‘feminization of labour’, a rubric for the devalued 
lives and experiences of the population of the Philippines, who have gone 
unrecognised as the engine of global capitalism.700 The domestic migrant 
workers who are working to sustain the illusion of digitality emblematise 
this mystification of productive labour. Here it becomes apparent that 
domestic outsourcing goes hand-in-hand with the maximal flexibilisation of 
labour, which is equally useful for abstracting the anterior of capitalist 
production from the spectacle of capital’s moral ecology. Labour must be 
flexibilised beyond its status as work—casualised to the point of 
incomprehension. That is, domestic (or incarcerated) forms of casualisation 
derail the idea of the “worker.” The worker is instead a fluctuating unit of 
work, drifting across the boundary between low-waged and unwaged, 
affective labour, as if all contractual economies possessed their own 
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feminized margin of care—a band of “zero-hours” wrapped around the 
nucleus of the human zero degree. 
As an object of moral theorising, the cloud concept marks the 
erotophobic, transphobic, racist, homophobic desire for “little white fluffy” 
modes of being. An extremity of the sovereignty that rides on the history of 
settler-colonialism and imperialism, “little white fluffy clouds” have come 
to denote the severity of social death secured by the reproductive domestic 
labour of technological goods. As argued in chapter two, the ecological 
emblem serves the role of naturalising this separation of worker from life, 
into what Marx calls the ‘premature death’ of ‘veiled slavery’.701 This 
vandalism of life serves more than to create a space where the dirty labour 
of digital capitalism can be exported. It produces a backstage for sustaining 
the moral spectre of digital capitalism. Realising that this backstage is in 
part made up of migrants working in domestic settings shifts the intended 
temporal emphases of capital’s moral theorising about the future of the 
ecology. Rather than holding and nurturing “our” promise for the future of 
“our human planet,” the futurity that the morality of capital signals (which 
so often centres around the idea of “mother earth”) seeks instead to 
command productive and reproductive insurgency and counterinsurgency, 
which is, in the words of Weinbaum echoing Foucault, the ‘motor of 
history’. 702  As Hartman writes, ‘gestational language has been key to 
describing the world-making and world-breaking capacities of racial 
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slavery’, through the theft, regulation and destruction of the black woman’s 
body through domestic, reproductive and sexual labour. 703  That is, 
genealogy is entirely at stake in power, and hence to make life contingent 
upon a moral promise for an ecological future renders bodies as 
genealogically disposable, bringing into sharp focus the forms of 
sovereignty over genealogical and reproductive futurity that this “promise” 
for “our earth” really implies. 
No wonder then that disorientation or the “state of becoming” is a 
facet of late capitalism. With disorientation as the modus operandi of late 
capitalism, elasticity becomes feasibly a way of life––which is of course a 
form of social death, projecting the subject into a disenfranchised state of 
becoming. In this sense, dispossession is not a state of being “below,” but 
the state of being both “before” and “after”—the state of being the prior 
forming and the future of forming that has no hold on the present. This is 
what Rosenberg means when they write of the ‘two temporalities’ of 
primitive accumulation by dispossession.704 Normative futurity depends on 
the ancestralness of object-ontologies.705 It is this ancestralness that puts the 
present into a state of elastic warp. This elastic warp is the lived experience 
of abject-subjects, through whom normative security and the narrative of the 
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origin are secured. That is, abject-subjects are figurations of the post-
structural economic logic of the gerund, or ‘–ing’ words, where life is ‘all 
change, no future’.706  
Surplus populations who embody the surplus value of capital praxis 
are projected into the future as surplus through the speculative, risk-taking 
ventures that embolden the futurity of globalisation, neoliberalism, late 
capitalism or financialisation. Writing against this temporal dimension, of 
what she calls the ‘life-times’ of primitive accumulation, Tadiar has argued 
that land appropriation is key to the temporal dispossession of life, writing 
at length: 
 
[Surplus populations] constitute the virtual time zone of financial 
speculation within which new opportunities of value extraction and 
absorption of the risks of these maneuvers are located. If indeed financial 
speculation finds opportunities for value extraction in the virtual zone of 
time — after all, what are commodity futures and “securities” (risk 
bundles) if not temporal commodities — then surplus populations are 
nothing but an entire global zone of disposable life-times for speculative 
maneuvers.707 
 
This emphasis on time and land re-visits the critical rejoinder of primitive 
accumulation from the circumstance of globalisation and highlights a 
central axis of my argument. How the ecology is conceptualised through its 
regulation, control and legislation comes to figure who is thought to relate 
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to that ecology in the promise of its future. The regulation of land is an 
always-speculative agenda, carrying implications not for the promise “we” 
owe to “our mother earth” but for the degree of flexibility that can be 
imposed upon life in its futurity, through the speculative, deregulated, risk-
taking moves of capital. This means to imply that the flexibilisation of 
labour is about more than the transformation of life into a material for 
capital, but also about the conceptual (via legislative or regulatory means) 
abstraction of populations from a “material real” into the open space 
functioning as a virtual cushion for the speculative play of capital’s agenda 
for flexibility and elasticity. 
Clouds are being put to work in awesome ways to perform this 
elastic warp of the present. The language that presumes the sky in flux––as 
more fundamentally processual than static––marks the adjustment of the 
ecology toward the capitalist morality of flexibility, which has been firming 
up its strongholds since at least the 1970s. 708  At this time, a post-
structuralist ideology of forming and tearing began making its protracted 
drift into the economics of flexibilisation and elasticity. As chapter three has 
argued, this economic logic is secured by the primitivism of the cloud 
concept, as the “zero degree” of nature, which was coming into view during 
the same period in the work of writers such as Damisch and his circle of 
influence, inclusive of Krauss, Deleuze and Guattari. Conceived as the 
“zero degree” of nature, the cloud concept has no present––it is only the 
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before (the forming) and the after (the tearing) of properly regulated and 
ordered natural form.709 In line with the work that Rosenberg and Tadiar 
have done to refresh the critical rejoinder of primitive accumulation, I am 
drawn to conclude that this temporal-conceptual ontology of clouds 
emblematises the origin narrative object-ontologies of normative futurity 
currently guaranteeing the abstraction of life into a virtual domain of 
speculative capitalist praxis.710 
The Grand Narrative of Global Warming is made up of these object-
ontologies, which, as I sought to outline in chapter two, work to abstract the 
actual dimension of primitive accumulation from its referential bases and 
forge a new sign made up of ecological form and ecological concept-being. 
Clouds are ecological concepts where the history of thought that is 
emphasised in their concept-being has permitted their significatory bases to 
go un-remarked. This is part of a more generalised trend to utilise the 
ecology, so as to re-route the logic of capital through ecological form, as a 
mechanism of “purification.” No doubt there are multiple forms that 
participate in this concept-being of the environment, and clouds cannot be 
singular instances open to the critical approach of this thesis. I am sure that 
multiple conceptual histories of the ecology could be unfolded and that 
intertwined narratives would be revealed. Being so composed, that grand 
narrative is not simply a fantasy of moralising about “our” planet’s future. It 
is an origin narrative about the “earth’s” past which looks as if it springs 
from the world but that actually originates with capital. If the concept-being 
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of the ecology originates in social and political forms of appropriation and 
abjection as this work suggests, then the over-arching narrative of 
ecological catastrophe or crisis is only ever going to continue to accelerate 
land appropriation and human dispossession through what might be seen as 
the conceptual untethering of populations from any kind of linguistic or 
value-based relationship with the “earth.” 
The false collective “we” of this narrative can be located in the 
appellations of the global discourse of environmental justice politics, as 
identified by Dipesh Chakrabarty, and repealed by Amiero and de 
Angelis.711 Clouds, as conceptual forms, partake in this appellation and 
hence their significatory qualities affirm the histories of ostracism, slavery, 
abjection, expropriation, abstraction and flexibilisation that I have written at 
length to suggest these forms covertly imply. The “we” that endorses these 
ideas is the very same “we” whose subscription to the environmentalism of 
the global North prescribes a dead-end state of emergency to the global 
South. The idea of clouds as somehow “defying” objecthood plays into the 
hands of this interpellation of populations into the social death of virtuality. 
That is, the ideology of clouds as forming forms works to establish a dance 
between consecrated ontology and imagined “object.” Movement or 
becoming is inscribed in the conceptual history of clouds. The extended 
scale of separation that clouds facilitate is hence grounded in the way these 
forms appear to both give form and take form in dialogue with reciprocally 
emergent ecological concepts. How inventive to affix ideas to forms whilst 
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simultaneously lauding those forms as form-as-becoming, or as an infinite 
aspect of the visual field of the natural world. The forming form will give 
form to the idea it appears to constitute, in a sort of natural cycle of 
conceptual refreshment. This ecological spectacle of epistemic renewal 
continues to drive the undergirding structures of appropriation, abstraction 
and accumulation. When the concept of clouds is continuously “brought-
into-being,” with each forming form, so too is a structure of that which 
emerges from capital. Lauding an ecological form as an escape from 
material wealth and its destitute bases does not cease to bring these things 
into being, but rather drives their manifestation forwards through the 
linguistic operations of that ecological form. 
The “fleeting” quality of clouds equally implies the centrality of the 
conceptual yardstick of tearing, to this cycle of epistemic renewal. Tearing 
is the counterpart to forming––though it is disclosed in clouds as if 
conceptually inseparable. Les Beldo eloquently identifies the role that 
tearing has to play in the capitalist logic of primitive accumulation, where 
he states that ecological ‘life is counted upon to exceed’.712 The ecology is 
counted upon to rupture its conceptual coherence, to rip through its 
codification. Writing about hog and chicken farming, Beldo responds to the 
idea that human labour is congealed in the broiler chicken as genetic 
codification by suggesting that the bird is neither defined by nor limited by 
its inarguable role as a ‘highly efficient machine’ for converting grain into 
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protein. 713  The potentially disruptive is instead indispensible to the 
predictable abstraction of energy from the life of the bird. In this mode of 
thinking, nature comes to the fore as a machine, built as a set of concepts 
that are counted upon to shift away from the prior disclosure of their 
concept-being, counted upon to exceed codification in a predictive and 
productive way. 
This way of understanding accumulation through dispossession 
reminds me of the passage where Marx suggests that the instruments of 
capital confer value upon any labour process, whilst losing instrumental 
worth through the daily wear and tear of use.714 Instruments exist on a scale 
of value-conferral, extending from the tool to the machine: a concatenation 
of maximal durability with a relatively large field of production. The 
deployment of clouds as a machine for sustaining the global morality of 
capital extends this scale to an “infinite” aspect. Part of the chaotic 
instability of clouds, as orgiastic spaces of break and rip, is the implied 
inability to conceptualise cloud forms, the inability to speak, to contain or 
quantify through description. While chapter two addressed the cloud 
concept as machine, chapter one and three both dealt with the idea of clouds 
as tearing, or as chaotic, unstable, unpredictable forms. Conceived as the 
rip-in-formation, or as the “zero degree” of forming, a fundamental function 
of the cloud concept is to rupture at its centre. Clouds are predicted to wear 
and tear to the point of impoverishing form of its being. The irony of this 
																																																								
713 Beldo, ‘Metabolic Labor: Broiler Chickens and the Exploitation of 
Vitality’. Cf. William Boyd, ‘Making Meat: Science, Technology, and 
American Poultry Production’, Technology and Culture 42:4 (2001) 631–64 
(p.634). 




auto-deconstructing concept-being is the insurance that the concept will be 
renewed. Destruction is codified as a quality of conceptual coming-into-
being. The working concept of clouds hence certifies that these forms 
infinitely renew the wear and tear that they confer on the spectacle of 
labour. The acclaimed infinity of clouds fashions these ecological concepts 
into a concatenation of tearing and forming, through which labour passes in 
order to abstract the spectacle from all of the dirt and all of the 
disfigurement. 
This thesis has attempted to articulate how a seemingly “natural” 
concept can be complicit in the disfigurement of humans into disembodied 
status via processes of capital accumulation by dispossession.715 I have 
sought to gather together the historical allusions that are condensed in the 
working concept of clouds. This is a concept that is brought into play by the 
industry leaders of cloud computing. From here, I have argued that the 
cloud concept is a paradigm that extends outwards into the present, across 
art, media theory and some aspects of eco-criticism. The urgency of 
remarking upon this paradigmatic status of clouds becomes clear upon 
moving away from the “given” concept of clouds and interrogating the 
discontinuous allusions that the cloud concept holds in its history. There 
have been moments in this thesis that have suggested associations between 
clouds and forms of social ostracism. I have equally struck upon a 
relationship between clouds and the idea of a “zero degree,” which has been 
historically productive within capital. Even the very way that the 
conceptuality of clouds operates has brought to light a remarkably troubling 
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parallel between clouds as “natural concepts” and the naturalisation of 
social separatism. For me, the most important facet of this work is 
encapsulated by Opie’s portrait with which I opened this conclusion. I hope 
this thesis has challenged its reader to think differently about clouds as 
metaphors that mediate the social. This should provoke a questioning repose 
toward what appears to be “natural” in the conceptuality of a “natural 
phenomenon.” How are we conceptually mapping the ecology in our 
promises for the future? Whose future does that promise really centre upon? 
As a broader implication of this work, I hope to have challenged my reader 
to question what histories of thought might reside beneath the surface of 
other ecological forms. This work hopes to have excited readers to approach 
the discourse of global environmental politics from a position of questioning 
whose values are predominant in ecological thought, and why those values 
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